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Abstract
Despite repeated commitments to promote gender equality in the United Na-
tions and elsewhere, women are still not as favoured as men in many dimensions,
including the labour market. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the changing
female relative labour market outcomes. This thesis is made up of three empirical
studies. The first empirical study describes and analyses the impact on the inter-
national gender wage differentials, measured at the mean, of globalisation and the
development of social openness, and how such impact has been changing over time
across different income and development levels and across different cultural back-
grounds. The objective of the second empirical study is to understand the variation
in the gender differential in employment in Japan, and investigate the relationship
between such variation and the development of technology. The third empirical
study determines the evolution of the UK gender gap at the top end of the wage
distribution in relation to different labour market sectors, occupations, and different
cohort groups, both within cohorts over their work lives, and across cohorts.
The results indicate that the effect on gender wage differentials of the develop-
ment of the economy and technology vary across different regions and skill levels
of workers. Having higher human capital accumulation or working in higher level
jobs is not always positively associated with good female labour market outcomes.
More stringent policy enforcement benefits the majority of women in terms of wages,
but such effects are found to be relatively weak for the women at the top decile of
the female wage distribution and more recent generations. Societal constraints do
not only limit female progress in the labour market but also the positive impact of
female politicians.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Aims and Objectives
Gender differences in earnings, employment, career progression and social sta-
tus have been much debated issues for several decades. Despite repeated commit-
ments to promote gender equality in the United Nations and elsewhere, women
are still not as favoured as men in many dimensions, including the labour mar-
ket. According to the World Economic Forum’s ‘The Global Gender Gap Report
2013’1 (2013), the gender gaps in health outcomes and in educational attainment
have been almost closed in the 136 countries considered in 2013, though the gaps
in economic participation and in political empowerment have remained significantly
large. In terms of the gender pay gap, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005)
suggest that international raw gender wage differentials have declined significantly
from about 65% in the 1960s to 30% in the 1990s over the 60 countries they con-
sider. As for more recent evidence, the International Trade Union Confederation
(2008, 2012) indicates that the global average gender gap in pay in 2008 was 16.5%2
across a sample of 62 countries, although it increased to 18.4% in their more recent
2012 report covering 43 countries, while OECD (2012) reports a gender differential
of 17.3% in full-time hourly wages in 2011 over OECD countries. Investigating the
changes in the gap between male and female pay before and after the 2008 financial
crisis, the ILO (2013), in accordance with the OECD’s (2012) findings, discovered a
1 The gender gap index designed in this report is to “measure gender-based gaps in access to resources
and opportunities in individual countries rather than the actual levels of the available resources
and opportunities in those countries.....In other words, the Index is constructed to rank countries
on their gender gaps not on their development level”(World Economic Forum, 2013, p.3).
2 The result excluded Bahrain, where an inverse pay gap of 40% is shown, which could be explained
partly by a relatively high proportion of qualified women in the labour market in view of very low
female employment rates. If the figure for Bahrain is included, the world average gap would be
15.6%.
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downward trend over the crisis years in most countries. The ILO (2013) additionally
suggests that the causes of this phenomenon are not all due to the improvement of
female labour market outcomes; rather some are from the deteriorating situation of
male outcomes3.
The sizes of the observed gender wage gaps from the published reports have been
found to vary significantly across countries, which are not only due to the differences
in the cultural and economical background but also the institutional factors, such
as the nationally agreed wage settings, collective bargaining power and unionization
(International Trade Union Confederation, 2012). One of the similar conclusions
most of these reports have reached is that Asian women seem to face greater difficulty
in being rewarded as well as men in the labour market. Japan and South Korea,
despite both countries being in developed and high income categories, have often
been shown to have the poorest gender parity compared to countries over all the
world (International Trade Union Confederation, 2008, 2012; OECD, 2012; World
Economic Forum, 2013). Statistics of the pay differentials between men and women
have been found to vary depending on the different points in the wage distribution
considered and whether part-timers are included in the comparison or only full-time
workers are considered. For instance, the average wage gap in Hungary has been
found to be one of the lowest in OECD countries, yet the gap at the 80th percentile
of the wage distribution is relatively large compared to other countries (OECD,
2012). In Norway, men and women are paid similarly in part-time employment,
but full-time men are paid considerably more than their female counterparts. The
overall gender wage gap is found to be higher than that for full-time workers, due
3 In Estonia, for instance, the narrowing gender pay gap was due largely to the fact that men were
more concentrated in sectors that were hardest hit by the crisis together with fewer working hours.
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to a greater proportion of female part-time workers who are paid considerably lower
than full-time workers (ILO, 2013).
The motivations behind the research presented in this thesis, which investigates
the changing female relative labour market outcomes, derive from both economic
and sociological fields. First of all, this research is motivated by the variations
of female labour market outcomes across countries with different social norms, at
different income levels, and at different stages of development over time. Second,
motivation is given by the important factors which explain these variations. The
changes in female relative outcomes could be driven by the integration of the world
economy via the progressive globalisation of trade and the development of technol-
ogy, which inevitably lead to changes in economic structure of countries and changes
in the relative demand for workers with different levels of skill. The changes in fe-
male relative outcomes could additionally be affected by the differentials in human
capital accumulation; increasing investment in formal education is extensively sug-
gested as having positive impacts on narrowing gender inequality in labour market
outcomes, however, the loss of work experience as a result of childbirth and family
responsibilities demonstrates the negative implications.
Female allocation to different occupations, sectors, and labour market segments
could be strongly associated with their labour market outcomes; previous research
has suggested that the persistent gender pay gap can be largely attributed to a
greater share of women attached to lower waged, lower status jobs (Bayard et al.,
2003; Manning, 2006; Haveman and Beresford, 2012). Moreover, gender differen-
tials in labour market outcomes are likely derived from institutional and societal
constraints; generous family friendly policies and sufficient supplies for child care
would make more women be able to remain attached to their career and lead to a
13
narrowing gender inequality in employment and wages. Social convention would not
only reflect women’s social status but also influence their decision on educational
investment, on the kind of jobs to apply for, on being work or family oriented, etc
(Vella, 1993, 1994; Ferna´ndez, 2011; Haveman and Beresford, 2012). The effect
of time would be another important element for the shifting female relative labour
market outcomes. The development of the economy and technology, the spread of
information, the enactment of regulations, and the changes in social norms all re-
quire time to see their impact on the real world. In addition, women from different
generations are likely to have very different performances in the labour market due
to the changing work environment, the differences in human capital investment, and
their attitude toward career and family.
The first aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact on female labour market
outcomes of globalisation, the spread of technology, the development of economies,
and of different social norms and cultural backgrounds. Next, the analysis in this
thesis focuses on women at different points in the distributions of occupation and
wages.
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) describes and analyses using meta-analysis
techniques how international gender wage differentials are associated with globali-
sation and development of social openness, and how these have been changing over
time across a broad range of countries at different income and development levels
and with different cultural backgrounds. Due to the unique social norms and labour
market structure, gender wage inequality in Japan has been the highest among devel-
oped countries (Blau and Kahn, 2003; Miyoshi, 2007). The objective of the second
empirical study (Chapter 3) is to understand how the Japanese gender employment
differential has been changing over time, to determine what role is played by non-
14
regular employment and to examine how much of the variation can be explained by
the development of technology.
Finally, although the closing of the average gender pay gap is an ongoing phe-
nomenon in developed countries, it has been discovered that the gap at the top end
of the wage distribution is significantly larger than that at the lower end of the
distribution in many European countries. The third empirical study (Chapter 4)
thus examines how the UK gender gap at the top end of the wage distribution has
evolved with respect to different labour market sectors, occupations, and different
cohort groups, both within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts.
1.2 Motivation behind the Research Questions
The majority of research into female relative labour market outcomes has
focused on investigating female workers’ characteristics relative to those of men.
More recently, these have been found to be limited in explaining the gender gap. The
motivation behind the research in this thesis is to demonstrate the important factors
that impact upon relative female labour market outcomes through both economic
and sociological channels. In the economic field, the impact of globalisation via
trade together with the spread of technology and the shifting economic structure on
the changing demand for different skilled workers will be discussed. In sociological
terms, the effect of different social norms and cultural backgrounds in relation to
female human capital accumulation and women’s performance in the labour market
will also be considered.
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1.2.1 Globalisation and Technology
The empirical research into the relationship between trade liberalisation and
wage inequality has found it difficult to reach a clear cut conclusion. According
to the Heckscher−Ohlin (H−O) and the Stolper−Samuelson (SS) theorems, the
expansion of trade in developing economies where unskilled workers are abundant
would reduce the within-country wage inequality by raising the relative demand
and prices for the unskilled workers, while the opposite story would be found for
advanced economies as their high skilled workers are relatively abundant (Stolper
and Samuelson, 1941; IMF, 2007). However, the implications of both the theorems
have been found difficult to verify, especially for the case of middle income countries
(Davis, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Xu, 2003; Milanovic, 2005). These coun-
tries lose their comparative advantage of unskilled labour abundance compared to
low income countries, and their skill-intensive sectors would also be contracted by
imports from high income countries, both leading to changes in their labour market
structure which possibly result in a rising wage inequality (Wood, 1997).
The development of technology has also led to a change in the relative demand for
different skilled workers. Trade liberalisation spread advanced technology from the
developed to the developing economies, which facilitates the development of skilled
labour in both economies. This increases the relative demand biased towards skilled
workers internationally (skill-biased technical change), and decreases the demand
and wages for the unskilled, leading to a higher wage inequality (Robbins, 1996,
2003; Berman and Machin, 2000, 2004; Acemoglu, 2003; Thoenig and Verdier, 2003;
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2007; Conte and Vivarelli, 2007). Therefore, if it is
the case that the majority of women are unskilled, international trade may narrow
the gender wage gap in countries with higher relative demand for unskilled workers
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but widen the gap in countries with higher relative demand for the skilled.
However, the hypothesis of skill-biased technical change does not seem to be able
to explain the changing demand for different skilled workers in developed countries
(Autor et al. (ALM hereafter), 2003; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2006, 2010; Spitz-
Oener, 2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; Lindley, 2011). A more nuanced concept
of tasked-biased technical change is hence developed, where technology polarises
employment into high paid and low paid jobs, as the middle paid jobs are usually
routine tasks and more easily substituted by computers, resulting in a rising wage
inequality (ibid). The implications of tasked-biased technical change on gender wage
inequality is less clear, as although there is a large proportion of women who have
been hired in the middle level clerical jobs, there is also a great number of men
working in the middle level production jobs. If it is the case that, compared to
men, there is a higher share of women engaged in relatively supporting tasks, then
a higher gender wage differential may be the outcome. In addition to these factors,
the shift of economic structures towards the service sectors also has a great impact
on the requirements from the labour force, which is found to benefit female workers
more than male workers (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Murphy and Welch, 1993).
All the arguments above have suggested that, apart from the impact of globali-
sation and technical change, female labour market outcomes are strongly subject to
their human capital accumulation and the jobs in which they work. Further moti-
vations for this research in relation to these points will be discussed in the following
subsections.
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1.2.2 Human Capital Accumulation and Labour Market Segmentation
Several thoughts have been put forward by Human Capital Theory (e.g. Min-
cer, 1958; Becker, 1964) on why women do not do as well as men in the labour
market: women hold lower necessary educational credentials than men; women have
different job preferences than men; and women have lower work experience accu-
mulation than men. Early development of this theory concentrated on the years of
schooling or on the accomplishment of a degree, yet as it has been found in many
countries that the share of higher-educated women has reached the same or sur-
passed that of men. Besides, it has also been noted that a more highly educated
female workforce does not necessarily lead to a narrower pay gap (Albrecht et al.,
2003; Kee, 2006; International Trade Union Confederation, 2008; Baro´n and Cobb-
Clark, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010). Albrecht et al. (2003), Kee (2006), and Baro´n
and Cobb-Clark (2010) discover that educational differences do not have an impact
on the gender differential at the top end of the wage distribution. Therefore, more
recent research has then argued that the returns to education are more dependent
on the subject/fields that the individual has studied, and that women are less likely
to enrol in the fields which require mathematical skills which then pushes them away
from higher paid, higher status jobs (Carrell et al., 2010; Bertrand et al., 2010).
As for job preferences, some argue that men would be more likely to pursue a
job with the characteristics of higher income, job security, and better opportunities
of advancement (Rowe and Snizek, 1995; Tolbert and Moen, 1998; Haveman and
Beresford, 2012). While for women, as the majority are likely to work in lower
positions than men even within the same occupation, they would then care more
about a sense of accomplishment and shorter working hours (Kanter, 1977; Rowe and
Snizek, 1995; Tolbert and Moen, 1998; Haveman and Beresford, 2012). Furthermore,
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women are inclined to have less of the work experience required to move up to higher
job positions than men as they are more likely to face inevitable interruption in their
careers due to family responsibilities such as bearing and raising children (Black et
al., 2008; Haveman and Beresford, 2012).
In terms of labour market segmentation, according to Piore’s (1973) dual labour
market theory, the market can be divided into a primary labour market and a
subordinate labour market. The primary labour market provides so-called better
jobs, which gives more on-the-job training, more opportunity of promotion, higher
wages, and lower turnover rates, with a stable structure. On the other hand, a
subordinate labour market provides an unfavourable environment for workers with
a lack of promotion opportunities, lower wages and higher turnover rates. Piore
(1973) believes the amount of wages depends on which market workers are in, and
the markets are based on the different industrial structures.
The implications of this theory suggest a higher gender wage differential if more
women are engaged in the subordinate labour market, which is very likely the case,
as there is a vast amount of women in part-time employment in order to balance
their work and family life. Moreover, a wider gender wage gap would be found
if the majority of women are segregated into lower skilled jobs which are thought
more suitable (e.g. cleaning, caring, clerical), while a large proportion of men are
in the higher level jobs (e.g. professional, engineers, managers). This is referred to
as horizontal occupational segregation and usually comes with gender stereotypes
(Becker, 1971). On the other hand, occupational segregation can be vertically, which
refers to the hierarchy within occupations. That is, women are situated at lower
positions than men within the same job, and watch their male counterparts surpass
them on the way to the top positions (Charles, 2003). It usually comes with the
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term ‘glass ceiling’, which describes the phenomenon whereby women face a barrier
to further progression in their career once they have reached a certain level.
1.2.3 Institutional and Cultural Constraints
Many studies have found that the enactment of gender-specific policies will
have positive implications on female relative labour market outcomes (Kee, 2006;
Manning, 2006; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010; World Economic Forum, 2013). The
World Economic Forum (2013) suggests that generous gender policies and day care
provision is one of the most important reasons for the significantly better female
labour market outcomes together with a relatively higher birth rate in the Nordic
countries compared to other OECD countries. Yet generous policies may have a
negative effect on the outcomes if women are penalised by the longer period out of
labour force, and which is more harmful for top ranking women than those in the
lower hierarchy Gupta et al. (2006).
In addition, the social norms and the cultural background of a country would
have strong impacts on female decision making in both the labour market and their
life. As mentioned above, the subject/field that individuals study may play an
important role in explaining the persistent gender pay differentials. Some research
suggests that women tend not to study mathematics and science not because they are
unable to do so, but rather because of the influence of stereotypes which make them
believe that they will not perform well in such fields (Corell, 2001, 2004; Nguyen
and Ryan, 2008). Some evidence also suggests that women’s educational attain-
ment is susceptible to religious preferences (Dollar and Gatti, 1999), and traditional
conventions in society (Becker, 1985; Tachibanaki, 2010).
Cultural differences also help explain the relatively lower work experience that
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women accumulate than men. With the typical thought that men are the bread-
winners while women take care of the home and children, high-achieving women are
more likely to leave higher managerial jobs for lower status jobs with greater flexibil-
ity, lower responsibility, and shorter working hours to find a balance between their
work and family (Haveman and Beresford, 2012). This leads to their lower accumu-
lation of experience and less opportunity to be promoted to higher level positions
once they would like to fully return to the labour market.
1.3 Structure and Content of the Thesis
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are empirically based research on three separate issues
associated with the aims and objectives and motivations discussed above. Chapter
5 will conclude the thesis by giving a summary of the results, and discussing their
implications, as well as providing suggestions for further analysis.
1.3.1 Chapter 2
The analysis in Chapter 2 examines the changes in the unexplained portion of
the gender wage gap across a broad range of countries, and investigates how much of
the variation can be explained by trade globalisation and cultural differences. The
motivation behind this analysis is firstly driven by the fact that recent research has
found limitations in the widely used variables included in explaining the persistent
pay gap between men and women. Thus, the first aim of this chapter is to discuss
the explanatory power of a number of factors typically considered in the estimation
of gender wage gaps, such as human capital accumulation, type of data used, method
of estimation, measures of wage, and other variables in relation to workers’ charac-
teristics. This research is further motivated by the fact that it has been found that
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the changing economic structure as well as trade competition have a positive impact
on gender equality in the labour market (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Murphy and Welch,
1993; Garrett, 2001; Oostendorp, 2009; Bussmann, 2009) though it may reach the
opposite result if increasing female employment is concentrated in lower status jobs
(Blau and Kahn, 2003; Menon and Rodger, 2009). The chapter investigates how
trade openness helps to explain the variation in the gender wage residual across
countries at different income levels and development status. The effects of trade
throughout different sectors are also considered. Additional motivation is provided
by the impact of social norms, in particular, whether a higher share of female politi-
cians is associated with lower gender differentials, and how this effect is changing in
countries with different social norms.
The analysis in this chapter uses meta-regression analysis (MRA) with a set of
constructed meta-data in order to reveal the variations in estimated gender wage
differentials across different empirical papers, countries, and over time. The chap-
ter helps to inform whether international trade and cultural differences have any
significant explanatory power on the wage residual.
1.3.2 Chapter 3
Chapter 3 explores the changes in Japanese regular/non-regular employment
between male and female workers and the effect of technical development on the
changes in the distribution of employment over time. The first motivation behind
this analysis is driven by the fact that women seem to face more difficulties in
the Japanese labour market than in other developed countries owing to the unique
labour market structure and social conventions. Over the course of the long term
recession in Japan, together with the advocacy of lifetime employment, a dual labour
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force, with the shrinking of regular employment (primary), and the expansion of
non-regular employment (subordinate), has been found to be more pronounced in
Japan since the 1990s. Without appropriate government policy and the protection
of trades unions, the rights of non-regular employees have been largely ignored,
and their wages are considerably lower than the wages of regular employees. This
labour market dualism increases the income and social security gap between male
and female workers, as women dominate non-regular employment.
The existence of job polarisation alongside rising wage inequality as a conse-
quence of the development of technology found in Western economies has addition-
ally motivated this research. A hypothesis of task biased technical change (TBTC)
proposed by Autor et al. (ALM) (2003) argues that technology has replaced the
routine tasks which are situated in the middle of the wage and skill distributions,
and has been associated with an increase in relative demand for well-paid skilled
jobs and also for low-paid least skilled jobs. If this hypothesis also holds true in
the case of Japan, it may push women into a worse situation in the labour market,
as the majority of women are employed in routine clerical jobs, given the strong
stereotypes in the society. The aim of this chapter is to understand how regular and
non-regular employment has been changing differently for male and female work-
ers over time, and to discover the within industry relationship between workers’
characteristics changes and technical change.
The analysis uses the Japanese Employment Status Survey and EU KLEMS data
in order to investigate the changes in Japanese regular/non-regular employment be-
tween male and female workers associated with the technical development over time.
Following the ALM model, decomposition and regression methods are employed to
analyse the within and between industry relationship between technical change and
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Japanese workers’ characteristics changes on the one hand, and the changes in the
gender regular/non-regular employment gap on the other.
1.3.3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 investigates how female relative pay at the top end of the pay
distribution in Britain has evolved with respect to different labour market sectors,
occupations, and different cohort groups, both within cohorts over their lifetime,
and across cohorts. The analysis in this chapter is firstly motivated by the fact that
the existence of a glass ceiling has been well discussed in empirical research, yet the
information on where the glass ceiling locates and how it has been changing over
time has remained unclear. Further motivation is provided by the large amount
of evidence that the gender differential at mean wages for younger birth cohorts is
lower than for older cohorts, but there is a lack of information on the link between
the cohort effect and the gender gap at other points of the wage distribution. The
analysis is also motivated by the fact that women may not face only one glass
ceiling over the entire wage distribution or in managerial positions, but multiple
glass ceilings at different job levels as well as different and shifting patterns across
the public and the private sectors. Therefore, the main idea of this chapter is to
estimate how female relative pay in the top decile of the UK wage distribution
has varied over time in relation to different labour market sectors, occupations,
and cohort groups. It will also investigate how female workers’ characteristics are
associated with the changes in the location of the glass ceilings.
This analysis draws upon two data sources: the New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) is used to implement cohort analysis to ex-
plore the shifting patterns of the glass ceiling in different sectors and occupations
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for different cohort groups by individual level; the Labour Force Surveys serve as
a supplement with the demographic data for the multivariate analysis at occupa-
tional levels. A cohort analysis is conducted to study the behaviour of lifecycle
earnings/glass ceilings profiles, to find out whether the changing pattern of female
relative pay at the 90th percentile of wage distribution is similar to the pattern at
the average. Regression at both individual and occupational levels helps discover
the effect of female worker’s characteristics, the place she works, the occupation she
is in, and the qualification she holds on the top female relative pay.
1.4 Conclusion
The underlying theme of the thesis is that women’s position in the labour
market is not being fully captured by the analyses that focus solely on changes
in average wages. Therefore, this thesis explores the variation of remaining unex-
plained differences in average wages (Chapter 2), of employment and job quality
(regular/non-regular) (Chapter 3), and at other points in the wage distribution. In
this way, it is expected to obtain a fuller description of women’s position in the
labour market and how this has changed over time. The final chapter of thesis will
then conclude by summing up the findings and discussing the implications.
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2 The Impact of Trade and Culture on the
International Gender Wage Gap
Summary
• Using meta regression analysis (MRA) with a set of constructed meta-data,
this chapter is interested in the variations of the gender wage differential in
terms of the unexplained portion (gender ‘discrimination’) across different em-
pirical studies, a broad range of countries, and over the period of 1963 to 2007.
• The effects of trade globalisation and cultural differences on gender ‘discrim-
ination’ are also examined across different income levels and development re-
gions.
• The findings of this chapter indicate that the overall effects of both trade and
female politician are associated with lower gender ‘discrimination’, however,
different patterns are observed across different economies and regions.
• Trade openness together with the diffusion of technology reduces the gender
wage gap for countries in the higher and the bottom income categories, but
increases the gap in lower-middle groups, with some weak evidence that the
trade effect is stronger in low income, and developing countries.
• Female politicians seem to find more difficulty to help women to improve their
work environment in countries with strong social conventions towards gender
roles.
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2.1 Introduction
Female relative labour market outcomes have been extensively investigated
over the past decades. Of these, the Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973;
Oaxaca 1973) is one of the methods applied the most, which divides the gender
wage differential into an “explained” and an “unexplained” portion. The former
accounts for the part of the gender differential due to productivity characteristics
(the endowments effect), the latter captures the potential effects of any differences
in unobserved factors between men and women. In addition, the unexplained part
of the differential may not be due to differences in characteristics between men and
women at all, but be due to gender wage discrimination (as is often referred to
as the discrimination component. The cumulative evidence of the empirical liter-
ature suggests that the magnitude of the unexplained portion of the gender gap
(the ‘discrimination’) is strongly subject to the setting of the wage estimating mod-
els, such as the inclusion of workers’ productivity characteristics, the type of data
used, or the econometric approaches (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998; Weichselbaumer and
Winter-Ebmer, 2003, 2005). However, the explanatory power of these factors has
been found to be limited for the recent studies (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer,
2003, 2005).
Therefore, this chapter aims to determine and quantify the important factors
which cause the constant residual gap, and can explain the variation of gender ‘dis-
crimination’ across a broad range of countries in both economic and sociological
fields. The analysis in this chapter will focus on demonstrating the effects of trade
globalisation, the changing economic structure, cultural difference, and the demo-
cratic system on the changes in the unexplained gender wage gap, rather than the
female personal development of their working skills.
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In terms of trade liberalisation, the standard trade theory, the Heckscher−Ohlin
(H−O) model together with the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem, proposes that
an increase in trade openness in a developing country where unskilled labour is
abundant will increase the relative demand and wage for unskilled workers and
result in a lower within-country income inequality (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941;
IMF, 2007). However, the empirical research has found conflicting evidence against
these theorems in particular for the middle income countries (Davis, 1996; Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996; Xu, 2003; Milanovic, 2005), as these countries may be seen as
unskilled intensive in the view of developed countries, but would be relatively skill
intensive compared to lower income countries. Moreover, the use of technology
would be widespread from developed to developing economies via the expansion of
trade, which improves the skills in the developing economies to a more advanced
level and hence lead to the relative demand for workers biased toward the skilled
internationally, resulting in a decrease in demand and prices for unskilled workers
and a rising wage inequality. Thus, trade liberalisation together with the diffusion
of technology may widen the gender pay gap in countries where the majority of
women are relatively lower skilled, which is very likely the case in the developing
economies.
As for theories of gender discrimination coupled with trade globalisation, con-
flicting theories have been proposed. Becker’s (1971) theory argues that increased
industrial competitiveness from international trade will reduce wage discrimination
in the long run. Firms in a competitive market will be under pressure to cut costs,
including costs associated with discrimination. On the contrary, the other school
of thought is that an increase in trade competition may reduce discrimination in
certain groups of industries but raise it in others. It may weaken women’s bargain-
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ing power if they are segregated into lower waged or lower status jobs (Darity and
Williams, 1985; Williams, 1987).
Women could benefit from an increase in international trade at both macro and
micro levels. At the macro level, international trade is not only an important source
of income for governments but also compels them to invest in public goods such
as infrastructure, education, and health services to increase their competitiveness
in the global market. This would reduce the gender differential of human capital
investment, and then narrow the gender wage gap (Garrett, 2001; Oostendorp, 2009;
Bussmann, 2009). As for the micro level, women could benefit from the boost of
export industries with more job opportunities. An increase in female labour force
participation could lead to a narrowed gender wage gap (Bussmann, 2009). However,
it may lead to the opposite outcome if the increased employment for women is mainly
in low paid and low skilled jobs (Blau and Kahn, 2003; Menon and Rodger, 2009).
Drawing upon a broader socio-economic analysis, the changing effects of social
norms and cultural differences will also be considered. These are regarded as impor-
tant factors because they would show the perceptions of appropriate gender roles in
societies, which are closely related to the gender division of labour. Societal conven-
tion may affect female decisions in human capital investment, their attitude towards
career and family commitments, with some women maybe self-selecting into lower
status jobs for child-bearing or household responsibilities in order to meet social
expectations (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Ferna´ndez, 2007, 2008, 2011; Haveman and
Beresford, 2012).
Most empirical research has focused on how much the degree of gender discrim-
ination has changed in the labour market, rather than attempt to explain why it
has changed. In order to investigate how the magnitude of the gender wage gap is
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subject to the measure of wages utilised, the use of different estimation techniques,
and the inclusion or exclusion of specific explanatory variables, this chapter adopts
the meta-analysis approach to explain the variations in the reported gap from one
study to the next across countries. This approach can also help explore how much
of the variation in the gender differential can be explained by trade globalisation
and cultural differences. Unlike recent studies into the effect of trade on gender gaps
that have only focussed on the manufacturing sector, such effects across different
sectors will be taken into account, with a concern that many economies have shifted
away from agriculture and toward manufacturing and service sectors. Moreover, the
interactive effects between international trade/culture and different economies will
also be investigated.
The next section of the chapter presents the existing empirical findings relating
to the impact of trade globalisation and cultural differences on the gender wage gap.
Section 2.3 explains the conceptual framework of the meta-analysis and the con-
struction of the meta-data, Section 2.4 describes the methodology used to estimate
the effects of trade and culture on the gender gap. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 present the
results by using meta-analysis regression techniques to examine how trade global-
isation and cultural differences can impact on the gender wage gap, and whether
such effects act differently across countries with different social norms, at different
income levels, and at different stages of development. The final section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 The Effect of Trade Globalisation on Gender Wage Inequality
According to the IMF (2007), world trade in real terms has risen five fold from
1980 to 2005, and its share of world GDP has increased by almost 20 percent to 55
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percent. Figure 2.1 provides more information on the changes in trade globalisation
between 1965 and 2008 for 190 countries by stage of development, measured as the
trade share of GDP in constant 2000 US dollars4. It can be seen that the trade
openness for Newly Industrialized Asian Economics (NIEs) has far exceeded other
groups. This group includes some typical export oriented countries: Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, with trade accounting for more than 200%
of their national GDP in the 2000s. Despite that, the trends of opening trade for
some other economies are also significant. As former Eastern bloc economies joined
the international trading market and as developing Asia progressively tore down
barriers to trade, their trade openness has increased considerably since the 1990s.
It is worth noting that trade openness in developing economies has been catching
up with or exceeding that in advanced economies, reflecting the fact that the trade
regimes of emerging markets and developing countries have moved on to more open
trading systems than in advanced economies (IMF, 2007).
The integration of the world economy and its benefit for economic growth has
often been addressed in the literature. Due to trade openness, countries are able to
focus on making products (and services) for export with relatively lower costs, and on
importing products from another country with much cheaper costs. National output
and real income will then be increased as industries can reach higher productivity
by allocating resources efficiently (Bussmann, 2009; Menon and Rodger, 2009).
The standard trade theory, the Heckscher−Ohlin (H−O) model coupled with
the Stolper−Samuelson (SS) theorem, predicts that international trade would bene-
fit economies for their abundant factors of production. An increase in trade openness
4 The plots for the changes in the ratios of import penetration and exports to GDP can be seen in
Appendix Figure 2.5 and 2.6.
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in a developing country in which unskilled labour is relatively abundant would raise
the relative demand and compensation for unskilled workers and lead to a decrease
in within-country income inequality (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; IMF, 2007). Yet
it may lead to the opposite conclusion in a developed economy where high-skilled
factors are relatively abundant, higher inequality would be observed. Both the H−O
and the SS theoretical frameworks have been criticised extensively for their restric-
tive and unrealistic assumptions. For instance, the model is based upon perfect
competition, with constant returns to scale, within countries but not international
labour and capital mobility, identical production functions with fixed-shared tech-
nology across countries, etc (Elson et al., 2007; IMF, 2007; Bussmann, 2009).
Moreover, the implications of both the theorems have generally not been verified
in the empirical research, especially for the effects of international trade on wage
inequality in developing countries (Davis, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Xu,
2003; Milanovic, 2005). Thus, to explain the rise in skill premium between skilled
and unskilled workers in some developing countries has been a particular challenge.
A developing country which has been seen as unskilled abundant from a global point
of view might be considered relatively skill abundant compared to other developing
countries (Davis, 1996). This is very likely to be the case for middle income countries.
Middle income countries face strong competition in low skill intensity sectors from
lower-waged, unskilled abundant low income countries, and in high skill intensity
sectors from developed countries, leading to the contraction of both sectors and
hence a declining relative demand and prices for unskilled workers as well as a
higher wage inequality (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Xu, 2003).
In addition to trade openness, the development of technology also plays an impor-
tant role in explaining the changes in demand for labour and in wage inequality for
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both the advanced and the developing economies. International trade facilitates the
spread of technology from advanced to developing countries, leading to an increase
in higher skilled workers in developing countries. Advanced economies upgrade their
skills to reduce the threat of imitation from other countries. This leads to a rising
relative demand biased toward skilled workers internationally (skill-biased techni-
cal change, SBTC) together with a falling demand and wage for the unskilled, and
hence an increase in wage inequality (Robbins, 1996, 2003; Berman and Machin,
2000, 2004; Acemoglu, 2003; Thoenig and Verdier, 2003; Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2004, 2007; Conte and Vivarelli, 2007). The implications of these theories on the
gender pay gap would be that if the majority of women engage in lower status, un-
skilled jobs, greater openness might decrease the gender differential in countries with
larger demand for unskilled workers (e.g. perhaps low income groups) but increase
the differential in countries with a rising demand for skilled workers.
As for the theories of labour market discrimination combined with trade glob-
alisation, the neoclassical approach (Becker, 1971) argues that trade expansion will
lead to increasing competitive pressure in the product market, thus discrimination
against women or minorities becomes more costly to employers and could not persist
in the long run. This implies that employers with market power who have a taste for
discrimination would be better able to practice the taste than those operating in a
competitive market. In this case the changes in market power would lead to changes
in wages and employment for those who were initially discriminated against, and
increased competition from international trade is thus supposed to reduce wage dif-
ferentials between women and men over time. In contrast, non-neoclassical theory
(Darity and Williams, 1985; Williams, 1987) contends that discrimination would
persist in a competitive economy, as an increase in trade competition may reduce
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discrimination in certain groups of industries but raise it in others. Gender wage
inequality may widen in countries where women have weaker bargaining power and
are assigned to lower paid or lower status jobs.
Considering there may be some simultaneous events, which are unrelated to
participation in international markets, that would contribute to an increase in trade
competition, many studies estimate the effects of trade openness on gender pay
discrimination by comparing the residual wage gap in more concentrated industries
to less concentrated (competitive) industries to avoid results being distorted (Berik
et al., 2004; Black and Brainerd, 2004). It is argued that firms operating in relatively
concentrated industries will be facing less domestic competition, hence any observed
decrease in discrimination against women in such industries should be ascribed to
the international competitiveness rather than to domestic pressure.
Using data for US manufacturing industries, Black and Brainerd (2004) find ev-
idence to support this hypothesis that the residual wage gap was narrowed more
rapidly in concentrated industries than in competitive industries by import pene-
tration between 1976 and 1993. In the case of Mexico, Artecona and Cunningham
(2002) demonstrate that trade liberalisation widens the gender wage gap in the man-
ufacturing sector, which is ascribed to general movements in the economy over trade
reform and raised premiums to skills. Yet a narrower gap is observed after elimi-
nating these two effects from the sample, particularly in those industries that were
compelled to be more competitive. Similarly, focusing on urban Mexico, Hazarika
and Otero (2004) discover a positive relationship between competition from foreign
trade in the product market and lower gender discrimination.
At the international level, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) adopt the
Economic Freedom Index to examine the impact of competition on the residual
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gender wage gap across 62 countries. The findings are in line with Becker’s model,
illustrating an increase in competition leading to a decrease in the gender wage
differential, whereas it is also noted that the residual gap can be constrained as
well as boosted by market orientation. Oostendorp (2009) studies cross-country
differences in the effects of globalisation on occupational gender pay differentials by
using FDI net flows and the trade to GDP ratio as competition indicators, and finds
that an increase in trade is associated with a narrowed residual gap within low-skill
occupations, while this effect within high-skill occupations can only be proved in
richer countries.
On the contrary, Berik et al. (2004) discover the opposite result for Taiwan and
Korea in the 1980s to 1990s, that increasing competition from international trade
in concentrated industries is significantly associated with increased discrimination
against female workers. Similar evidence from India (Menon and Rodgers, 2009)
suggests that increased trade openness in concentrated manufacturing industries
results in a larger residual gender pay differential from 1983 to 2004. In another
study, about the effects of market forces and sex discrimination in the United States,
Hellerstein et al. (2002) find there is a positive relationship between profitability
and the proportion of female employees at firm level. It indicates that those plants
with higher market power tend to hire more women leading to higher profitability.
This result is consistent with Becker’s model that the employers with higher market
power are more able to practice discrimination. However, there is no evidence found
whether market power reduces discrimination by the penalty of lower growth for
being discriminatory.
Economic integration could also influence the requirements from the labour force.
Several academic researchers indicate that the shift of economic structures towards
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the service sectors benefits female workers more than male workers. Owing to innate
ability, women are unable to reach the same productivity as men in labour-intensive
industries, resulting in a rising gender wage inequality. However, the expansion of
service sectors may increase female competitiveness to male workers, as less phys-
ical strength is required and women would have a comparative advantage even in
unskilled nursing or servicing jobs (Fan and Lui, 2003). Blau and Kahn (1992) show
that a decrease in the demand for employees in manufacturing is one of the critical
factors reducing the gender gap by examining different countries along with differ-
ent economic structures. Murphy and Welch (1993) also find evidence to support
this theory; the economy moving away from manufacturing to the service sectors in
the United States having a positive influence on relative women’s earnings during
1964− 1988.
2.2.2 The Effect of Culture on Gender Wage Inequality
Due possibly to the difficulty of finding an efficient method to identify the sep-
arate influences of the economic and institutional environment from those of culture,
the effect of culture on economic outcomes was largely ignored for a long period in
economic literature. More recently, several new approaches have been put forward
to investigate what role social attitudes and beliefs (the culture) have played in ex-
plaining the changes in economic outcomes across different countries, social groups,
and over time (Ferna´ndez, 2011)5. For instance, some provide experimental results
of examining the differences in the behaviour of playing different strategies in games
when individuals are from different social groups (Henrich et al., 2001). In addition,
a great portion of evidence is provided following the epidemiological approach, which
5 Ferna´ndez (2011) provides a series of literature reviews on culture and economics.
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is used to distinguish the effects of culture from those of environment on economic
outcomes for individuals in the same economic and institutional setting, but whose
cultural backgrounds are potentially different (Ferna´ndez, 2007, 2008).
The differences in the distribution of social preferences and beliefs have a non-
negligible impact on female labour market outcomes. Limited by family or social
expectations, women encounter more difficulties in their career progression; they of-
ten face career interruption as a result of child-bearing or household responsibilities
and are generally under-represented in supervisory roles and in managerial occu-
pations which thereby affects their earnings. The findings of Ferna´ndez and Fogli
(2009) indicate that countries which possess a more traditional view of female roles
are more likely associated with lower female workforce participation and higher fer-
tility6. Alesina et al. (2010) discover a negative relationship between the strength
of family ties and labour market outcomes, where individuals from a more family-
focused background are less willing to move away from family to take advantage of
job opportunities.
Social conventions could also have a great impact on female educational invest-
ment. Becker (1985) points out that the traditional thinking of the female as having
household responsibilities reduces their willingness to invest in education. This then
decreases their productivity and wages. According to IMF (2007), although female
educational participation has shown a positive trend all over the world, it is with
great variation across countries. Some indicate that a part of the differential in the
investment in education between men and women may be explained by religious
preferences rather than the choice of economic efficiency (Dollar and Gatti, 1999).
6 However, this may make more and more women unwilling to start a family and have children.
(Haworth, 2013).
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Alesina and Giuliano (2007) find a lower ratio of girls to boys in tertiary educa-
tion in response to stronger family ties. In addition, it has also been noted that
a more highly educated female workforce does not necessarily lead to a narrower
pay gap (Albrecht et al., 2003; Kee, 2006; International Trade Union Confederation,
2008; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010). Albrecht et al. (2003), Kee
(2006), and Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010) discover that educational differences do
not have an impact on the gender differential at the top end of the wage distribution.
Tachibanaki (2010) states that, following the traditional convention, some Japanese
women graduating from elite universities may give up a much better job offer at a
smaller firm but self-select into a low-level clerical job in a prestigious company, as
it gives them a better chance to find a better qualified husband.
Against this background, this chapter is interested in discovering how the changes
in the development of social openness will lead the changes in the gender wage resid-
ual. To demonstrate this point, the analysis uses the share of women in the national
parliament as a proxy. Given the fact that the cultural or the social differences
are difficult to measure, this proxy allows the research to have a quantitative mea-
sure on such issues, and to see the differences in empowerment of women across
countries. Elections are one very important channel for people to express their pref-
erences. Societal preferences would not be accurately voiced while participation of
female politicians is limited or non-existent, leading to the under-provision of public
goods (e.g. female education opportunities, health care) or sufficient gender- specific
policies in the labour market (Brown, 2004). Countries where more women hold po-
sitions in the national parliament could therefore be seen as more democratic and
as a proxy for societal constraints on women, since those women are not only better
able to promote policies for female rights but also serve as role models for other
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women.
However, although the share of women in the national parliament can provide
good information about the social openness across countries, some issues still need
to be borne in mind by adopting this estimator. One of the concerns is that this
estimator is not actually a continuous variable over time due to the cycle of elec-
tions. Besides, the power of individual female politicians may vary significantly due
to the position each of them hold, for instance, those who are in the cabinet or
senior positions may be more able to address gender issues. For a discussion of the
representativeness of politicians in the UK, see Durose et al. (2011).
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 shows how the proportion of females in national parlia-
ments has evolved over time across different economic and cultural regions/groups
of countries. Overall, the recruitment of female politicians has accelerated since
the 1990s in most countries apart from CEE (post-communist countries in Central
and Eastern Europe). A dramatic decrease in the share of female politicians in CEE
countries could be partly attributed to the introduction of market reforms and partly
to the disintegration of communism since 1989. It is not very surprising that there
was a quite high proportion of seats in their parliaments held by women in commu-
nist countries, as these countries have a commitment to secure gender equality in
the labour market (Brainerd, 2000), and their governments offered higher minimum
wages, generous maternity benefits and day care centres which inspired women to
work.
However, those counties in the Confucianism group have considerably lower pro-
portions of females in national parliament, even though they are all developed and
high income countries: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. East Asian
societies are strongly influenced by Confucianism, whereby people deem that the
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male plays a higher role than the female in any given situation. This occurs in poli-
tics, public policy, labour market, son preference, and even in sex-selective abortions
(Almond et al., 2009; Chun and Gupta, 2009). Women have always been seen as
followers in the Confucian society; following their father in childhood, their husband
in marriage and their son in widowhood. One of the more important responsibilities
they have is to produce a son for the family. Since a female is not able to continue
the lineage, nor to perform ancestral rites, she is an outsider of the family as soon as
she leaves home at marriage. Due to this traditional convention, women have often
been considered a subordinate class in society (Chun and Gupta, 2009).
Recent empirical literature on the relationship between trade globalisation and
gender inequality has mainly focussed on the manufacturing industries, either on
the manufacturing trade effect on the total gender gap or on the effect of trade
openness on the manufacturing gender gap. Most of them have only taken into
account the overall trade effect while ignoring such effects at sectoral levels. Since
the economic structures of many countries have moved away from agriculture toward
manufacturing and service sectors following the development of the economy, it is of
both practical and academic interest to discover how the pay differential is influenced
by the trade from different sectors. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter will
discuss the link between the impact of overall and sectoral trade openness on gender
earnings inequality, and also investigate the differences in such effects on countries
at different income levels and developing status.
With respect to cultural differences, the particular changing pattern in cultural
backgrounds and political regimes observed from Figure 2.3 raises a question: what
role do the social attitudes and beliefs play in explaining the variation in gender wage
differentials across countries, developing regions, and over time? Does Communism
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contribute to a decrease in the gender pay gap but Confucianism to an increase in
the gap?
Two stages of analysis will be implemented in this chapter. The first stage of
estimation focuses on discussing what factors have played important roles in explain-
ing the variation in the gender wage gap from the published empirical literature by
using meta-analysis. The following section will investigate the changes in the gap
when the effects of trade globalisation and cultural differences have been introduced.
2.3 Research Framework for Meta-Analysis
Meta-analysis is a means to amass and assess previously obtained research
results in a specific field. It offers a helpful structure providing a systematic review
to quantitatively summarise and evaluate the literature on a given topic. It not
only combines the results of a set of studies, but examines whether the variation
of estimates is more than expected due to different sampling, and accentuates the
practical effect rather than the statistical significance of single studies. The meta-
analysis approach started as a tool of combining and summarising the results of
several experiments which has been widely practiced in medicine and biological sci-
ences. In the field of economics, meta-regression analysis (MRA) has been designed
to assess a series of nonexperimental publications (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998). It is
a meta-analytic technique to explain the variations of reported estimates from one
study to the next using a regression model.
The research framework for this chapter is based upon the studies from Weich-
selbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005), which examine the international gender
wage gap and were an extension of the Stanley and Jarrell (1998) study that only
focuses on the US data.
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Stanley and Jarrell (1998) set up some rules for the inclusion of studies into
their sample, such as the studies must present estimation of the US gender wage
gap by using a broad range of national data, and the estimated results must be from
a regression analysis. The MRA is adopted without a specific weighting scheme
involved, and only 12 factors7 are included. The MRA results are statistically sig-
nificant for almost all the coefficients with more than 80 percent of the variation
explained by the model.
On the other hand, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005) look at the
changes in the international gender wage gap across 62 countries, with many more
identified factors8 included and a specific weighting scheme9 was used to correct for
possible bias derived from the problem of biased sampling used with a concern to
the quality of the studies. In addition to these concerns, the effects of unobserved
characteristics, such as institutional factors, across countries may also be one of the
factors for the different results in Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005)
who find the effects of many estimators to be insignificant or inconsistent across
different model specifications.
With an awareness that the lack of significance of the estimators will also be
a concern for the analysis in this chapter, as the analysis will be based upon the
data from Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005), suitably updated, a
careful choice of model specifications with different econometric considerations will
be discussed in the following sections.
7 The measure of wage, whether dummy variable for sex is used, whether studies control for selection
bias, the omission of workers characteristics, and the sex of the researcher
8 Table 2.2 explains the estimates in detail.
9 See Section 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 in more detail.
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2.3.1 Estimating Gender Wage Differentials
The decomposition approach is commonly used to measure discrimination, in
particular the one developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). It divides the
gender inequality into a measurable (explained) part and an immeasurable (unex-
plained) part. The measurable part can be identified and quantified by average
group differences in observed variables/characteristics, such as age, education, and
marital status. On the other hand, the unexplained portion, which is also called the
residual portion, is often attributed to discrimination. If the inequality in the resid-
ual component is large, it may imply that labour market discrimination is relatively
large.
Given two groups m (Male) and f (Female), a wage variable W , and a set of
control variables, to measure the mean wage differences as follows:
Gap = E (Wm)− E (Wf ) (2.1)
where E (W ) is the expected value of the wage variable, calculated by group differ-
ences in the control variables. Based on the wage regression equation:
Wgi = βgXgi + εgi (2.2)
where g = (m, f) denotes male and female workers respectively. Wgi is the natural
logarithm of earnings and Xgi are observable characteristics of an individual i in
group g. βg is a vector of coefficients. εgi is a disturbance term.
Some suggest that a set of non-discriminatory coefficients should also be taken
into account for estimating the contribution of male and female differences in control
variables to the overall wage differences (Oaxaca, 1973; Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988;
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Neumark, 1988). Let β∗ be such a vector of non-discriminatory coefficients, Equation
2.1 can then be rewritten as (Jann, 2008):
Gap = [E (Xm)− E (Xf )]
′
β∗ +
[
E (Xm)
′
(βm − β∗) + E (Xf )
′
(β∗ − βf )
]
(2.3)
The first term on the right hand side represents, the explained portion, the
contribution that the differences in endowments make to the gender pay gap. The
second term is the unexplained/residual portion that captures the potential effects
of differences in unobserved factors and is usually referred to as the magnitude of
gender wage discrimination.
Furthermore, there may be a case to assume that discrimination is directed solely
against one of the groups, thus β∗ = βm or β∗ = βf (Oaxaca 1973). If, for instance,
there is no wage discrimination of men but discrimination is only directed towards
women, then adopting βˆm as an estimate for β
∗, the group means Xm and Xf for
E (Xm) and E (Xf ), and Wm and W f for E (Wm) and E (Wf ), Equation 2.3 can be
arranged as (Oaxaca, 1973; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003, 2005; Jann,
2008):
ˆGAP = Wm −W f =
(
Xm −Xf
)′
βˆm +X
′
f
(
βˆm − βˆf
)
≡ Q+ U (2.4)
where Q is the explained portion and U is the unexplained portion.
And if wage discrimination is solely directed towards men but not on women,
then the decomposition is
ˆGAP = Wm −W f =
(
Xm −Xf
)′
βˆf +X
′
m
(
βˆm − βˆf
)
≡ Q+ U (2.5)
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However, it is not often there is a specific reason to assume that there is no
discrimination for one or the other group. Some derivatives of the Blinder−Oaxaca
decomposition are proposed.
Reimers (1983) adopts the average coefficients over male and female groups as
an estimate for β∗, then
βˆ∗ = 0.5βˆm − 0.5βˆf (2.6)
Cotton (1988) proposes the use of group sizes nm and nf to weight β
∗
βˆ∗ =
nm
nm + nf
βˆm − nf
nm + nf
βˆf (2.7)
Neumark (1988) suggests the coefficients from a pooled regression to be an esti-
mate for the non-discriminatory coefficients β∗. Furthermore, Brown et al. (1980)
advocate the inclusion of the probability from a multinomial logit model of being in
a certain occupation for the estimation of wage differentials.
Moving away from decompositions, another common approach to examine the
gender differential is simply to introduce a sex dummy into an earnings regression
equation:
Wi = βXi + γSexi + εi (2.8)
where Wi is the natural logarithm of earnings. Xi is a vector of individual charac-
teristics. β is a vector of coefficients, γ is the gender differential coefficient. εi is a
disturbance term.
The meta-regression analysis (MRA) in this study includes all the published
estimates of the gender wage differential examined by dummies (from Equation
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2.8), residual gender gap (U from Equation 2.4 to 2.7) or the derivatives10 of the
Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition discussed above. These reported estimates are em-
ployed as the dependent variable in this MRA study, which are expected to be
explained by the data set used in the respective papers, methods of estimation used,
measures of wage used, gender of the authors, etc. Yet the reported gender wage
differentials as well as the meta-wage residuals in the estimations are very likely
suffering from some biases, as the perfect wage equation and data set remain un-
known, some potentially important factors might have been omitted in the empirical
studies.
2.3.2 Meta-Data
Part of the meta-data in this analysis were constructed by Weichselbaumer
and Winter-Ebmer (2005) for those papers published in the period from the 1960s
to the 1990s and a few in 200011. Following Stanley and Jarrell (1998) and Weich-
selbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005), in October 2010, the author searched
the Economic Literature Index (EconLit) for any reference to: “(wage* or salar*
or earning*) and (discrimination or differen*) and (sex or gender)”, and restricted
the published year to be between 2000 and 2010. The empirical papers that only
focus on theoretical discussions, or simply report the ratios of median or average
wages without taking the effect of workers’ characteristics into account were elimi-
nated. Following this standard, 142 articles were finally qualified to be included in
the meta-data analysis. Some papers might estimate the gender wage differential
for various countries, regions, different sample of populations, period of time, etc.
10Brown et al., 1980; Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; and Neumark, 1988
11 I would like to record my special thanks to Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Doris Weichselbaumer for
supplying their data
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In this case, the empirical paper would then be split into different “studies” while
the estimates were associated with different populations and periods of time. This
process yielded 457 different studies from the 142 qualified articles. Moreover, if a
paper reports several evaluations based upon the same sample of population and
time period, all the evaluations were included and coded in this meta-data. Each
specific estimate was treated as one observation. A total of 952 estimates were then
created in this process, which accounts for 38 percent of the total data sample.
Adopting multiple estimates from a single study is a cause of concern: a problem
of nonspherical errors is very likely to occur as multiple estimates based upon the
same sample are not independent of each other. Besides, a study with more estimates
would gain more weight if multiple estimates from one study are treated as different
observations. These concerns will be further discussed in the following subsection.
It has to be noted that the meta-data analysis suffers from sample selection biases,
as those papers published in non English languages as well as unpublished papers for
policy-making or from research institutes were not included. Table 2.1 summarises
the distribution of the meta-dataset, which covers a time span from 1963 to 2007
(depending on the time of the original dataset collection rather than the date of
publication of the paper). The sample in total contains 405 articles, which yield 2487
estimates, for the gender wage gap with identical characteristics in 84 countries. In
the 1960s and the 1970s, the estimates are mainly conducted in America, but Europe
has caught up with and surpassed America since the 1980s. With respect to income
levels, the estimates for high income countries dominate over time especially for the
1960s.
A list of meta explanatory variables adopted in the analysis is given in Table 2.2.
It depicts the original dataset was most frequently from surveys where the wage was
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usually not measured by hour, and that the majority of researchers employed the
Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition or its derivatives, but with instrumental variables
very unlikely to be employed. As for workers’ characteristics, over 90% of researchers
controlled for workers’ job experience real or potential. However, there is very large
proportion of estimates that failed to account for whether or not workers had children
or on-the-job training, their union status, the share of women in their jobs, and the
number of weeks they worked. This might be due possibly to the lack of availability
of data for those individual characteristics.
Figure 2.4 presents the development of the reported total gender wage gap
(Wm − W f in Equation 2.4 to 2.7) and reported residual gap (the unexplained
portion U in Equation 2.4 to 2.7 of the decomposition approach or the estimated
coefficienton the sex dummies in Equation 2.8) averaged at each time point over the
period 1963-2007 together with 95% confidence intervals, based on the studies used
in the meta analysis. It is clearly shown that the estimated total wage gap declines
dramatically from over 65% in the 1960s in some studies to less than 30% after
1990, although the reported residual gap remains almost the same over time. This
considerable decrease in the total gap can largely be explained by the self develop-
ment of females through increased education and work experience. In addition, the
confidence intervals indicate that the total wage gap is significantly higher than the
residual gap in the 1960s, yet there is almost no significant difference between them
after 1995. It also implies that the standard control variables, e.g. human capital,
occupational segregation, and industrial segregation, provide limited explanations
of the gender wage gap in recent times.
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2.3.3 Meta-Regression Analysis
The employed meta-regression model in this analysis takes the following form
(Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005):
Gapj = β0 + β1Zkj + β2tτj + β3Cij + εj (2.9)
where
Gapj is the natural logarithm of the gender wage residual of the j
th estimate, which
comes from the unexplained portion U (Equation 2.4 to 2.7) in the decomposition
approach or the estimated coefficient on the sex dummies (Equation 2.8).
Zkj is a n× k matrix of meta explanatory variables.
tτj is a set of time dummies to show that the individual estimate j draws upon data
in time τ .
Cij is set of country dummies that the individual estimate j belongs to.
εj is the error term.
The set of meta explanatory variables are segregated into the selection of data
set, the methodology of estimation, measure of wages, and control variables for
omitted individual or workplace characteristics. To explain the results, the base
category for the selection of data set is a random sample of the total population (as
opposed to an estimate based on a restricted sample such as public sector only), and
the base category for the control variables is the inclusion of the respective variables
in the original regression (so the estimated results show the effect of omitting the
respective variable relative to this base category of including it). Several issues have
to be taken into account when using meta-analysis. Due to the approach relying
heavily on published papers, one of the major weaknesses of meta-analysis is the
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‘file drawer problem’. It is not known how many unpublished papers and results
have been conducted as most academic journals tend to only publish the significant
results, which would then lead to a biased and skewed distribution of the outcomes as
well as an overestimation of the significance of the published papers (Stanley, 2005).
Yet, this concern is less problematic for this analysis, as gender wage differentials
are usually examined by Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition, which does not rely on a
significance test. Besides, as it has been largely accepted that a gender wage gap
exists, a study observing no bias or a reverse effect is actually more likely to be
published (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998).
Another severe weakness of meta techniques is that some studies are conducted
under certain expectations to achieve political, economic, or social goals. This “Pyg-
malion effect would then abuse and bias the true effect size. In the field of gender
inequality, one might suspect that female authors are inclined to be generous with
the result of higher estimated gaps as they might have experienced discrimination on
a personal basis (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998). The gender of author thus is adopted
to examine and control for this possible bias in this study (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998;
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003, 2005). In addition, an issue remaining
is that different researchers might have used different methods to examine the data
which is the same or very much alike, producing a lack of independence of the data
points, although there is no clear scheme to correct this bias. These drawbacks will
hence be considered when interpreting the results of this analysis.
2.3.4 Econometric Considerations for MRA
Study quality is the primary cause for concern in meta-analysis. With a con-
cern that some data points are conducted by the same study therefore producing
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non-spherical standard errors, a clustering approach, defined on the ID of studies, is
applied to all specifications to correct for the possible biases in the precision of the
estimates. A weighting scheme is also developed to cope with the issue of the lack
of independence of the estimates. One of the weighting approaches is the inverse of
the number of estimates conducted by a single study, which thereby takes into con-
sideration that an individual study with more estimates would otherwise be given
more weight than the one with fewer estimates. Another method, the inverse of the
coefficient of variation among the estimates within one study, gives more weight to
those studies that provide less variation in results across specifications, as a study
is seen as more reliable if the same result is reached by different specifications. Yet
the difference between estimating approaches might not be properly identified, as
the different estimates within the same study are treated alike under this weight-
ing method. A preferred approach would be the typical weighting that takes the
precision of the estimate (the standard error) as a quality indicator. Although the
t-statistics are not available as the majority of reported gender gaps are estimated
by Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition, the square root of the degrees of freedom is in-
stead employed as a proxy. Note that many meta analyses may use the ranking of
journals to control for the quality of the publication. Yet this weighting approach
is not adopted in this analysis as it may drop a high proportion of observations
due to the inclusion of a large number of books and working papers. With concern
about this issue, the Fixed Effects model will hence also be employed in the further
analysis, to control for the specific effect of individual published papers.
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2.4 Estimating the Effects of Trade Globalisation and Cul-
ture on the Gender Pay Gap
2.4.1 Data
The data for trade globalisation are from various sources, with the majority
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (September 2010).
Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of gross domestic product. Imports, exports, and sectoral trade data on
agriculture, manufacturing and services are also expressed as a ratio to GDP. All
the trade related variables are treated as natural logarithms as the distributions
are typically skewed. The women in parliaments variable is the percentage of par-
liamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women. The data are from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (September 2010) and
Women’s Indicators and Statistics database (www.ipu.org).
The classification by income level is from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators database (September 2010). The countries are divided into income
groups: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income according to gross na-
tional income (GNI) per capita in the period 1987−2007, calculated using the World
Bank Altas method. Note that the data for the current level of income classifica-
tions are only available from 1987 onwards, so those before 1987 are arranged to
the 1987 categories. Hence, a robustness check on a restricted sample for the period
1987 − 2007 will be implemented for the models including income level indicators.
The category of developing status is from the World Economic Outlook (October
2010) and continent is from the United Nations Statistics Division (September 2010).
The classification by beliefs is from Gradstein et al. (2001) to investigate how the
gender wage gap varies with belief system, as well as to hold beliefs constant to
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focus on other country level effects. It has to be noted that only the classifications
by beliefs and income levels are time varying, all other definitions of country clas-
sifications are at constant levels in 2010. The detailed classification of countries is
presented in Appendix 2A Table 2.10.
2.4.2 Basic Regression Model
In order to explore how much the magnitude of the reported gender wage
residual can be explained by the effect of trade liberalisation and culture differences,
these two variables introduced to Equation 2.9 can be written as follows:
Gapj = β0 + β1Zkj + β2tτj + β3Trade Globalisation+ β4Culture+ εj (2.10)
where
Gapj is the natural logarithm of gender wage residual of the j
th estimate.
Zkj is a n× k matrix of meta explanatory variables.
tτj is a set of time dummies for individual estimate j drawing upon data in time τ .
εj is the error term.
Trade Globalisation is measured by trade openness, the share of imports, the share
of exports, and both the share of imports and exports in agriculture, manufacturing
and service sectors. All these trade related variables are in natural logarithms.
Culture is measured by the proportion of women in national parliaments (Fparl) and
a set of social norms dummies. The variable of Fparl has additionally been split into
dummies by dividing the distribution of the share of female politicians into three
components(as tertiles), low, middle, and high, in order to identify whether there
are threshold effects on the residual gender wage gap.
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2.4.3 Regression Model with Interaction Terms
The interaction terms are introduced to test how trade competition is associ-
ated with the gender pay gap across countries at different income and development
levels:
Gapj = β0 + β1Zkj + β2tτj + β3Trade Globalisation
+β4Income Levels (or Advanced Economies)
+β5Trade Globalisation× Income Levels (or Advanced Economies) + εj
(2.11)
As for measuring the interactive effect of culture,
Gapj = β0 + β1Zkj + β2tτj + β3Fparl + β4Beliefs (or Income Levels)
+β5Fparl ×Beliefs(or Income Levels) + εj
(2.12)
where the base category for income levels is the low income countries, the omitted
variable for religion is Confucianism, and the base category for development status
is the developing economies.
Results from this subsection will reveal whether trade globalisation and the de-
velopment of social openness have similar impacts on female relative wages across
different income, development levels, and cultural backgrounds. It will identify
whether the higher share of trade in developing countries compared to advanced
countries as shown in Figure 2.1 leads to a greater reduction in the gender gap in
the developing countries. It can also be seen whether more women recruited into
parliament in the more conservative countries helps women to be paid more equally.
As mentioned above, the classification of countries by income status is only
available for the period from 1987 to 2007. All the models including the income
level variable will thus also be restricted to the period 1987 to 2007 to examine how
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robust the original models are. The weighting scheme introduced above will also
be applied to all the models. Besides, a year lagged trade share and two year lag
of the share of female politicians are adopted to measure whether it takes time for
these variables to have an effect on the gender wage residual. One-year lagged data
is often used in the economic analysis to discount the influence of the current shock.
On the other hand, the choice of the two-year lagged female politician share is with
a concern that the influence they have, such as the promotion of policies, education
etc., would take a longer time to be effective.
2.5 Results of Meta-Regression Analysis
2.5.1 OLS Model
Table 2.3 presents the results of the benchmark meta-regression model in this
analysis showing how the magnitude of the residual gender wage gaps is related to
the control variables in reported empirical research. The effects of data and methods
on the residual wage gap in this meta-analysis are similar to the findings of Weichsel-
baumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005)12. It is suggested that the type of data set
used plays a very important role in the magnitude of the residual gender wage gap,
where the results are consistent across all the specifications and are in line with the
common findings of the empirical literature. Compared to a random sample of the
whole population, the gender wage residual is lower by about 7 percentage points if
studies only focus on new entrants in the labour market. Moreover, the estimated
12The replication of Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer’s (2003) MRA results can be found in Ap-
pendix 2A Table 2.11, where it can be seen clearly that the authors results are similar to theirs. For
instance, the results from Table 2.3, Table 2.11 and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer’s (2003) all
reach the same conclusion that the sample of data used has the strongest effects on the magnitude
of gender gap, and that the impact of the omission of workers’ characteristics on the gap is very
similar in terms of both the size and the sign.
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gap is found to be narrower in the public sector, in samples based on particular
occupations, in high-prestige occupations, and for non-married individuals, but it is
significantly wider in samples of married workers and in the private sector. These
results are consistent with popular concerns that, for instance, women fare better
in the public sector as a result of more strict regulation enforcement; their relative
wages are higher in top occupations due possibly to their higher human capital accu-
mulation; and married women are more disadvantaged in the labour market owing
to family commitment while the reverse holds true for men.
With respect to econometric methods, strong evidence suggests that the gender
wage residual tends to be higher if a Blinder−Oaxaca decomposition with female
coefficients is used, but it does not seem to matter if other decomposition approaches
or dummy variable techniques are used. A little evidence, in column 4 only, sug-
gests that the estimated gap would be lower if a panel dataset is used compared
to if other kinds of data are used, as panel data allows the researcher to control
unobserved individual heterogeneity. In contrast to Stanley and Jarrell (1998), the
results suggest that not using the Heckman correction for selection bias results in
a larger residual wage gap. Considering that women may usually work few hours,
one would expect that using an hourly wage measure would produce a narrower es-
timated gap than other measures, and weak but consistent evidence has been found
supporting the idea. In comparison with using a measure of actual experience, using
a variable of potential experience, calculated as age minus years of education minus
6, is strongly associated with a larger estimate of the gender residual. This suggests
that the estimated residual gap would be overstated when the measure of individual
workers’ characteristics are less accurate.
In terms of the exclusion of particular control variables, the estimated gap is lower
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when individual’s work experience (no matter whether it is actual or potential) is
omitted. The result confirms Makepeace et al. (2004) that rates of reward to
experience for men and women are not equal, hence when any form of experience
measure is included, the unexplained portion increases. The omission of marital
status reduces the wage gap, corresponding to what Becker (1985) proposed that the
household responsibilities of women would lead to lower productivity and wages. On
the contrary, men usually benefit from their marriage due to their wife’s contribution
at home. Similar to the findings from Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005),
the omission of tenure, union status, and the share of females in occupations widens
the residual gap. Omitting industry variables is also associated with a higher gender
differential. Moreover, the effect of the gender of the authors is not clear, that is
there is no evidence found that female authors tend to be more likely to report a
higher estimated gap.
2.5.2 Fixed Effects
One would suspect that some traits of the empirical papers, such as detail of
the questionnaire and the data set, or minor adjustment of research techniques, are
not able to be captured by the meta-coding, which may affect the accuracy of the
meta-data set. The Fixed Effects approach is therefore adopted to control for the
specific effect of individual papers. Following Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer
(2005), this study uses (i) Fixed Effect within papers to control for the specific
characteristics of each paper; and (ii) Fixed Effect within studies (one country at a
time point within a paper) to control for the specific features of each study. Note that
the sample for these Fixed Effect models is restricted to those papers that include
more than one estimate, which impacts on the precision of some of coefficients due
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to the low variation within a specific group (paper or study). Hence, given this
concern coupled with the elimination of a great number of observations, the Fixed
Effect model is not the preferred approach compared to the OLS methods, although
it would provide a good control for the quality of the publication.
It is suggested again that the type of data set is playing a very important role
(Table 2.4). The gender wage gap is narrowed if studies only focus on a sample of
new entrants, the singles (never-marrieds), and the full-time workers, but it is found
to be significantly larger in the private sector. The results confirms that the gender
pay residual is larger if the model does not consider part-time and full-time workers
separately, as a large proportion of female part-timers is engaged in lower paid jobs
which enlarges the wage gap between them.
Compared to the OLS results, there is no clear evidence found that the use
of decomposition techniques or dummy variable techniques affects the estimated
gap. Moreover, the effects of the measure of wages emerge more explicitly. The
panel models demonstrate that the use of non hourly wages results in a significantly
higher gender differential. Due to more job interruptions and fewer working hours
for women, it could be expected that the use of hourly wages results in a smaller
estimated gap than other measures of wages. As expected, if the studies exclude
whether or not a worker has a child, it will result in a lower gender wage differential.
Similar to the previous findings, the omission of union status and the share of females
in occupations will increase the estimated gap.
According to Stanley and Jarrell (1998), the more wage-related and productivity-
related factors are included, the smaller the residual gap will be. The results do sup-
port this idea as the omission of occupation is associated with a wider estimated gap.
However, the inclusion of occupational variables is often controversial. As Stanley
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and Jarrell (1998, p.965) state,“Many researchers would argue that there has been
so much segregation and gender stereotyping that the measured effect of occupa-
tion on wages is itself gender discrimination rather than reflection of unobserved
skill differences”. Thus, occupational variables should not necessarily be taken into
account. On the contrary, controlling for occupations may somewhat obscure the
effect of other variables. As the choice of occupation usually depends on education,
experience, wages, and many other similar variables maybe accounted for in the
estimation model, then the problem of multicollinearity with occupations is also a
cause for concern (ibid).
Overall, the estimated results from both the OLS and the Fixed Effects models
are found to be very similar to the findings from Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer
(2003, 2005). It is suggested that the specification of the estimated wage equation
has a significant impact on the magnitude of the unexplained portion of the gen-
der wage gap. In particular, the type of the data used has a greatest effect on the
size of the gender wage residuals, and the method of estimation seems less impor-
tant compared to the other factors in the wage equations. In addition, the lack of
significance of, and the inconsistence of, some coefficients across model specifica-
tions is also found to be similar in this study, in contrast to the very strong results
observed by Stanley and Jarrell (1998). One of the main reasons for these signifi-
cant differences is due to the fact that Stanley and Jarrell (1998) strictly controlled
their sample to only include those studies that estimate the US gender wage gap,
using national databases and only estimates from a regression analysis. However,
this study and the Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003, 2005) include over
60 countries with no possible method to control for the datasets used in individual
studies and which adopt all measures of gender wage residual calculation (from a
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regression analysis and the derivatives of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition). The
analyses for both the studies suffer from non-spherical error due to some estimates
being based on the same data (country and time span) are hence not independent
from each other. Moreover, the unobserved characteristics across countries (i.e. the
institutional factors) may play some role.
2.6 The Effect of Trade Globalisation and Culture on the
Gender Pay Gap
2.6.1 Basic Regression Model
This subsection intends to explore how international trade and the develop-
ment of social openness are associated with the magnitude of the residual gender
wage gap (Equation 2.10). The estimated results with different specifications are
presented in Table 2.5, where the first five columns display the results when looking
at the overall effects of a social openness proxy, the share of women in national par-
liament (Fparl), on the gender pay residual, and the next five columns demonstrate
the threshold effects of social openness (Fparllow, Fparlmid, and Fparlhigh). In
each case, the first column shows the results from an OLS specification; the next
two columns from a continent Fixed Effect specification, which allows the analysis
to control for unobserved differences across continents and investigates the within-
continent variation; and the final two columns from an income Fixed Effect specifica-
tion which allows the analysis to concentrate on the within-income group variation.
The specifications with continent (income groups) Fixed Effect intend to explore
how the changes in trade or female politicians within each continent (income group)
are associated with the changes in the gender wage differential. The overall results
will give some insight into how the impacts, on the variation of the gender wage
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gap, of the within-continent trade and cultural effect changes are different to the
within-income level changes.
In line with Becker’s model, the results indicate that an increase in trade com-
petition in general leads to a decrease in the residual gender wage gap, and it does
not seem to matter whether the measure of trade liberalisation is by trade openness,
the share of exports to GDP, or the import penetration ratio13. It is suggested that
a one percent increase in trade within continents will decrease the gender wage gap
by about 1 to 2.5 percentage points.
As for social openness, its impact on the gender pay residual is found to be
statistically stronger than trade openness across all specifications. Of these, the size
of the overall effect is quite low, where a one percentage point increase in the share
of women in national parliaments will decrease the gender pay gap by about 0.1 to
0.2 percentage points. In contrast, the size of the threshold effects (columns 6 to
10 ) is much greater and both Fparlmid and Fparlhigh have been found to have a
significantly negative effect on the dependent variable as compared to Fparllow14.
In particular Fparlmid shows a stronger impact on reducing the unexplained gender
wage gap, where a one percentage point increase in the share of women in national
parliaments is associated with about a 2 to 2.6 percentage points change. It indicates
that the countries with a share of women in the national parliament in the middle
to higher end of the distribution have a smaller gender pay gap compared to those
at the lower end of the distribution. The results also imply that the negative effect
of the share of female politicians does not continue increasing once it has reached a
13The results for the measure of export or import share can be seen in Appendix 2A Table 2.12 and
2.13
14The estimated coefficients for testing the threshold effects are strong and robust across all specifi-
cations and to small changes in the choice of cutoff points for the thresholds (Also see Appendix
Table 2.12, 2.13)
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certain point.
Alongside the integration of world economy, many countries have experienced a
changing economic structure. The following analysis hence considers the impact of
trade at the sectoral level on the changing international gender wage gap. Table
2.6 displays the estimated results with different specifications, in which the first five
columns present the results with sectoral effects of exports on the gender residual,
and the next five columns focus on imports at sectoral level, and the final column
includes imports and exports simultaneously. Similarly, in each case, the first col-
umn shows the results from an OLS specification with the measure of overall effects
of Fparl; the next two columns with continent or income level Fixed Effect specifi-
cations; and the final two columns present the results with the threshold effects of
Fparllow, Fparlmid, and Fparlhigh, with a continent or an income level Fixed Ef-
fect used. The results are expected to provide information on whether female work-
ers benefited from their economies moving away from agriculture or male-dominated
manufacturing towards the service sectors.
The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between a higher share
of exports in agriculture and manufacturing sectors and the unexplained gender
wage gap. One would expect that female workforces would benefit from the boost
of export industries with more job opportunities, yet it might also hurt their wages
as they usually hold the lower skilled and lower paid jobs. The results confirm the
latter, which corresponds to several studies suggesting that more women working in
manufacturing widens the residual wage gap (Fan and Lui, 2003; Bussmann, 2009,
Menon and Rodgers, 2009). In contrast, a significant narrowing of the wage gap is
found where the share of exports from the service sector is increasing, with a one
percentage point increase in this share of exports leading to at least a 1.6 percentage
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point decrease in the gender pay differential, which may imply that women might
benefit on gender parity following a rising demand for workers in the service sectors.
As for import penetration, the results indicate that more imports in the agri-
cultural and manufacturing sectors are associated with lower gender differentials,
though the estimates for the latter are not statistically significant. In addition,
higher gender inequality would be observed where the share of imports in the ser-
vice sector is increasing. The results reflect the fact that while states have moved
from agriculture and manufacturing towards the services, more women engaging in
the service sector where they have comparative advantage even in low-skilled nursing
or servicing jobs, and fewer women working in the male-dominated manufacturing
and physical-strength-required agriculture, would be associated with lower gender
gaps (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Fan and Lui, 2003; Murphy and Welch, 1993). Noted
that the results in column (11) suggest that putting imports and exports together
into the same equation does not make much difference to the results.
2.6.2 Testing for Trade Effects on the Gender Pay Residual in Different
Development Economies
Table 2.7 displays the results explaining how trade competition will affect gen-
der wage inequality in countries at different income and development levels (Equa-
tion 2.11). Results with different specifications are included, columns 5 to 8 showing
the results with the one year lagged trade variable for the purpose of testing the
time effect of trade openness on the gap and also being a robustness check; columns
9 and 10 are the results for the restricted sample with a concern that data for the
indicators of income levels of countries were available only from 1987 onwards. The
outcomes for different trade effects across different income levels are found to be
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statistically weak but very consistent across all specifications.
It is revealed that the residual gender pay gap is significantly smaller in all
higher income countries as compared to low income countries at zero levels of trade
openness, though the estimates are only statistically significant for the low middle
income countries. As for the interactive effect, it suggests that trade openness re-
duces the gender gap for countries in higher and the bottom income categories, but
increases the gap in lower-middle groups, with some weak evidence that the trade
effect is stronger in lower income, and developing countries. The further F-test on
the coefficients of the interaction terms TradeLM and Trade15 has indicated that
the interaction effect is statistically significant and opposite in sign to the base trade
effect, which suggests that a one percent increase in the share of international trade
will widen the residual gender pay gap by 5 to over 7 percentage points (columns
2, 6, 9, and 10 ). The results for trade effects associated with different development
economies are not found to be significantly different from zero16. The weak results
observed from the higher income countries may imply that the changes in gender pay
differentials in these countries are more likely to be affected by the pressure within
the countries and by female workers’ characteristics. Moreover, the findings of the
widening gender gap associated with the expansion of trade in the lower-middle in-
come countries are in line with the empirical evidence (Davis, 1996; Feenstra and
Hanson, 1996; Berman and Machin, 2000, 2004; Acemoglu, 2003; Xu, 2003; Gold-
berg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2007; Conte and Vivarelli, 2007) that trade liberalisation
together with the diffusion of technology depresses the relative demand and prices
for unskilled worker, where women account for the majority, resulting in a higher
15Test on Trade+TradeLM=0 successfully rejects the hypothesis
16The lack of significance for the division of the developing region may be due partly to the fact that
the classifications are not time varying
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wage inequality.
2.6.3 Testing for Societal Effects on the Gender Pay Residual in Differ-
ent Cultural Backgrounds and Development Economies
This subsection is interested in exploring how female relative wages will change
along with the development of social openness against different cultural backgrounds
and income levels (Equation 2.12). Table 2.8 display the outcomes for the interactive
effect of social openness and culture/beliefs on the residual gender pay gap. Sim-
ilar to the preceding analysis, different specifications are included. The first three
columns are from the basic models, and the final three columns are the results with
the two years lagged cultural indicator (Fparl) for the purpose of testing the time
effect of social openness on the gap and also being a robustness check.
The results are found to be quite weak and inconsistent across all specifications,
with some evidence suggesting that the countries with Communist and Mixed beliefs
are associated with lower gender inequality as compared to Confucianism countries
where the share of female politician is zero. In terms of interactive effects, an increase
in the share of female politicians in Protestant countries significantly lowers the
gender differential, but opposite story is found in the Communism, Confucianism,
Muslim, and Mixed countries. This implies that the effect of female politicians
on gender pay equality in countries with stronger social constraints might be quite
weak. It might also be because female politicians are rather in the minority in these
countries and so might not have such authority that men would have for policy
conducting or implementing.
Table 2.9 presents the results examining the interactive impact of social openness
and income levels on gender wage inequality. The first two columns show the results
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from basic models; the next two columns are with the two years lagged cultural
indicator (Fparl); and the last two columns are the results for the restricted sample
in the period 1987− 2007. The results indicate that the gender gap is found to be
narrower for richer countries as compared to low income countries at zero levels of
‘Fparl’. Yet a higher share of female politicians does not seem to have much impact
on the narrowing gender wage gap in higher income categories, while such effects
are found to be much stronger in the low income countries. The positive interaction
coefficients for ‘Fparl’ with higher income countries offsets the negative base ‘Fparl’
effect, implying that the effect of a higher share of women in national parliaments on
gender parity is stronger in the low income countries. Although the further F-test
on the coefficients of interaction terms FparlH and Fparl is significantly different
from zero, the size of effects is minor, with a one percentage point increase in the
share of women in national parliament decreasing the gender wage differential by
0.1 percentage points (columns 2 and 4 ).
2.7 Conclusion
The results indicate that the magnitude of the gender wage residual is signif-
icantly affected by the specification of estimated models, in particular by the type
of data set (the sample) used and the control variables included. Of these, studies
focusing on a sample of new entrants in the labour market, non-married individuals,
full-time workers, the public sector, and top-level occupations are associated with a
smaller unexplained portion of gender wage gap, whereas an opposite story is found
in those studies looking at married women and the private sector. It implies that
when the models have a lower possibility of being driven by unobserved characteris-
tics the estimated gap would be lower. For instance, women may be under relatively
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strong protection from gender-specific policies in the public sectors, and their wages
are more influenced by the market economy in the private sector. Discrimination
against married women is more likely in practice, as they may be considered a group
that see their family commitment as a priority rather than their career. Further-
more, the omission of real experience, marital status, and the presence of children
are all found to decrease the residual gender gap, which suggests that a lower esti-
mated gap would be observed if the model ignores the factor in relation to female
workers’ disadvantages. As for the use of potential experience, the result is found
to increase the unexplained portion of gender pay gap, suggesting that this portion
is likely to be overstated when estimating models including less precise measures of
labour force characteristics.
With respect to trade globalisation, the results indicate that the expansion of
trade on average decreases the international gender wage gap, although different
patterns are observed across countries at different income levels and development
categories. Trade openness reduces the gender gap in higher and the bottom income
countries, but such an effect is found to be stronger in low income, and developing
countries. It implies that the variations of the gender gap in the high income and
advanced countries may be more likely to be driven by domestic pressure and female
workforce characteristics.
On the contrary, the introduction of trade is found to widen the gender wage gap
strongly in the middle income countries. It implies that while trade liberalisation
together with the development of technology change the relative demand for workers
biased towards skilled workers, it pushes the majority of women in those countries
into a more difficult situation, as they are more likely engaged in unskilled jobs.
When the female labour supply cannot keep up with the relative demand for skilled
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workers, the overall gender wage gap will be increased. Moreover, the findings for
trade competition in different industrial sectors indicate that the economic structure
moving towards the service sectors benefited women in terms of their wages, as
women are more likely to have a comparative advantage for the jobs in the latter
sector than in the labour-intensive agriculture and male-dominated manufacturing
sectors.
In terms of the cultural effect, it is suggested that a higher share of female politi-
cians is associated with lower international gender pay inequality. The interactive
effects of social openness across different cultural backgrounds and income levels are
relatively weak. It is in general suggested that female politicians seem not quite able
to improve female working situation in countries with stronger social conventions on
women’s traditional roles. It might imply that it is difficult for female workers in
those countries to break out of the gender stereotype trap. Besides, a higher share
of women in parliament is found to have a stronger effect on narrowing the gender
gap in the low income than the high income countries.
Overall, the results in this chapter indicate that although the international total
gender wage gap has been falling significantly over the period of 1963 − 2007, the
unexplained portion of the gap remained persistent. Although improvement in the
estimated wage equations would result in a smaller unexplained portion of the gender
wage gap, it has to be kept in mind that it does not necessarily mean that the
discrimination against women in the labour market is lower. Rather, it is likely
due to models with a lower possibility of being driven by unobserved characteristics.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that globalisation together with the spread of technology
and the shifting economic structure have strong influences on female relative pay
throughout the changing relative demand for different skilled workers, although it is
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not all positive. A very strong societal constraint on women is likely to limit their
career pursuing. Furthermore, it is found that the reasons for the persistent gender
wage residual in the high income countries are more complex, hence other factors
and dimensions will need to be taken into account for further analysis.
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Figure 2.1: The Evolution of Trade Globalisation by Development Region
Source: World Development Indicators (2010)
Note: Advanced Economics (Adv); Newly Industrialized Asian Economics (NIEs); Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Developing Asia (Dasia); Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC); Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of Women in National Parliament by Develop-
ment Region
Source: Women’s Indicators and Statistics (2010); World Development Indicators (2010)
Note: Advanced Economics (Adv); Newly Industrialized Asian Economics (NIEs); Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Developing Asia (Dasia); Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC); Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of Women in National Parliament by Social Norms
Source: La Porta et al. (1998); Women’s Indicators and Statistics (2010); World Development Indicators (2010)
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Figure 2.4: Reported Log Gender Wage Gap
Source: Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), extended and updated by the author (2013)
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Table 2.1: Female/Male Wage Ratio
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All
Number of Papers 12 68 203 178 49 405
Number of Studies 17 145 492 495 96 1245
Number of Estimates 50 304 983 945 205 2487
Fraction of Estimates
Continent
Africa 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.04
America 0.66 0.69 0.51 0.34 0.19 0.44
Asia 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16
Europe 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.43 0.44 0.32
Oceania 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04
Income level
High Income 1.00 0.83 0.74 0.59 0.55 0.68
Upper-Middle Income 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.09
Lower-Middle Income 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.14
Low Income 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.10
Mean Total Wage Gap 0.470 0.429 0.310 0.268 0.344 0.314
Mean Residual Wage Gap 0.225 0.223 0.196 0.190 0.201 0.198
Source: Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), extended and updated by the author (2013)
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Table 2.3: Meta Regression
No. of (2)+ (2)+
Weighting No Estimates Precision Square
Scheme Weights in Study of Estimates Root of DF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Paper
Author Female 0.0029 0.0096 −0.0103 0.0190
(0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0138)
B. Data Set
New Entries −0.0753∗∗∗ −0.0635∗∗ −0.0730∗∗∗ −0.0605
(0.0190) (0.0223) (0.0163) (0.0322)
Public −0.0310∗ −0.0288 −0.0142 −0.0503∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0228) (0.0150)
Private 0.0315 0.0316 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.0282
(0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0198) (0.0159)
Narrow Occ −0.0486∗∗ −0.0539∗∗ −0.0266 −0.0637∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0175) (0.0259) (0.0225)
Low Occ 0.0147 0.0225 0.0189 0.0491
(0.0194) (0.0184) (0.0407) (0.0261)
Medium Occ −0.0240 −0.0309∗∗ −0.0289 −0.0348
(0.0143) (0.0119) (0.0286) (0.0224)
High Occ −0.0913∗∗∗ −0.0879∗∗∗ −0.0765∗∗ −0.1060∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0238) (0.0185)
Single −0.1086∗∗∗ −0.1032∗∗∗ −0.1430∗∗∗ −0.1272∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0183) (0.0355) (0.0395)
Married 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0096 0.0786
(0.0270) (0.0221) (0.0398) (0.0560)
Minority −0.0004 −0.0089 0.0118 −0.0228
(0.0128) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0182)
Majority 0.0138 0.0103 0.0200 −0.0128
(0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0145)
Full-Time 0.0153 0.0134 0.0080 0.0009
(0.0099) (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0117)
C. Method of Estimation
Bof 0.0189∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0014 0.0250∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0026) (0.0087)
Neumark 0.0168 0.0097 0.0114 0.0074
(0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0067) (0.0109)
Reimers 0.0018 0.0118 −0.0029 0.0397∗
(0.0300) (0.0275) (0.0146) (0.0169)
Cotton 0.0137 0.0132 −0.0052 0.0165
(0.0132) (0.0149) (0.0069) (0.0085)
Brown 0.0161 0.0177 0.0184 0.0279
(0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0144) (0.0143)
Dummy 0.0148 0.0158 0.0087 0.0299∗
(0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0109) (0.0125)
IV 0.0073 −0.0128 0.0215 −0.0209
(0.0265) (0.0311) (0.0402) (0.0351)
Panel −0.0158 0.0011 −0.0069 −0.0708∗
(0.0201) (0.0236) (0.0330) (0.0313)
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Table 2.3: Continued
No. of (2)+ (2)+
Weighting No Estimates Precision Square
Scheme Weights in Study of Estimates Root of DF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman −0.0207 −0.0354 0.0097 −0.0330∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0184) (0.0076) (0.0120)
D. Alternative Measures of Wages
Not Hourly 0.0250 0.0229 0.0129 0.0323∗
(0.0131) (0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0139)
Hourly Conducted 0.0059 0.0075 0.0147 −0.0095
(0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0110)
Gross −0.0055 0.0031 −0.0241∗ 0.0005
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0128)
Potential Exp 0.0270∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ −0.0036 0.0302∗
(0.0092) (0.0100) (0.0117) (0.0122)
E. Variables for Workers’ Characteristics
Experience 0.0019 −0.0012 −0.0266∗ −0.0029
(0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0170)
Race/Immigrant 0.0023 0.0132 0.0117 −0.0001
(0.0098) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0121)
Marital Status −0.0278∗∗ −0.0421∗∗∗ 0.0040 −0.0342∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0123)
Kid 0.0078 0.0112 −0.0151 0.0315∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0122)
Marital/Kid −0.0101 0.0117 −0.0385 −0.0015
(0.0212) (0.0235) (0.0198) (0.0250)
Training 0.0166 0.0116 0.0034 0.0017
(0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0165)
Tenure 0.0227∗ 0.0145 0.0282∗∗ 0.0219
(0.0089) (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0118)
Occupation 0.0091 0.0097 0.0158 0.0171
(0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0090)
Industry 0.0217∗ 0.0275∗∗ 0.0071 0.0394∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0091)
Government 0.0265∗∗ 0.0188 0.0207 0.0112
(0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0107)
Union −0.0112 −0.0101 0.0153 0.0197
(0.0120) (0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0134)
Share of Female 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0260∗ 0.0301∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0116) (0.0109)
FT-PT −0.0031 0.0021 −0.0061 −0.0022
(0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0100)
Urban 0.0086 0.0105 0.0075 0.0031
(0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0148) (0.0121)
Region −0.0095 −0.0061 −0.0026 −0.0132
(0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0097)
Constant 0.0483 0.0252 0.1025 −0.0199
(0.0494) (0.0503) (0.0564) (0.0608)
N 2370 2370 1702 1927
R2 0.4390 0.4386 0.7184 0.5140
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Country and Year dummies are included in all specifications
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Table 2.4: Fixed Effects Model
FE(Paper) FE(Paper) FE(Study)
(1) (2) (3)
Data Set
New Entries −0.0669∗∗∗ −0.0666∗∗∗ −0.0578∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0197)
Public 0.0098 0.0223 .
(0.0413) (0.0481) .
Private 0.0778∗∗ 0.0847∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0285) (0.0030)
Narrow Occ 0.0274 0.0283 .
(0.0156) (0.0157) .
Low Occ −0.0131 −0.0269 −0.1780∗∗∗
(0.0610) (0.0714) (0.0081)
Medium Occ 0.0303 0.0236 .
(0.0195) (0.0206) .
High Occ 0.0833 0.0868 .
(0.0716) (0.0681) .
Single −0.2596∗∗∗ −0.2409∗∗∗ −0.3031∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0239) (0.0000)
Married 0.0884 0.1064∗ .
(0.0464) (0.0460) .
Minority −0.0780 −0.0770 −0.0859∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0512) (0.0283)
Majority −0.0769 −0.0761 .
(0.0614) (0.0636) .
Full-Time −0.0612∗∗∗ −0.0661∗∗∗ −0.0495∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0059)
Method of Estimation
Bof 0.0082 0.0082 0.0083
(0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0064)
Neumark 0.0161 0.0161 0.0158
(0.0296) (0.0302) (0.0098)
Reimers −0.0028 −0.0028 −0.0029
(0.0316) (0.0321) (0.0300)
Cotton 0.0196 0.0195 0.0195∗
(0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0082)
Brown 0.0185 0.0180 0.0043
(0.0154) (0.0135) (0.0105)
Dummy 0.0122 0.0120 0.0074
(0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0116)
IV 0.0060 0.0060 0.0069
(0.0250) (0.0255) (0.0283)
Panel −0.0411 −0.0156 −0.0388
(0.0462) (0.0367) (0.0417)
Heckman −0.0117 −0.0107 −0.0166∗
(0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0083)
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Table 2.4: Continued
FE(Paper) FE(Paper) FE(Study)
(1) (2) (3)
Alternative Measures of Wages
Not Hourly 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.1240∗∗∗ 0.1023∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0173) (0.0114)
Hourly Conducted −0.0229 0.0088 −0.0130
(0.0561) (0.0593) (0.0567)
Gross −0.0852∗∗∗ . .
(0.0000) . .
Potential Exp 0.0256∗ 0.0290∗ 0.0393∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0086)
Variables for Workers’ Characteristics
Experience 0.0125 0.0256 0.0505
(0.0231) (0.0258) (0.0265)
Race/Immigrant 0.2740∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0032
(0.0989) (0.0544) (0.0486)
Marital Status 0.0339 0.0587∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Kid −0.0584∗∗∗ −0.0761∗∗∗ −0.1032∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0160)
Training −0.0254 −0.0305 −0.0113
(0.0189) (0.0209) (0.0086)
Tenure 0.0332 0.0418∗ 0.0336
(0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0182)
Occupation 0.0473∗∗ 0.0482∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0101)
Industry 0.0193 0.0193 0.0119
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0095)
Government −0.0131 −0.0085 0.0045
(0.0184) (0.0162) (0.0153)
Union 0.0485∗∗ 0.0208 0.0340∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0160) (0.0107)
Share of Female 0.0401∗∗ 0.0406∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0078)
FT-PT 0.0096 −0.0043 0.0189
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0107)
Urban −0.0938 −0.0119 −0.0602
(0.0579) (0.0366) (0.0355)
Region −0.0141 −0.0131 −0.0011
(0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0094)
Constant −0.0026 0.2264∗∗∗ 0.1178∗∗
(0.0675) (0.0458) (0.0378)
Year Dummies No Yes No
Country Dummies No Yes No
N 1731 1731 1731
R2 0.2698 0.3472 0.1393
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.8: The Interactive Effect of Women in National Parliaments and
Countries with Different Social Norms on the Residual Gender Wage Gap
Basic Two Years Lagged Fparl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fparl 0.0043 0.0059∗ 0.0045 −0.0036 −0.0026 −0.0030
(0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Christ 0.0030 0.0262 0.0088 −0.0260 −0.0162 0.0053
(0.0460) (0.0315) (0.0337) (0.0450) (0.0310) (0.0355)
Buddh −0.0257 −0.0044 −0.0214 −0.1212∗ −0.1016 −0.1128
(0.0538) (0.0597) (0.0586) (0.0609) (0.0654) (0.0640)
Catho 0.0098 0.0165 −0.0017 −0.0357 −0.0316 −0.0097
(0.0474) (0.0280) (0.0355) (0.0445) (0.0283) (0.0369)
Commu −0.0697 −0.1167 −0.0767 −0.2100∗ −0.3105∗∗∗ −0.2563∗∗
(0.1198) (0.0958) (0.0950) (0.0967) (0.0916) (0.0886)
Mixed −0.3102∗∗∗ −0.3148∗∗∗ −0.2922∗∗∗ −0.4485∗∗∗ −0.4535∗∗∗ −0.4161∗∗∗
(0.0792) (0.0485) (0.0532) (0.1069) (0.0621) (0.0669)
Muslim 0.0139 −0.0030 0.0147 −0.0265 −0.0531 −0.0194
(0.0587) (0.0374) (0.0350) (0.0674) (0.0403) (0.0388)
Ortho 0.0358 0.0388 0.0488 −0.0394 −0.0542 −0.0022
(0.0469) (0.0337) (0.0370) (0.0480) (0.0344) (0.0394)
Protest −0.0160 0.0074 −0.0073 −0.0635 −0.0483 −0.0235
(0.0401) (0.0284) (0.0334) (0.0407) (0.0285) (0.0358)
Fparlbu 0.0027 −0.0039 0.0024 0.0165 0.0083 0.0157∗
(0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0078)
Fparlcath −0.0052 −0.0062∗ −0.0043 0.0026 0.0019 0.0027
(0.0069) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0072) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Fparlchr −0.0053 −0.0076∗∗ −0.0054∗ 0.0016 0.0002 0.0013
(0.0066) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0071) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Fparlcom −0.0008 −0.0012 −0.0005 0.0117 0.0137∗∗ 0.0137∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Fparlmix 0.0090 0.0078∗ 0.0073 0.0286∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0099) (0.0058) (0.0059)
Fparlmus 0.0056 0.0053 0.0057 0.0120 0.0118∗∗ 0.0113∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0090) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Fparlorth −0.0053 −0.0069∗ −0.0057∗ 0.0053 0.0047 0.0049
(0.0064) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Fparlprot −0.0060 −0.0077∗∗ −0.0058∗ 0.0020 0.0010 0.0019
(0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Constant 0.0828 0.0705 0.0858 0.1924∗ 0.1933∗ 0.0927
(0.0577) (0.0430) (0.0455) (0.0976) (0.0800) (0.0796)
FE(Continent) No No Yes No No Yes
FE(Income) No Yes No No Yes No
N 2197 2193 2197 2180 2175 2180
R2 0.3474 0.3291 0.3182 0.3404 0.3193 0.3141
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Note: The regression includes all the explanatory variables presented in Table 2.3. A set of year dummies
is included. To allow for the variations of trade openness and cultural indicators across countries, country
dummies are not included.
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Table 2.9: The Interactive Effect of Women in National Parliaments and
Different Development Levels on the Residual Gender Wage Gap
Two Years
Basic Lagged Fparl 1987 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fparl −0.0023 −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0038 −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0045∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0014)
High −0.0676∗ −0.1046∗∗∗ −0.1012∗∗ −0.1552∗∗∗ −0.1151∗ −0.1047∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0229) (0.0349) (0.0247) (0.0461) (0.0297)
UpM −0.0260 −0.0730∗∗ −0.0543 −0.1109∗∗∗ −0.1213∗ −0.1000∗∗
(0.0434) (0.0250) (0.0439) (0.0264) (0.0534) (0.0326)
LowM −0.0695 −0.1014∗∗∗ −0.1154∗∗ −0.1659∗∗∗ −0.0994∗ −0.0698∗
(0.0409) (0.0235) (0.0416) (0.0248) (0.0503) (0.0310)
FparlH 0.0006 0.0028∗ 0.0022 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.0040∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0015)
FparlUM −0.0001 0.0030 0.0010 0.0047∗ 0.0052 0.0061∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0019)
FparlLM 0.0030 0.0043∗∗ 0.0063∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0049 0.0047∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0017)
Constant 0.1082∗ 0.1864 0.1077∗ 0.2188∗∗ 0.1545∗∗ 0.1486∗∗∗
(0.0531) (0.1182) (0.0479) (0.0762) (0.0586) (0.0443)
FE(Continent) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2198 2198 2180 2180 1307 1307
R2 0.3081 0.2918 0.3135 0.2967 0.3029 0.2461
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Note: The regression includes all the explanatory variables presented in Table 2.3. A set of year dummies
is included. To allow for the variations of trade openness and cultural indicators across countries, country
dummies are not included.
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Appendix 2A
Figure 2.5: The Evolution of Trade Globalisation by Developing Region
(Export/GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators (2010)
Note: Advanced Economics (Adv); Newly Industrialized Asian Economics (NIEs); Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Developing Asia (Dasia); Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC); Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Figure 2.6: The Evolution of Trade Globalisation by Developing Region
(Import/GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators (2010)
Note: Advanced Economics (Adv); Newly Industrialized Asian Economics (NIEs); Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Developing Asia (Dasia); Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC); Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Table 2.10: Definition of Variables
Trade Trade (% of GDP)
Export Exports (% of GDP)
Agri Ex Agriculture Exports (% of GDP)
Manu Ex Manufacturing Exports (% of GDP)
Serv Ex Service Exports (% of GDP)
Import Imports (% of GDP)
Agri Im Agriculture Imports (% of GDP)
Manu Im Manufacturing Imports (% of GDP)
Serv Im Service Imports (% of GDP)
Fparl Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%)
Dummy Variable For
Fparllow Fparl at the Lower End of the Distribution (Reference Group)
Fparlmid Fparl at the Middle of the Distribution
Fparlhigh Fparl at the Higher End of the Distribution
Confu Confucianism (Reference Group)
Christ Christianity/Judaism
Buddh Buddhism/Hinduism
Catho Catholic
Commu Communism
Mixed Mixed
Muslim Muslim
Ortho Orthodox
Protest Protestant
Dev Developing Economies (Reference Group)
Adv Advanced Economies
Low Low Income Countries (Reference Group)
LowM Lower-Middle Income Countries
UpM Upper-Middle Income Countries
High High Income Countries
Interaction Terms
TradeDev Trade × Developing Economies (Reference Group)
TradeAdv Trade × Advanced Economies
TradeL Trade × Low Income (Reference Group)
TradeLM Trade × Lower-Middle Income
TradeUM Trade × Upper-Middle Income
TradeH Trade × High Income
Fparlconfu Fparl × Confucianism (Reference Group)
Fparlbu Fparl × Buddhism/Hinduism
Fparlcath Fparl × Catholic
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Table 2.10: Continued
Fparlchr Fparl × Christianity/Judaism
Fparlcom Fparl × Communism
Fparlmix Fparl × Mixed
Fparlmus Fparl × Muslim
Fparlorth Fparl × Orthodox
Fparlprot Fparl × Protestant
FparlL Fparl × Low Income (Reference Group)
FparlLM Fparl × Lower-Middle Income
FparlUM Fparl × Upper-Middle Income
FparlH Fparl × High Income
Countries by Development Region
Adv Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA
NIEs Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
CEE Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, Yugoslavia
CIS Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Dasia Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
LAC Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
MENA Morocco, Sudan
SSA Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
Countries by Cultural Background/Beliefsa,b
Confucianism Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
Christ&Jud Botswana, Canada, East Germany, Germany, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya,
Madagascar, Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, Uganda
Buddhism India, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Catholic Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela
Communism China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia, Vietnam
Mixed Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago
Muslim Brunei, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan,
Sudan, Turkey, Uzbekistan
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Table 2.10: Continued
Orthodox Belarus, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Georgia, Greece, Russia, Ukraine,
Protestant Australia, Barbados, Denmark, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, UK, USA
Note: For country classification, this table only displays the countries included in the meta-regression analysis
in this chapter. Figure 2.1 to 2.3 present the results using global data.
a Gradstein et al. (2001, p.11) provide the clear definition of the belief classification, Our rule in deciding
what is a dominant religion in a given country was that at least 40 percent of the population had to have
the same religion, with the second most numerous religion not exceeding 25 percent of the population.
It explains the Christian/Judaism grouping, they are grouped together as the size of the two are similar,
whereas some other combinations are not grouped into a single category but just treated as mixed.
b It may be seen that some countries (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia) appear in multiple categories due to
the breakdown of the communist system (transform to Catholic) yet not for all former communist countries
(e.g. Hungary and Poland). This is because there are no observations for those countries in the communist
period in the meta dataset for this analysis, so catholic was their dominant belief system in the years that
data were observed.
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Table 2.11: Meta Regression (1963-1999)
No. of (2)+ (2)+
Weighting No Estimates Precision Square
Scheme Weights in Study of Estimates Root of DF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Paper
Author Female 0.0068 0.0129 −0.0109 −0.0020
(0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0145) (0.0184)
B. Data Set
New Entries −0.0778∗∗ −0.0691∗ −0.0731∗∗ −0.0693∗
(0.0269) (0.0285) (0.0236) (0.0318)
Public −0.0474∗ −0.0665∗∗ −0.0439 −0.0453∗
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0315) (0.0223)
Private 0.0042 −0.0080 0.0351 0.0123
(0.0276) (0.0261) (0.0277) (0.0238)
Narrow Occ −0.0567∗∗ −0.0592∗∗ −0.0269 −0.0863∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0245) (0.0248)
Low Occ 0.0397 0.0541∗∗ −0.0246 0.0703∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0363) (0.0246)
Medium Occ −0.0314 −0.0260 −0.0763∗ −0.0504∗
(0.0183) (0.0162) (0.0350) (0.0219)
High Occ −0.1223∗∗∗ −0.1106∗∗∗ −0.1278∗∗∗ −0.1567∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0278) (0.0194)
Single −0.1363∗∗∗ −0.1327∗∗∗ −0.1165∗∗ −0.1544∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0203) (0.0363) (0.0399)
Married 0.0697∗∗ 0.0670∗∗ 0.0480 0.0667
(0.0266) (0.0244) (0.0392) (0.0498)
Minority −0.0273 −0.0449 0.0144 −0.0294
(0.0206) (0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0214)
Majority 0.0092 0.0163 −0.0017 −0.0146
(0.0199) (0.0229) (0.0287) (0.0213)
Full-Time 0.0112 0.0129 −0.0116 −0.0115
(0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0171)
C. Method of Estimation
Bof 0.0147 0.0178 0.0025 0.0064
(0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0027) (0.0089)
Neumark 0.0342∗∗ 0.0192 0.0280∗∗ −0.0055
(0.0115) (0.0144) (0.0086) (0.0152)
Reimers −0.0070 0.0016 0.0188 0.0411
(0.0381) (0.0275) (0.0188) (0.0255)
Cotton 0.0075 −0.0010 0.0110 0.0027
(0.0234) (0.0302) (0.0168) (0.0277)
Brown 0.0016 0.0034 0.0416∗ −0.0171
(0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0191)
Dummy 0.0078 0.0023 0.0523∗∗ 0.0043
(0.0164) (0.0190) (0.0174) (0.0198)
IV −0.0070 −0.0116 −0.0659∗∗ −0.0280
(0.0263) (0.0350) (0.0254) (0.0330)
Panel −0.0020 0.0125 0.0349 −0.0911∗
(0.0255) (0.0275) (0.0559) (0.0446)
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Table 2.11: Continued
No. of (2)+ (2)+
Weighting No Estimates Precision Square
Scheme Weights in Study of Estimates Root of DF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman −0.0168 −0.0255 0.0158∗ −0.0493∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0213) (0.0078) (0.0139)
D. Alternative Measures of Wages
Not Hourly 0.0125 −0.0043 0.0306 0.0268
(0.0221) (0.0294) (0.0214) (0.0200)
Hourly Conducted −0.0072 −0.0304 0.0385∗ −0.0099
(0.0187) (0.0222) (0.0166) (0.0199)
Gross 0.0355 0.0407 0.0775 0.0271
(0.0279) (0.0249) (0.0460) (0.0366)
Potential Exp 0.0131 0.0403∗ −0.0295 0.0047
(0.0142) (0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0168)
E. Variables for Workers’ Characteristics
Experience 0.0005 −0.0190 −0.0417 −0.0155
(0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0251) (0.0291)
Race/Immigrant 0.0130 0.0220 0.0064 0.0213
(0.0160) (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0176)
Marital Status −0.0405∗∗ −0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0255 −0.0344∗
(0.0140) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.0166)
Kid 0.0133 0.0156 −0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0248
(0.0159) (0.0183) (0.0158) (0.0180)
Marital/Kid −0.0460 0.0034 0.0136 −0.1200∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0456) (0.0422) (0.0399)
Training 0.0030 −0.0076 −0.0105 −0.0258
(0.0391) (0.0389) (0.0224) (0.0222)
Tenure 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.0359∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0139)
Occupation 0.0040 0.0018 0.0299∗ 0.0010
(0.0099) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0091)
Industry 0.0134 0.0216 −0.0105 0.0304∗
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0141)
Government 0.0018 −0.0131 −0.0238 0.0203
(0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.0188)
Union 0.0314 0.0435 0.0341∗ 0.0469∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0244) (0.0170) (0.0174)
Share of Female 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0540∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0188) (0.0137) (0.0135)
FT-PT −0.0144 −0.0056 −0.0209 −0.0172
(0.0137) (0.0162) (0.0131) (0.0145)
Urban 0.0294 0.0264 0.0138 0.0202
(0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0171) (0.0157)
Region −0.0173 −0.0205 0.0099 −0.0179
(0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0152) (0.0161)
Constant 0.0837 0.0407 0.0200 0.1285
(0.0708) (0.0798) (0.0758) (0.0695)
N 1532 1532 1072 1225
R2 0.5085 0.4981 0.7905 0.6019
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Country and Year dummies are included in all specifications
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3 The Effect of Technical Change on Gender
Employment Differentials: The Case of Japan
Summary
• Using data from the Japanese Employment Status Survey in 1987− 2007 and
EUKLEMS, this chapter explores the changes in Japanese regular/irregular
employment between male and female workers and the effect of technical de-
velopment on the changes over time.
• Following the Autor-Levy- Murnane model, decomposition and regression meth-
ods are employed to analyse the within and between industry relationship
between technical change and changes in workers’ characteristics on the one
hand, and the changes in the gender regular/irregular employment gap on the
other.
• The findings of this chapter indicate that the total gender employment gap
in Japan has fallen considerably in the period 1987 − 2007 as a consequence
of the crisis and structural changes, as well as the fast growth of irregular
employment for women but not for men.
• In addition, rising ICT intensity in sectors only increases the relative demand
for female regular employment in sales jobs, while for other jobs it pushes
women into irregular jobs, which is opposite to the effect for men.
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3.1 Introduction
When it comes to gender parity, Japan seems to face a more blunt version
of a trend the rest of the world is experiencing, and has frequently been ranked
at the bottom of the world in female relative labour market outcomes and political
empowerment (Blau and Kahn, 2003; Daly et al., 2006; Miyoshi, 2008; OECD, 2012;
World Economic Forum, 2012, 2013), despite many developed economies having
succeeded in closing the gender pay gap and in maximizing the returns on women’s
investment in their human capital. With the poor government policies, patriarchal
expectations, unsupportive work environments, and often undervalued by bosses,
many well-educated Japanese women either suffer in low-paid, part-time jobs or are
compelled to be in dead-end “office-lady” tracks serving tea for men, and are often
pushed off their career once they become mothers, even if they may have outstanding
analytical skills and graduate from an elite university (Alter, 2013; Beech, 2013;
Haworth, 2013; Hewlett, 2013; Wingfield-Hayes, 2013).
The Japanese labour market takes on a rigid form in favour of the lifetime em-
ployment system (shushin koyo), the seniority payment principle17 (nenko joretsu),
and company-based trade unions (kigyo-betsu rodo kumiai), with strong discrimina-
tion against women (Peng, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011; World Economic
Forum, 2012; Beech, 2013; Haworth, 2013; Hewlett, 2013; Wingfield-Hayes, 2013).
The advocates of lifetime employment explain various phenomena unique to the
Japanese labour market, which are also strongly associated with the severe issue
of a dual labour force with respect to regular (primary; seishain) and non-regular
17Combined with the lifetime employment system, the standard salary is set by employee’s senior-
ity and position to encourage employees accumulating their seniority in the same company until
retirement.
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employment (subordinate; hiseiki shain)18. Firms rarely dismiss their regular em-
ployees, and these workers do not casually quit or change their jobs. They benefit
from the seniority system, and the candidates for promotion are also picked from
the cluster (Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011). Over the course of the long term
recession, commencing in the 1990s, companies have opted to increase the share of
non-regular employees to cut labour costs rather than lay off current regular em-
ployees, and so a labour market dualism in Japan thus has formed (Doeringer and
Piore, 1971; Miyoshi, 2008; Peng, 2010; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011). Non-regular
workers comprised about one third of the share of total employment in the 2000s,
of which the majority were women and youths (Shinozuka, 2006; Miyoshi, 2008;
Peng, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011). Their pay is considerably lower
than for the regular workers, and the work experience and seniority of non-regular
jobs are not positively associated with wages; only regular employment seniority
can help increase wages (Shinozuka, 2006; Miyoshi, 2008). This labour market dual-
ism increases the income and social security gap, not only between the regular and
non-regular workers, but also between male and female workers, as women comprise
the largest share of non-regular employment (Shinozuka, 2006; Miyoshi, 2008; Peng,
2010).
Concentrating on the supply side factors such as the changes in characteristics of
men and women, the empirical literature has revealed there is a substantial portion
of changes in female relative labour market outcomes remaining unexplained all over
the world (Blau and Kahn, 1997, 2003, 2006), which implies the importance of the
demand side story. In the case of Japan, a number of studies have attributed the
18Those with unlimited employment terms and full time work hours are regarded as regular employ-
ees, otherwise they are non-regular employees. Section 3.3 provides a more detailed definition on
this point.
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great gender pay gap to the disparity of higher education attainment between men
and women, to the remarkably lower female labour participation, to the greater
share of female part time workers, to the poor gender-specific policies, and possibly
to the sexism in the society (Miyoshi, 2008; Abe, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010; World
Economic Forum, 2012; Beech, 2013; Haworth, 2013; Hewlett, 2013; Wingfield-
Hayes, 2013). Of these, human capital accumulation has often been pointed out
as one of the most important factors driving the changes in the Japanese gender
pay gap (Kawaguchi, 2005; Miyoshi, 2008; Abe, 2010; Asano et al., 2010; Ikenaga,
2009, 2011). However, despite the existence of a dual labour force in Japan having
been extensively documented (Miyoshi, 2008; Sommer, 2009; Asano et al., 2010;
Peng, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011), most research on the
Japanese gender gap in labour market performance does not take into account this
issue and hence does not consider shifts within and between job types. This could
therefore be another cause of changes in gender differentials.
Furthermore, recent empirical work has shown a growing interest in the effect
of the development of technology on the labour market in particular in advanced
Western economies. In early studies, the idea of skill biased technical change (SBTC)
argues that technology changes have favoured higher-educated skilled workers and
been against lower-educated unskilled workers, which has been a key explanation of
rising wage inequality (Berman et al., 1994, 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998).
As an increase in relative demand for the least-skilled low paid jobs compared to
the intermediate level jobs is found, which is not in line with the hypothesis of
SBTC, more recently literature has examined the effect of technical change on the
demand for different jobs. A hypothesis of task biased technical change (TBTC)
put forth by Autor et al. (ALM) (2003) argues that technology has replaced the
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routine tasks which are situated in the middle of wage and skill distribution, and
been associated with an increase in relative demand for well-paid skilled jobs and
low-paid least skilled jobs − this process causes so-called job polarisation, and this
technical change has occurred alongside rising wage inequality.
Hence, the aim of this chapter is to understand how the regular and non-regular
employment has been changing differently for male and female workers over time,
and to discover the within industry relationship between workers’ characteristics
changes and technical change. This is the first study using Japan as a case to pro-
vide evidence of how the introduction of technology shifts the regular/non-regular
employment in the perspective of gender. It will not only focus on the between
industry task changes but also on the within industry employment shifts for women
relative to men, as many studies have pointed out that the effect of technical change
would occur within rather than between industries (Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener,
2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2006, 2010; Lindley, 2011).
Overall, the results suggest that although the relative proportion of women in em-
ployment has increased in Japan, this has not all been in good/regular jobs, with
the restructuring of the economy (between sectors) and ICT investment (within sec-
tors) both having some role to play in the rising numbers of non-regular workers,
particularly amongst women.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the evolution of
Japan’s economy. Section 3.3 describes Japan’s employment structure and the
changing pattern of Japan’s labour market between 1987 and 2007. Section 3.4
presents the concept of technical change and the empirical findings. Section 3.5 de-
scribes the data sets, and Section 3.6 discusses the conceptual framework. Section
3.7 uses industry level data to examine how the gender employment gap in Japan
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has been changing within and between sectors; and how the changes in workers’
characteristics and ICT intensity have driven the within sector changes. The final
section concludes.
3.2 The Evolution of Japan’s Economy
In the decades of very strong economic growth following World War II, Japan’s
gross national product (GNP) reached the second largest in the world in the 1970s.
After the Plaza Accord was signed in 1985, Japanese exports were hit hard by the
yen appreciating, alongside the economic growth declining by about two percent
from 1985 to 1986 (Figure 3.1). The government thus created an incentive for the
expansionary monetary policies to offset the stronger yen, and the Bank of Japan
lowered the discount rate from 5 percent to 2.5 percent during 1986 and 1987 (Powell,
2002; Koo, 2003). Along with financial deregulation, drastically easing monetary
policies, large trade surpluses, and overconfidence of Japan’s economy, one of largest
financial bubbles in history was created. Aggressive speculation was inevitable, and
asset prices inflated particularly in the real estate and stock markets. Contractionary
monetary policies were hence implemented to restrain the bubble, and the discount
rate was raised five times to 6 percent in the period 1989−1990, then the bubble burst
(Powell, 2002; Koo, 2003; Citrin and Wolfson, 2006). The economy then entered
the long term recession since the early 1990s, and GDP growth decreased sharply
by more than four percentage points between 1990 and 1993, which is known as
the “lost decade” in Japan (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). According to Koo (2003),
about 1400 trillion Japanese yen were erased with the combined crash of the stock
and real estate markets during the decade, the equivalent of about three years’ worth
of Japanese GDP of 1989.
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In the aftermath of the collapsing bubble, the plummeted value of land and
banks’ equity portfolios and the persistently high nonperforming loans constrained
bank credit and crippled the confidence of household and business. The 1997
Asian Financial Crisis furthermore exacerbated the downturn, detonating a series of
bankruptcies of firms and large financial institutes that had substantial investment
in Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, leading to the two years’ negative GDP growth.
Despite the repeated fiscal stimulus packages, where government tried ten stimulus
packages with more than one hundred trillion yen in total during the 1990s, the
Japanese economy still failed to get away from its trough (Powell, 2002). As part of
Japan’s quantitative easing policy, the government and the central bank announced
that interest rates were reduced to near zero for the purpose of eliminating deflation
in 2001, but the strategy failed again. The stock price eventually bottomed out in
2003 following almost 3 percent economic growth and the falling ratio of nonper-
forming loans at major banks to below 2.5 percent in 2005. The zero rate policy was
finally ended in 2006, until the global financial crisis arose in 2008 (Powell, 2002;
Koo, 2003; Citrin and Wolfson, 2006; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011).
Domestic demand started playing a key role instead of exports in the development
of the Japanese economy since the late 1980s. The excesses of debt, capacity and
labour have imposed pressures on the corporate sector since the bubble burst, leading
to a reduction in domestic private spending for both consumption and investment.
As Figure 3.1 shows, the changing pattern of imports is strongly influenced by the
business cycle compared to exports, where for example, the imports increased at a
faster pace than the exports since 1986 until the recessionary period began (Citrin
and Wolfson, 2006).
Due to the long term sluggish GDP growth since the early 1990s, Japan’s un-
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employment rate went up from 2.1 percent in 1997, to 4.7 percent in 2002, and to
5.6 percent in July 2009 (Powell, 2002; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011). Given the
historical and social convention of lifetime employment with the unemployment rate
never more than 2.8 percent in the 1980s, the increase to 5.6 percent is significant
in Japan (Powell, 2002). The manufacturing and construction industries were hit
particularly hard by the recession, alongside a sharp decline in their employment
(Figure 3.2). The ongoing structural change, moving away from manufacturing to
the service sector, has naturally played a role in explaining the variation across in-
dustries, and the bursting bubble accelerated the ongoing decrease in employment
in some sectors, of which the employment in manufacturing plummeted by almost
eight percentage points between 1987 and 2007 and the construction industry shrank
considerably in the period 1997 − 2007. Along with the rapid growth of the aging
population, the rising demand for the service of health care has expanded the sector
significantly. Employment in professional and technology related services has also
increased following the development of technology.
3.3 The Changing Patterns of Japan’s Labour Market
The lifetime employment system (shushin koyo), the seniority payment prin-
ciple (nenko joretsu), and company-based trade unions (kigyo-betsu rodo kumiai),
alongside strong sexism, are the main components of the rigid Japanese labour mar-
ket. (Peng, 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011). The lifetime employment
system is that the firms recruit a particular amount of new graduates at a fixed
time each year, and the employment term is indefinite. Employers prefer to hire
new graduates fresh out of high school or university, especially those who have good
potential to offer longer term service, and who are easier to mould. With the typical
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hiring process in Japan, graduates have to find good jobs before graduation during
the job hunting period19, otherwise, the opportunities for being interviewed are lim-
ited. The good jobs usually refer to those with unlimited employment terms, with
full time work hours, as regular employees (seishain). By contrast, those who do not
meet the above definitions and with a contract that clearly states the employment
terms are regarded as non-regular employees (hiseiki shain) (Abe, 2010; Peng, 2010;
Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011).
Non-regular employees include several different types: dispatched (haken), con-
tract (keiyaku), entrusted (shokutaku), part time (pato), and arbeit (arubaito/temporary)
employees. Dispatched workers are hired by temporary labour agencies and usually
dispatched to large manufacturing firms, in which the majority are men (Shire and
Van Jaarsvald, 2008; Tachibanaki, 2010). Contract and entrusted employees often
refer to people belonging to the company subsequently, where the entrusted workers
generally refer to those who are re-employed after retirement as contractors. The
growing number of re-employed contract workers has led to an increase in the pen-
sion age gradually from 60 to 65 since the late 1980s (Steinberg and Nakane, 2011).
Part time arbeit employees are usually hired in the service sectors associated with
large proportions of women, especially housewives, and are paid less than other
types of workers (Tachibanaki, 2010; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011).
The advocates of lifetime employment explain various phenomena unique to the
Japanese labour market. Firms rarely dismiss the regular employees as they are
19Japanese school starts in April and ends in March. The college students start looking for a job
about after summer in the third year (there are four years in Japanese university). Although it
is controversial as they are supposed to study while they belong to university, this job hunting
(kigyo-betsu rodo kumiai) style has been a social convention in Japan. Over time students have
started hunting for a job increasingly earlier, as the failure in finding regular jobs would make
them to be considered second-rate, which would strongly affect their whole working career as well
as their life outside the labour market.
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protected by strict employment regulation. These workers do not casually quit or
change their jobs as the given company-specialised on-the-job training, and the skills
and work experiences they have gained in a particular firm, may not be transferable
to another firm. The seniority system is also a matter of fact where these regular
workers would immediately lose their accumulation of seniority once they leave a
firm (Tachibanaki, 2010; Yashiro, 2011).
In the aftermath of the bubble bursting in the early 1990s, companies have opted
to increase their share of non-regular employees to cut labour costs rather than lay off
current regular employees. The strict manpower regulations have compelled firms to
hoard their regular workforce during the downturn, and thus to cut down the number
of job vacancies for regular employees, instead hiring more non-regular workers, who
can be legally dismissed and their numbers quickly adjusted to uncertainty about the
future (Asano et al., 2010; Tachibanaki, 2010). Besides, a series of deregulations on
dispatch workers began to be put in place. According to the Manpower Dispatching
Business Act in 1986, dispatched workers could only be employed in 26 occupations
requiring highly professional skills. This limitation on occupation field was expanded
in 1999, and the manufacturing sector was permitted to hire dispatched workers
in 2003, with the extension of maximum contract terms from one to three years
(Kuwahara, 2007; Shire and Van Jaarsvald, 2008; Peng, 2010; Steinberg and Nakane,
2011). This deregulation dramatically accelerated the decline of regular employment
and the growth of non-regular employment in the 2000s (Table 3.3 and 3.4).
It is very difficult for non-regular workers to convert their contracts to regular
ones, and their interests have been largely neglected by government, employers, and
trade unions (Peng, 2010, Yun, 2010; Yashiro, 2011). The government has been
in close alignment with the large enterprises over the issues of the expansion of
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non-regular employment and deregulating the restrictions on dispatch agencies and
workers’ dismissals. Moreover, most mainstream trade unions, usually represent-
ing the interests of male regular employees, deem that the growth of non-regular
employment is unavoidable as it would protect industrial competitiveness and the
benefits of their union members (Peng, 2010; Yun, 2010). A dual labour force hence
has been formed in Japan with the shrinking of regular employment (primary), and
the expansion of non-regular and temporary employment (subordinate) associated
with a massive share of women and youths (Miyoshi, 2008; Peng, 2010; Tachibanaki,
2010; Yashiro, 2011).
The dualization processes began in the mid to late 1980s, with the pace of in-
crease rapid in the late 1990s, where the share of non-regular workers has grown
significantly from 18 percent in 1987 to 33 percent of total employment in 2007
(Figure 3.3), and the increase for female workers far exceeds the rise for male work-
ers. In addition, the share of male regular employment has declined at a faster
rate than for female workers, which is due possibly to the rapid shrinking of the
male-dominated industries, to the increase in the number of part time workers and
freeters20 mainly among young men, and to those who are shifted from regular em-
ployees to contractors being offered voluntary retirement packages in the old cohort.
Figure 3.4 shows the changing pattern of regular and non-regular employment
across industries. The health care sector stands out with a marked increase in both
types of workforce compared to all other industries which have large decreases in
regular employees over time, as a consequence of the growth of an ageing population
20Freeters are young people who do not have regular employment but who work at one or more part
time jobs or at one short term job after another, excluding housewives and students. The term
was coined by combining the English word free and German word Arbeiter (worker) (Tachibanaki,
2010).
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in Japan (Ikenaga, 2009, 2011; Tachibanaki, 2010), where the employees in this
sector are mainly women. With respect to the wholesale and retail trade sector,
although the share of regular employment was still relatively large in 2007, the
regular workforce is on a trend of being substituted by the non-regular over time,
with a decrease in the regular by 4 percentage points and an increase in the non-
regular by 3.6 percentage points during the two decades. A growth of non-regular
employment is an ongoing phenomenon in almost all industries, particularly where
large proportions of women, mainly housewives, are employed as part timers such
as in the hotel and restaurant sectors followed by the retail, health care, and the
education sectors (Kuwahara, 2007; Tachibanaki, 2010).
As mentioned in the previous section, the combined effects of Japan’s structural
change and the collapse of the bubble hit the manufacturing sector particularly
hard, where the employment losses were concentrated among the regular workers.
Considering the ban on hiring dispatched workers in the manufacturing sector was
just lifted in 2003, the growth of non-regular employees in the sector is significant
in the period of 1997 − 2007. The construction sector has also shown a dramatic
contraction between 1997 and 2007, which is very likely continuing. According to
Steinberg and Nakane (2011), the loss of employment in the manufacturing and
construction industries contributed 87 percent of all job losses from 2007 to 2009.
Transport and communication is next in terms of a decreasing regular workforce over
time. Moreover, in addition to manufacturing being a male-dominated sector, there
are almost no female workers in the construction and transportation sectors due to
the heavy reliance on physical strength (Tachibanaki, 2010). These help explain the
sharp decline in the male regular employment over the twenty years, especially after
1997 associated with a marked contraction of the manufacturing, construction and
107
transportation sectors.
Many Japanese large corporations adopt a dual-track employment system man-
agement (sogoshoku) and clerical (ippanshoku). The probability of implementing
the dual-track system is positively associated with the firm size (Daly et al., 2006;
Tachibanaki, 2010), and workers are appointed to one or the other track at the time
of their engagement. Management-track employees with a larger share of men are
engaged in comparatively higher level tasks, and must accept transferring across the
country as required. By contrast, those in clerical-track positions, which are mainly
held by women, are involved in relatively general and routine support tasks, and
are usually not required to transfer. The decision of Japanese corporations at the
time of hiring is strongly driven by individual academic achievement in particular
for female employees. As Tachibanaki (2010) states, women who have not gradu-
ated from top rank universities are very likely to be employed on the clerical track,
in other words, those who only hold high school or junior college diplomas have
almost no chance to play managerial roles in the Japanese labour market as they
are considered a group of people planning to leave the market in a short time. On
the other hand, a career-minded woman, who is ambitious to enter the management
track but has been unable to attend a prestigious university, is more likely to find
satisfaction at a small and medium size firm.
Gender trends in occupational choice combined with type of employment are sim-
ilar to those noted with regard to type of industry following the structural changes
in Japan (Table 3.1, Panel A). On top of that, the pattern of a dual-track employ-
ment system with a gender division is clearly shown, where a much larger share of
women is involved in the non-regular clerical track and a relatively higher propor-
tion of men is found on the management track. Although the gender employment
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gap in professional and managerial jobs has slightly shrunk, it remained large. The
impact of recession and industrial structure changes as well as the gender difference
in physical strength on occupational choice is clear. Following the expansion of
the service industries, the share of sales and service employment especially for non-
regular workers has increased dramatically for all workers in particular for women,
but with a rapid decline of male regular workers by over five percentage points in
production-related occupations.
Turning to the gender employment difference in relation to age groups (Table 3.1,
Panel B), there is almost no gap between females and males in the youngest cohort,
associated with a large reduction in the share of employment over the twenty years
up to 2007. Several possible reasons can help explain the downward trend of youth
employment: first, the increase of attainment in higher levels of education postpones
their age of first entering the labour market; and fewer job opportunities are offered
to youths due to the crisis (Steinberg and Nakane, 2011; Yashiro, 2011). For the
age groups after the youngest, the gender differential in both types of employment
remains extremely large in particular for those aged 35 − 49; where the share of
regular employment for men was at least 11 percentage points more than for women,
but the non-regular workforce remained female-dominated. Note that although the
gender gap of total employment in this cohort has been narrowing gradually over the
two decades, it is due largely to the substantial decline in male regular employees.
Surprisingly, the oldest cohort shows a steady growth of regular workers for both
men and women compared to the falling regular employment across most age groups,
which is very likely another causal fact to explain why the young generation have
been struggling to find a good job during the downturn. Moreover, the share of
female regular workers has been relatively stable compared to male workers over
109
time, this reflects the fact that more and more women are choosing their career
rather than settling down (Beech, 2013; Haworth, 2013) as in particular there is an
uptrend found for female workers in the 25− 34 age group.
Looking in Figure 3.5 at the gender employment gap by educational levels, both
men and women with higher education have been an increasing proportion of em-
ployment compared to the lower level of education, however, the gender gap in the
university or graduates category is found to be very large. The gender difference
in junior college is also largely associated with a greater share of female workers,
where the curricula of junior college frequently focuses on providing for a short term
career before marriage or preparation for marriage. As has been mentioned, female
educational background at the time of their hiring is critical, the observed large ed-
ucational gap between men and women helps to explain why the majority of women
are in clerical-related occupations but men are in managerial and professional jobs.
Japan is a conservative, patriarchal society, the young are dominated by the old,
and the marginalization of women is pervasive. Despite the fact that the share of
higher-educated women is rising, most of them have found it difficult to pursue their
careers following the poor gender-specific legislations, unsupportive work environ-
ments, and social expectations for women. Those women are either shunted into a
dead-end supporting track, as “office lady” roles serving tea for men, or pushed into
low-paid, non-regular jobs, the reason for them doing these menial jobs are dictated
by her gender even if they may have outstanding analytical skills and graduate from
an elite university (Beech, 2013; Hewlett, 2013). Moreover, many well-qualified
women leave the labour market because of the lack opportunities for career devel-
opment, the poor family friendly policy provision and the lack of available day-care
which together compel them to quit once they have their first child (Haworth, 2013;
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Hewlett, 2013; Wingfield-Hayes, 2013).
In order to follow the international commitment for the elimination of gender
discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEO Law hereafter) was
passed in 1985 and was enacted in April 1986 in Japan. However, the content itself
was very ambiguous, there were no clear Law Articles prohibiting gender discrimi-
nation in recruitment, hiring, allocation, and promotion, due to the anger against
the law from society. It was worried that women would take over the jobs from
the relatively lower qualified men, the enforcement of the law would destroy their
traditional social norms or women taking care of homes (Chiou, 2007). As the
EEO Law 1985 was unsurprisingly ineffective since then, the Japanese government
passed a modification of the EEO Law in 1997, which clearly stated the prohibition
against gender discrimination in workplaces, that employers are under the obliga-
tion to practice gender equality and have actions to prevent sexual harassment in
workplaces, etc. Yet the effectiveness of the law still remains in doubt, as it does
not really help change the stereotype of gender roles in the society. Hence in 2002,
a policy research institution on equal employment opportunities was established to
tackle the persistent gender inequality in the Japanese labour market (ibid). The
unfriendly work environment and very slow improvement in the concept of gender
roles are definitely amongst the main factors making Japanese women unable to re-
main in the labour market. However, it should also be known that male workers and
employers should not always be blamed, since some women decide to only remain
in the market until getting married and self select into relatively lower position jobs
compared to their education.
Tachibanaki (2010) has brought up another idea about why there is a great
amount of women playing a supporting role in the labour market. Following the
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conventional wisdom in Japan, higher education for women is still largely perceived
as giving a better chance to find a better qualified husband who, for instance, works
in a prestigious company in a good position. Some women are keen to enter presti-
gious companies in specific geographical locations, as the chance of finding a “good
marriage partner” is higher than in other areas. Hence, some female graduates from
elite universities may give up the management-track positions at small and medium
size firms but deliberately self-select into clerical jobs. As the tasks are mainly
routine and supportive, corporations have been increasing the share of non-regular
employees in the clerical track under the long term economic depression. Many
female high school and junior college graduates thus are compelled to enter the non-
regular clerical track while the regular positions have been occupied by the higher
educated women (ibid), which results in the marked increase in female non-regular
employment in clerical occupations over the twenty years up to 2007 (Table 3.1).
Since the late 1990s, a downward trend in average wages has been revealed in
Japan. Between 1997 and 2007 average nominal wages have fallen by 9.4 percent
(Steinberg and Nakane, 2011). Various thoughts have been put forward to explain
the fall (Sommer, 2009; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011): first, Japanese firms tend
to raise bonuses to reward highly performing workers, rather than increase their
monthly base wages. The large share of bonus and overtime payments has been
cut down during the recession to adjust labour costs for corporations. However,
it is found that both negotiated wages and bonuses for regular workers actually
rose every year in the period between 1997 and 2007 (Steinberg and Nakane, 2011).
Another argument for the falling average wages is that the younger workers who
are not so well paid have been replacing the older employees with high payments.
This seems not very persuasive as it can be seen in Table 3.1 that the employment
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of the oldest cohort is much greater than for the young generation. Most empirical
studies have reached an agreement that the rapid growth of non-regular employment
is the main explanation for the declining average wages and wage inequality in Japan
(Shinozuka, 2006; Sommer, 2009; Tachibanaki, 2010; Steinberg and Nakane, 2011).
Consistent with this, it is noted that average wages have been falling since the late
1990s, while the share of non-regular workers has been increasing dramatically in
the period, where it was about 23 percent of total employment in 1997 rising to 30
percent in 2002, and to 33 percent in 2007 (Figure 3.3).
3.4 The Effect of Technical Change on Jobs
Recent research has shown growing interest in the effect of the declining price
of information technology on changes in relative demand for workers with different
levels of skill. In earlier studies, the idea of skill biased technical change (SBTC)
argued that technical change has resulted in rising wage inequality as it has favoured
higher-educated skilled workers and been against lower-educated unskilled workers
(Berman et al., 1994, 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). However, some studies
have disagreed with the SBTC hypothesis in explaining the growth of wage inequality
(Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006). For instance, it is observed that although
technical change increased the relative demand for the higher-skilled workers in the
1980s, it actually increased the demand for unskilled workers in the other periods
in the US21. As this phenomenon is difficult to reconcile with the SBTC hypothesis,
more recent literature has suggested an alternative effect of technical change on
the demand for workers at different levels of the skill and wage distributions. A
21 It is argued that the rising wage inequality in the 1980s in the US was a temporary phenomenon
due possibly to the decrease in the real minimum wage, unionization rate, etc.
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hypothesis of task biased technical change (TBTC) put forth by Autor et al. (ALM)
(2003) argues that the relative demand for workers at the middle of the wage and
skill distribution has been decreasing, as the middle paid jobs are usually routine
tasks and can be substituted by computers/technology, while the relative demand
for those at the top and the bottom have been increasing, leading to job polarization
in labour market.
Empirical literature on the issue of technical change resulting in job polarization
alongside rising wage inequality has mainly focused on Western economies so far.
Categorising the nature of workplace tasks22, ALM have found evidence of a hollow-
ing out of the US skill distribution as a result of TBTC. A similar story is revealed in
the case of Germany by Spitz-Oener (2006), Goos and Manning (2007) for the UK,
and Goos et al. (2009) for sixteen European countries, with a remarkably greater
increase in demand for high paying professional and managerial jobs together with
an increase in low paying service jobs and a decrease in many of the middle pay-
ing clerical and skilled manual occupations in manufacturing. Goos and Manning
(2007) in addition investigate the impact of several potential factors, such as female
labour participation, the changing pattern of age and education, and trade, on the
composition of the UK labour force, and conclude that even though these factors do
somewhat help explain the employment changes in at least some occupations, the
ICT based polarisation hypothesis is likely to be the most suitable explanation for
job polarisation. Looking at the composition of nine Western European countries,
the US and Japanese labour forces, the findings from Michaels et al. (2009) are
also in line with the TBTC hypothesis. A significantly positive relationship is found
between the growth of industry ICT intensity and the change in the share of college
22Routine versus non-routine, manual versus information processing.
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educated workers, but industries that experienced a growth in ICT experienced falls
in relative demand for medium skilled workers. In line with the findings of Goos
and Manning (2007), it is also noted that in these skill demand equations, technical
change is a stronger explanatory variable than trade.
There is little existing literature exploring the relationship between the growth in
ICT and changes in female relative labour market outcomes. Following ALM models,
Black and Spitz-Oener (2006, 2010) find evidence of polarisation in employment for
both women and men in the German labour market, and this tendency is showing a
stronger impact on women than men in recent decades. Women experienced rising
relative demand for non-routine analytical and interactive tasks with higher skill
requirements. Yet the most significant difference between the genders is that the
demand for women in routine tasks has fallen strongly as a consequence of technical
change but not for men. They additionally suggest that relative task changes explain
the fall in the gender pay gap in recent decades. Lindley (2011) has discovered
similar results in the case of the UK labour market, employment polarisation as a
consequence of technical change has been only for women but insignificant for men.
It is also found that the within industry and occupation changes in the demand
for women in moderate computer tasks has grown relative to men, but the share
of women in complex computer jobs has declined relative to men, which suggests
gender biased TBTC in the UK labour market.
There has been surprisingly little research investigating the effect of technical
change on Japanese employment structure, nor literature focusing on the gender
perspective. One of the exceptions is Ikenaga (2009), who uses the data sets of the
Japanese Population Census for 1980 to 2005 with detailed occupation classification
including total employment to investigate whether there is a trend of polarisation
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in the labour market, and to analyse the relationship between technical change
and the trend using the ALM framework. A hollowing out of the Japanese skill
distribution is observed, associated with a rising relative demand for tasks at the
top and the bottom of the skill distribution and a decline in the middle. Contrary to
the findings in Western countries, the between industry changes are found to have
a greater impact on the changes in types of tasks than the within industry changes.
In addition, the growth of industry ICT intensity has a significantly negative effect
on routine tasks, yet a positive effect on non-routine analytic tasks.
A few studies have investigated the relationship between technical change and the
relative demand for regular and non-regular employment, nevertheless, the changes
in demand for jobs in different skill levels for both types of employment have not
yet been exposed. Sunada et al. (2004) reveal that the use of ICT standardizing
task flows has devalued the accumulated experience of regular workers, reduced
the number of regular positions, and increased the relative demand for non-regular
workers. Although the changes in industrial composition are a very important factor
in explaining the growth of non-regular employment between 1997 and 2006, it is
also found that those firms with higher ICT usage are associated with more non-
regular employment. Asano et al. (2010) reach a similar conclusion where the firms
that utilize ICT intensively tend to have the higher share of non-regular workers
compared to firms without ICT usage, however, it is also noted that the quantitative
effect of technical change on Japanese employment structure is limited.
Most of the literature on Japan’s female relative labour market outcomes has
focused on supply side explanations such as the changing accumulation of human
capital and the significant growth of female labour force participation (Miyoshi,
2008; Abe, 2010; Asano et al., 2010). A number of papers show an awareness of the
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fast growing non-regular employment arguing it is one of key drivers of the rising
income inequality (Shinozuka, 2006; Sommer, 2009; Tachibanaki, 2010; Steinberg
and Nakane, 2011). As for the pay differential between regular and non-regular
workers, it is large23 and the wages of regular employees increase with their accu-
mulated seniority and work experience, which have very little effect for non-regular
employees in Japan (Tachibanaki, 2006, 2010; Miyoshi, 2008). This labour market
dualism in Japan has increased the income and social security disparities, not only
between the regular and non-regular employees, but also between the senior and
the youngest workers, and between men and women, as the young and women com-
prise the largest share of non-regular employment (Shinozuka, 2006; Miyoshi, 2008;
Peng, 2010). However, there has been little research discovering the implications of
the development of the Japanese dual labour market structure in the perspective
of gender, nor focusing on how employment status interacts with technical change.
Furthermore, along with the effects of global integration, the economic structure
of Japan has shifted away from agriculture and toward manufacturing and service
sectors, which inevitably leads to a change in the relative demand of the labour
force. Empirical literature indicates that moving towards the service sectors has a
positive impact on female employment and earnings (Blau and Khan, 1992; Murphy
and Welch, 1993), as it increases women’s competitiveness to men due to a lower
reliance on physical strength.
Against this background, this chapter aims to investigate the changing pattern of
the employment polarisation between regular and non-regular workers with respect
to between and within industry shifts for women relative to men. It is interesting to
23For example, the ratio of hourly wages for part-time female workers to full-time female workers
was 65.7% in 2004, and for male workers was 50.6% in 2004 (Tachibanaki, 2010).
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understand whether the structural changes give Japanese women better chances to
enter a better employment track or it actually pushes women into a more unpleas-
ant situation. Besides, the effects of workers’ characteristics changes and technical
change on the relative demand for different types of employment between men and
women within industry will also be explored, as it has been suggested that the ef-
fect of technical change occurs within rather than between industry (Autor et al.,
2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2006,
2010; Lindley, 2011). Following the findings in Western economies, it is expected to
reveal the shifts in Japan’s employment showing a hollowing out across the skill dis-
tribution as a consequence of technical change, and perhaps a greater employment
polarisation among women relative to men.
3.5 Data
The two data sets used in this study are the Employment Status Survey (ESS)
and the EU KLEMS data. Published every five years, the ESS is a large cross
section dataset conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
in Japan. It covers approximately 450,000 households in 2007 with respondents who
are aged 15 years old or more, but excludes those who are resident in cantonment
or ships of the Self-Defence Forces, foreigners and their dependents, and prisoners.
The ESS provides information on the condition of the employment structure, such
as whether engaged in work, type of employment, industry, occupation, working
days and hours, whether wishing to change a job, whether having additional jobs,
etc. It also contains personal information on sex, marital status, educational status,
relationship to the head of household, etc. This analysis utilizes the published,
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aggregate ESS24 data at the industry level in 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007
only for those who are employees25, and covers the variables of type of employment,
occupation, sex, age, and education. Marital status is not included due to the data
at the two-digit industry level only being available in 2007, which thus is not able
to provide the information on changes of workers’ marital status over time.
The EU KLEMS database is part of a European Commission financed research
project, which aims to support empirical and theoretical research in the field of
economic growth and productivity mainly for European Union member states, as
well as Japan and the United States. Detailed information on value added, capital
investment and compensation, as well as labour inputs at the broadly two-digit
industry level from 1970 onwards has been covered in the database, which recruits
data from the national statistical office of each country, where the harmonisation of
the basic data has been considered in order to create consistent and uniform growth
accounts (Timmer et al., 2007). The datasets for Japan’s Capital Accounts are
mainly constructed using data from the Fixed Capital Formation Matrix (FCFM)
in the Input-Output Tables. The Perpetual Inventory Method is employed to build
the capital stock measure using the investment flow data for various types of capital.
ICT26 real fixed capital stock share in total capital stock27, and ICT real gross
fixed capital formation share in total capital formation28 are used as the measure
24Due to the availability of the EES data, this analysis can only measure the changes in employment
every five years. It should be acknowledged that quite a lot can change within this period and
may hence overlap the spells of important factors on the economy and the labour market. Yet the
time of the available datasets actually have quite good coverage for the important events in the
Japanese economy (Appendix Table 3.19)
25Those who are self-employed are not taken into account in this study.
26 ICT assets are Computing equipment, Communications equipment and Software.
27According to Timmer et al. (2007, p.32),“ In the PIM, capital stock is defined as a weighted sum of
past investments with weights given by the relative efficiencies of capital goods at different ages.”
28Note that the gross fixed capital formation can be negative as it“consists of new investments and
net sales of second-hand assets” (Timmer et al., 2007, p.39), according to the European System of
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of technology intensity at the industry level in this analysis29. These measures of
ICT have been widely used in the empirical research in recent years (Michaels, et
al., 2009; Lindley, 2011; Lindley and Machin, 2011) to examine the impact of the
rapid fall in ICT prices and the differences in reliance on ICT usage (sometimes
associated with international trade) across industries on changing skill demand in
the labour market. Considering that the following analyses are based on the Fixed
Effects models, the estimated coefficients will be seen to identify the changes in
specific variables within industries. Hence, using the measure of ICT capital stock
will be expected to show how the change in employment is caused by the change in
the capital stock, and using the measure of ICT capital formation will be expected
to show how the change in employment is caused by the rate of change of capital.
The stock of the capital may be the more relevant measure in this analysis as capital
is expected to last more than one period, though given the fact that the lifespan
of capital is declining with the development of ICT, as technology and computers
become outdated more quickly, the rate of change is also of interest.
The main idea of this chapter is to consider the relationship between technical
change and changes in gender regular/non-regular employment differences in the
same industries. This requires the matching of data from these two different sources
and at different levels of industry disaggregation. There is a technical issue arising
in the construction of the sample, as the industry level in EES is classified according
to Japan’s Standard Industrial Classification, but the EU KLEMS industries are
Accounts 1995
29The changes in both datasets across one digit industries and time can be seen in Appendix Table
3.6 and 3.7. It is shown that, apart from the government sector (L) in the period of 1987-1997,
the share of ICT Capital increases significantly across all industries over time in particular to the
Finance and Insurance (J), and Renting Machinery and Equipment, Professional Services (K71t74)
industries. It also seems to point out that the growth of the ICT investments were lower for the
majority of industries after 1997, when the Asian Financial Crisis happened.
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according to the European NACE revision 1 classification.
Aggregate sectors of the ESS data in 1987, 1992, and 1997 can be broken down
into around fifty industries at the two-digit level, and in 2002 and 2007 for over one
hundred industries at the three-digit level. To enable the estimation to be conducted,
the industries therefore are arranged to the lowest possible level of aggregation with
a concern for all the included variables. For the EU KLEMS, the available data
is for 38 disaggregated industries at broadly two-digit level, and also, due to the
unavailability of 2007 data, the 2006 data is employed instead for matching to ESS
data for 2007. In order to merge these two data sets, the ESS data has been arranged
following the European NACE revision 1 classification (the detailed industries com-
parison is in Appendix 3A Table 3.12). The detailed definition of dependent and
explanatory variables used in this chapter can also be found in Appendix 3A Table
3.11.
3.6 Methodology
3.6.1 Decomposition
This subsection will investigate how the regular/non-regular employment has
been changing differently for male and female workers within and between industries
by using the Japanese Employment Status Survey in 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and
2007. Following ALM (2003), and Black and Spitz-Oener (2006, 2010), the gender
employment changes over time can be decomposed as follows:
∆Gτ = ∆ (EM − EF )τ =
∑
j
n (∆Eigjτ α¯gj) +
∑
j
n
(
∆αigjτ E¯gj
)
= ∆Ebigτ + ∆E
w
igjτ
j = 1, ...., n (n = 38) & τ = time2 − time1 = t− t−1
(3.1)
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where,
∆Gτ is the total change in the gender employment gap in period τ .
∆Eigjτ is the change in the different type of employment i (R and NR represents reg-
ular and non-regular employees respectively), of gender g (M and F represents male
and female workers respectively), in industry j in period τ as a share of aggregate
employees.
Note that the equation only focuses on those who are employees, in other words,
those who are self-employed or working at home are not taken into account, thus the
denominator here is the total employees. For regular employees, it includes regular
staff as well as those who are executives of their company or corporation.
∆αigjτ is a measure of the change in the proportion of different type of employment
i of gender g in industry j’s workforce in period τ .
An overscore denotes an average over time:
α¯gj = (αgjt + αgjt−1)÷ 2 ; E¯gj = (Egjt + Egjt−1)÷ 2
∆Ebigτ reflects the changes in aggregate employees of gender regular/non-regular
workers attributable to changes in employment share between industries as a con-
sequence of structural changes.
∆Ewigjτ reflects within industry gender regular/non-regular employment changes that
result from the changes in workers’ characteristics and in the development of tech-
nology.
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The changes in the gender employment gap can be written as:
∆Gτ = (ERM − ERF )2 − (ERM − ERF )1 + (ENRM − ENRF )2 − (ENRM − ENRF )1
≡
∑
j
α¯Mj (ERMj2 − ERMj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
−
∑
j
α¯Fj (ERFj2 − ERFj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+
∑
j
α¯Mj (ENRMj2 − ENRMj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
−
∑
j
α¯Fj (ENRFj2 − ENRFj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
+
∑
j
E¯Mj (αRMj2 − αRMj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)
−
∑
j
E¯Fj (αRFj2 − αRFj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6)
+
∑
j
E¯Mj (αNRMj2 − αNRMj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
−
∑
j
E¯Fj (αNRFj2 − αNRFj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(8)
(3.2)
where, for instance,
ERMj2 is the share of male regular employment in industry j in total employees at
time 2.
αRMj2 is the proportion of male regular employment in industry j at time 2.
Terms (1) to (4) represent the changes in male and female regular/non-regular
employment between industries. The fifth to eighth terms represent within industry
gender regular/non-regular employment changes.
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A more detailed equation is written as follows:
(
ERM
T
− ERF
T
)
2
−
(
ERM
T
− ERF
T
)
1
+
(
ENRM
T
− ENRF
T
)
2
−
(
ENRM
T
− ENRF
T
)
1
≡
∑
j
[(
E¯Mj2
Tj2
+
E¯Mj1
Tj1
)
÷ 2×
(
ERMj2
T2
− ERMj1
T1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
−
∑
j
[(
E¯Fj2
Tj2
+
E¯Fj1
Tj1
)
÷ 2×
(
ERFj2
T2
− ERFj1
T1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+
∑
j
[(
E¯Mj2
Tj2
+
E¯Mj1
Tj1
)
÷ 2×
(
ENRMj2
T2
− ENRMj1
T1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
−
∑
j
[(
E¯Fj2
Tj2
+
E¯Fj1
Tj1
)
÷ 2×
(
ENRFj2
T2
− ENRFj1
T1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
+
∑
j
[(
E¯Mj2
T2
+
E¯Mj1
T1
)
÷ 2×
(
ERMj2
Tj2
− ERMj1
Tj1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)
−
∑
j
[(
E¯Fj2
T2
+
E¯Fj1
T1
)
÷ 2×
(
ERFj2
Tj2
− ERFj1
Tj1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6)
+
∑
j
[(
E¯Mj2
T2
+
E¯Mj1
T1
)
÷ 2×
(
ENRMj2
Tj2
− ENRMj1
Tj1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
−
∑
j
[(
E¯Fj2
T2
+
E¯Fj1
T1
)
÷ 2×
(
ENRFj2
Tj2
− ENRFj1
Tj1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(8)
(3.3)
where,
Tjt is the total employees in industry j at time t.
3.6.2 Regression
The technical change hypothesis suggests that if the changes in employment
composition are as a consequence of technical change or human capital accumulation,
the changes should occur within industry. Changes between industries would be
result of structural changes or the crisis. In order to explore the implications of
the development of the Japanese dual labour market, regression on the pooled data
set with time dummies from 1987 to 2007 is thus applied to investigate the within
industry relationship between technical change and workers’ characteristics changes
on the one hand, and the change in the gender employment gap on the other. All
the specifications are weighted by the cross-period average of industries’ share in
total employment with concern for the large variations in the number of persons
employed across industries. A clustering approach is also applied, defined as the
124
different sectors, to correct the possible biases in the standard error due to the
matching of data from two different sources, where the industries are arranged to
the lowest possible level of aggregation. The regression estimation is formed as
follows:
∆Ewigjτ = β0 + β1∆Cjτ + β2∆LFgjτ + β3Periodτ + εigjτ (3.4)
where,
The equation is examined separately by gender
∆Ewigjτ is the within industry changes in the employment i as a share of employees
in industry j, of gender g, in period τ .
∆Cjτ is the technical change in industry j in period τ .
∆LFgjτ is the change in workers’ characteristics, such as age, education, and occu-
pation, of gender g in industry j in period τ .
Periodτ is a set of time dummy variables to remove the common time trend for
four periods of 1987 − 1992 (the reference period), 1992 − 1997, 1997 − 2002, and
2002− 2007.
This subsection is intended to understand the impact of different workers’ char-
acteristics on the relative demand for regular/non-regular employment between men
and women. It is interested in discovering whether the improvement of educational
attainment for women does help them enter the primary labour force while many de-
veloped economies have succeeded in maximizing the returns on women’s investment
in education, and whether the sectors with a rising proportion of female workers on
the management track will lead to an increase in female regular employment as they,
compared to male managers, may be more likely to support women enter the regular
workforce at the time of hiring.
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3.6.3 Interaction Terms
The interaction terms are introduced to test whether the changes in Japan’s
employment structure are in line with the hypotheses of SBTC or TBTC as follows:
For SBTC,
∆Ewigjτ = β0 +β1∆Cjτ +β2∆LFgjτ +β3∆Periodτ +β4∆Cjτ×∆Edugjτ +εigjτ (3.5)
where,
∆Edugjτ is a set of education groups for non-educated, and primary or junior high
school graduates (the reference group), senior high school graduates, higher profes-
sional school or junior college graduate, and university or graduate school graduates.
This equation examines whether technical change has favoured higher educated
workers but harmed lower educated workers separately by gender. If the SBTC
hypothesis is valid the results will show a positive relationship between technical
change and higher educated workers, but a negative relationship for lower educated
workers.
For TBTC,
∆Ewigjτ = β0 +β1∆Cjτ +β2∆LFgjτ +β3∆Periodτ +β4∆Cjτ×∆Occugjτ +εigjτ (3.6)
where,
∆Occugjτ is a set of occupation groups for unskilled jobs (i.e. security, agriculture,
transport, etc; the reference group), production-related jobs, sales and service, cler-
ical jobs, and professional or managerial jobs. Again, the specification is estimated
separately by gender.
Results from this specification will reveal whether technology has replaced the
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jobs at the middle of the skill distribution which are usually routine tasks. If the
TBTC hypothesis is valid, the results will show a pattern that an increase in ICT
use will decrease the relative demand for workers in intermediate level occupations,
but increase the share of employment in top and low rank jobs.
Overall, the set of analyses in this chapter aim to discover how technological
development affects the mobility of the regular and non-regular workers for both
genders in Japan, and whether the changing relative demand for different skilled
workers is following the SBTC or the TBTC hypothesis. A significant upward trend
in the share of non-regular employment with a downward trend in the regular will not
be a surprising result considering what has already been observed in the empirical
research (Sunada et al., 2004; Asana et al., 2010), as the progress of computerisation
simplifies the tasks used to be done by the regular workers and makes the tasks
easily substitutable by the non-regular workers. It is also expected to see whether
an increase in higher educated women30 leads to more equal employment between
genders in particular to the good jobs (regular/higher-skilled), or it actually pushes
more women, those who do not graduate from elite university or do not have a
university degree, into bad (non-regular/lower-skilled) jobs, as companies cannot
afford many regular positions once they hire a higher qualified and hence more
expensive worker. Given the fact that men are more likely to be employed in the
industries that are more reliant on ICT (Appendix Figure 3.6, 3.7, and Table 3.13),
it may be expected to see that technical change will have a greater impact on male
workers by pushing them into the good jobs as the majority of them are involved
30With regards to the impact of education on female labour market outcome, more recent studies
argue that the returns to education are more dependent on the subject/fields that the individual
has studied, and that women are less likely to enrol in the fields which require mathematical skills,
which then pushes them away from higher paid, higher status jobs (Carrell et al., 2010; Bertrand
et al., 2010). However, this argument cannot be examined in this analysis due to the unavailability
of data sources on degree subject.
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in more advanced technological usage. Moreover, considering the evidence from the
UK that the majority of men in non-routine tasks are involved in moderate and
complex computer use, while the majority of women are complements to simple and
moderate computerisation (Lindley, 2011), a pattern with a growth of the relative
demand for non-regular workers in particular for the routine tasks and amongst
women following the ICT investment will very likely be the case for Japan.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Decomposition
In line with the finding of Ikenaga (2009), most of the aggregate changes in
Japan’s gender employment gap are observed as changes in regular and non-regular
employment between rather than within sectors (Table 3.2 and 3.3). The last row of
both tables showing the results for the entire period clearly demonstrates this point,
which signifies that the combined effects of structural changes and the business
cycle play the main roles in explaining the employment changes in Japan. The total
variation of the gender employment gap is considerable, accounting for almost a 12
percentage points change in favour of female workers between 1987 and 2007. The
greatest change is found in male regular employees with a dramatic decrease, followed
by a marked increase in female non-regular employees. Besides, the gender gap in
regular employment grows within sectors in the period of 1992 to 2002 (Table 3.3),
with increased demand to hire men as regular workers and women as non-regular,
and that was reversed in the final period.
In terms of aggregate variations in the gender gap by different periods, the largest
shift is discovered between 1987 and 1992 (Table 3.2 and 3.3, column one) associated
with a marked growth in the number of female employees for both regular and non-
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regular in almost all sectors (Appendix 3A Table 3.13) 31, especially for the wholesale
and retail sector. The most significant increase in male employment is observed in
the manufacturing, construction and business activities, for instance, repair, renting,
and computer related activities, sectors in particular for regular workers. Each sector
hired more workers for both men and women, but the relatively greater increase in
female regular workers results in the lower proportion of male regular employment
(first rows in Table 3.2 and 3.3).
A different story is discovered in the following period, although the gender gap in
regular employment seems to decrease between sectors in the period 1992− 1997, it
has seen a growth within sectors by almost one percentage point (Table 3.3). In ad-
dition, the combined effects of economic structural changes and the bursting bubble
on changes in employment structure have been discovered in this period, associated
with a noticeable decline in the total workforce in manufacturing but increase in the
service sectors (Appendix 3A Table 3.13). A much larger number of female regu-
lar employees were found losing their jobs compared to men in manufacturing and
professional service sectors, which reflects the fact that firms tend to dismiss the
women first to cut the labour cost during the crisis as they are usually in supportive
positions. Non-regular employment started increasing at a rapid pace in particular
in the wholesale and retail, and hotel and restaurant sectors, in which the great
share was conducted by women. Note that there was actually a massive increase in
female regular employees in the health service sector alongside Japan’s population
ageing, but the falling number of female workers in other sectors offset this increase,
which combined with the vast increases in female non-regular employment results
in the lower share of regular employment for both men and women.
31The total number of female employees increased from 17,002,000 in 1987 to 20,524,000 in 1992.
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The most significant changes in the type of employment for both within and
between sectors are revealed in the period 1997 − 2002 (Table 3.2). In the after-
math of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis combined with the long term recession and
structural shifts in Japan, manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors
shrank dramatically during this period. A vast number of male regular employees
lost their jobs in these male domains accounting for a 3% decrease in male regular
employment between sectors (Appendix 3A Table 3.13) 32. With a rapid expansion
of the service sectors, a considerable number of non-regular workers for both men
and women, substituted for the regular ones, were employed in the wholesale and
retail sector. Moreover, the number of female regular workers in the health care
sector continued growing in this period33. Each sector was hiring fewer regular em-
ployees but more non-regular on average resulting in a growth of sectors with much
higher proportions of non-regular employment (Table 3.2).
Turning to the period 2002−2007, there was a marked increase of regular workers
in the professional service and the health care sectors, though the regular employ-
ment continued decreasing in almost all other sectors associated with much greater
losses for men than women (Appendix 3A Table 3.13). The large job losses for male
regular workers in other sectors offset the increase in these two sectors leading to a
reduction of total male regular employment in 2007 compared to 2002. In contrast,
with a smaller amount of job losses for women, the female regular employment share
in total employment increased during the period (Table 3.2). The non-regular em-
ployment for both men and women continued increasing at a rapid pace in most
sectors, especially for men in the manufacturing sector as a consequence of the
32Almost two million male regular workers in these male-dominated sectors lost their job is this
period.
33The number of female regular employees in the health care sector increased by over 1.5 million.
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deregulation on dispatched workers in 2003. The negative sign for females within
sectors but positive sign for the between sector change can then be interpreted as
each sector hiring fewer regular women on average but a growth of sectors with a
higher proportion of regular female workers (Table 3.2).
Overall, the results suggest that the total gender employment differential in
Japan has fallen significantly between 1987 and 2007, in which the restructuring
of the economy and the crisis play the main role in such changes. The relative
proportion of female employment has increased substantially over time, yet this
has not all been in good/regular jobs; which is contrary to the empirical literature
suggesting that changes in economic structure have a positive effect on female labour
market outcomes (Blau and Khan, 1992; Murphy and Welch, 1993). Female non-
regular employment has grown rapidly in particular in the wholesale and retail, and
hotel and restaurant sectors. Considering that the changes between sectors are as a
consequence of structural changes, and the within changes are due to the workers’
characteristics or technological changes/demand changes, it is worth noting that
the female regular employment within sector changes are much greater than the
between changes. It implies that women losing regular jobs is more likely due to
their relatively lower human capital accumulation and technical change rather than
the effect of economic structural changes. Besides, a rising gender gap within sectors
in the period 1992 − 1997 (Table 3.3) indicates that firms tend to dismiss female
regular workers first during the crisis as they are usually in supportive positions. In
contrast, the falling male employment, as well as the rise of the total non-regular
employment, is between sectors as a consequence of the restructuring of the economy
and the recession in Japan.
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3.7.2 Basic Regression Model
Considering that the effects of technical changes and human capital accumula-
tion on the changes in employment composition should occur within industries, the
rest of this chapter will focus solely on the within industry changes to explore the
relationship between such effects and the development of the Japanese dual labour
market.
This subsection is interested in discovering how technical change and the shift-
ing proportion within industries of workers’ characteristics are associated with the
within industry changes in the Japanese employment (Equation 3.4), where the de-
pendent variables are the changes in the share of employees within two-digit industry
levels that were observed in Section 3.7.1. The estimated results with sector Fixed
Effects are presented in Table 3.434. The sector Fixed Effects specification is used to
control for differences in unobserved characteristics across sectors, which allows the
analysis to focus on within sector variations and reduces the risk of omitted variable
bias.
The results indicate that those sectors that have increased their share of prime
aged workers have seen a rise in female regular employment, but there is no evidence
found to suggest that the share of regular jobs for men is influenced by different age
cohorts. Male regular employment is increasing in sectors where the share of higher
educated graduates is rising, and the results are quite strong across all models. How-
ever, better educational attainments do not seem to affect female regular workers
in the same way, where changes in the share of junior college and university grad-
uates in sectors have decreased the relative demand for female regular workers by
34The OLS results can be seen in Appendix 3A Table 3.14
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around one to two percentage points, but the effect of the rising share of senior high
school graduates is in the reverse direction. It somewhat confirms the phenomenon
Tachibanaki (2010) addressed that firms are compelled to cut their labour costs by
offering fewer regular jobs and pushing non-graduate women into non-regular jobs
while more regular jobs are occupied by female university graduates, leading to a
decrease in the overall share of female regular employment. As for occupation cat-
egories, there is only weak evidence, from the OLS estimates (Appendix 3A Table
3.14), that a relative rise in the share of sales/service workers in sectors leads to
about a one percentage point increase in the male regular employment. Moreover,
the relative demand for female regular workers has seen a decrease in the period
between 1997 and 2002 alongside the crisis in Japan.
With respect to the non-regular employment, the share of male non-regular work-
ers is found to be growing in sectors where the share of prime aged workers is in-
creasing. Considering that Table 3.1 has shown that the share of male non-regular
employment is mainly contributed to by the youngest cohort (Steinberg and Nakane,
2011), those sectors that have a higher proportion of prime aged workers, who are
very likely employed as regular, reduce the vacancies of regular jobs to cut down
their labour costs thus increasing the overall share of non-regular workers for men.
In addition, consistent with those who noted that the vast majority of female non-
regular workers are housewives, sectors that have increased their share of workers
in the older cohort have seen a rise in female non-regular employment, although
the results are not statistically significant35. The effect of higher educational at-
tainments on male non-regular employment in sectors is observed to be negative,
but that on women is not very clear. The Fixed Effects and the OLS coefficients
35The OLS results are positive and significantly greater than zero (Appendix 3A Table 3.14).
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for junior college graduates are observed opposite in sign. It is suggested that a
higher proportion of female junior college graduates is associated with higher fe-
male non-regular employment, yet if the share of junior college graduates increases
within sectors this would decrease the share of female non-regular workers. There
is some evidence suggesting that a rising proportion of all types of job except clerks
in sectors has increased the relative demand for male non-regular workers. On the
other hand, apart from those women who work in managerial/professional positions,
changes in other occupations in sectors have raised the share of non-regular employ-
ment for women. Male non-regular employment has been in a significantly upward
trend especially in the period of 1997− 2002, while the share of female non-regular
employment is also found to be increasing between 1992 and 2002.
In summary, the results indicate that firms that have a higher proportion of
relatively expensive workers, such as prime aged men and female graduates , tend
to cut their labour costs by increasing (decreasing) the share of non-regular (regu-
lar) employees. The share of non-regular employment has been increasing in most
occupations within sectors for both men and women. It is also revealed that non-
regular (regular) employment has grown (fallen) especially in the period of 1997 and
2002, which is consistent with those who noted the impact of the crisis on changes
in labour market structure. Besides, technical change seems to have no significant
effect on changes in Japan’s employment structure.This might be because of their
strict workforce regulation limiting the quantitative effects of technical development
as Michaels et al. (2009) have suggested. The next sections consider whether tech-
nical change has had a more specific effect by looking at interactions with other
variables.
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3.7.3 Testing for Skill Biased Technical Change
The effect of technological development on male employment associated with
educational levels seems relatively weak compared to that on women (Equation 3.5).
The results from both ICT measures are consistent, regardless that the results with
the capital stock measure of ICT (Table 3.5) are relatively stronger than with the
capital formation measure of ICT (Table 3.6)36.
For regular employment, men and women have seen a different trend. While
technical change has increased the relative demand for male regular workers in those
sectors that have a higher share of well-educated employees, it increases female
regular employment only if sectors hire more women who are less educated than
junior college. Besides, some evidence suggests that technology has shifted men
into, but women out of, regular jobs in those sectors that hire a higher share of
junior college graduates. Note that although it shows ICT use strongly moves male
junior college graduates into regular jobs, the proportion of men in junior college
is very low in Japan, and hence the effect is actually minor. In terms of non-
regular employment, the effect of technical change on men associated with workers’
educational levels is not statistically significant. In contrast, an increase in ICT
use has increased female non-regular employment most in sectors where the share
of junior college graduates is rising, and reduced the relative demand of female
non-regular employees in those sectors hiring a greater proportion of lower or non
educated workers.
Summarizing the results, it is found that, following an increase in ICT intensity,
lower or non educated women are more likely to be moved into regular jobs, but
36The OLS results can be seen in Appendix 3A Table 3.15 and 3.16
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intermediate educated women into non-regular jobs. The effect of technical change
associated with educational levels on the male workforce seems relatively weak, but
it suggests that technology somewhat benefits better educated men by a rising share
of regular employment.
3.7.4 Testing for Task Biased Technical Change
Turning to the interactive effect between technical change and different jobs
on the share of employment (Equation 3.6), relatively weak results are again ob-
served for men compared to for women. The positive and significant coefficient
on ICTS×Prof (Table 3.7)37 suggests that an increase in ICT use will increase the
share of male regular workers more in sectors that have a higher share of special-
ist/managerial workers. It signifies that technology has the greatest effect on moving
men into sectors that employ a larger proportion of professional workers, which is
in line with the TBTC hypothesis that the development of technology raises the
relative demand for workers in high skill jobs. By contrast, with the measure of ICT
capital formation ICTF (Table 3.8)38, it is suggested that technology has a weak
effect on shifting the least-skilled men into regular jobs. The effect of technical
change on the relative demand for male regular workers at the middle of the skill
distribution is not clear, as the results from the different measures of ICT are not
consistent and are statistically insignificant.
As for female regular workers, technology does not seem to have helped high
skilled women in the way it does for men. Sectors with a rising share of profes-
sional/managerial workers have increased female regular employment by almost 4
37The OLS results can be seen in Appendix 3A Table 3.17
38The OLS results can be seen in Appendix 3A Table 3.18
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percentage points (Table 3.7) where there has been no change in technology, how-
ever, the size of this effect falls, as the change in ICT get larger. The results from
the measure of ICT capital formation (Table 3.8) additionally reveal that an in-
crease in ICT use has a greater effect on moving women into regular jobs, in those
sectors that hire a higher proportion of sales/service workers. Furthermore, some
weak evidence indicates that a higher proportion of ICT used will slightly decrease
the relative demand for female regular jobs at the very bottom of the skill distribu-
tion, such as security, transportation, and agriculture. It has to be noted that these
jobs are mainly for men, as Table 3.1 has shown that the share of female regular
workers in these occupations is less than one percentage point, which means that
the magnitude of technology effects on changes in female employment structure is
minor.
In terms of non-regular employment, despite the results for men being not very
strong or robust, it somewhat suggests that an increase in ICT use will increase
(decrease) the share of male non-regular workers more in sectors that have a higher
proportion share of production related (professional) workers (Table 3.7). Besides,
some weak evidence found (Table 3.8) that technical change has somewhat reduced
the share of male non-regular employment in those sectors increasing their share
of unskilled manual workers. For women, the positive and significant coefficient
on ICTS×Prof (Table 3.7) strongly demonstrate that a higher proportion of ICT
used will increase the share of female non-regular workers more in sectors that
have a higher share of professional/managerial workers. Moreover, technology also
increases the proportion of non-regular employment in sectors that have a higher
share of clerical, and security/driver workers, but decreases the relative demand for
the female non-regular workers in sales and service related jobs.
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Taken together, it is revealed that technology increases male regular employment
in higher-skilled professional and very low-skilled jobs, while for middle-skilled pro-
duction related jobs it moves men into non-regular jobs, which is in line with the
TBTC hypothesis. However, the opposite story is found in the case of women, where
the results indicate that technology only increases female regular employment when
the share of women in unskilled sales/service jobs is rising, while for other jobs it
pushes women into non-regular works. Various notions can be put forth to explain
these changing patterns for women. Concerning the findings from Sunada et al.
(2004), Asano et al. (2010), and Lindley (2011), one of the possible explanations is
that there is gender biased ICT usage within specialist/managerial occupations as a
larger share of women are probably involved in less complex computer tasks relative
to men, and those tasks are more likely to be substituted by advanced technol-
ogy and non-regular workers. Another thought of concern could be that the higher
share of women employed in high-skilled, regular jobs would push other women into
more difficult situations, as there are then fewer regular jobs available in the market
(Tachibanaki, 2010).
3.7.5 Regression of the Within Sector Changes in Different Periods
The results (Table 3.9) are not very strong when the data are broken into
different periods. In general, better educational attainment has a positive effect on
increasing male regular employment. Looking at the entire period, it suggests that
male regular employment is decreasing most in sectors where the share of workers in
the older cohort is increasing. A possible explanation could be that firms are forced
to cut labour cost by offering fewer regular jobs as more experienced male workers
are usually very expensive, hence an increase in the share of old workers leads to less
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opportunity of being hired as regular employees for the younger workers. Moreover,
those sectors that have increased their share of sales/service workers have seen a rise
in male regular employment.
Female regular employment is increasing most in sectors where the proportion
of professional/managerial workers is rising, the significant effects are found in the
entire period and particularly the period 1992 − 1997. An increase in the share
of clerical and sales/service workers in sectors is associated with a rising relative
demand for female regular workers in the earlier period. Consistent with the trends
in terms of educational attainments, sectors that have a greater share of senior high
school graduates have seen a rise in female regular employment, but the reverse
direction is found for the junior college graduates. It is additionally revealed that
technical change has a positive effect on increasing female regular employment in
the entire period.
Similar to the previous findings, better educational attainment benefits men by
moving them out of non-regular jobs (Table 3.10). Those sectors that have increased
their share of professional/managerial and production related workers have seen a
rise in male non-regular employment. Furthermore, a higher proportion of prime
aged worker hired in sectors increased the relative demand for male non-regular
employees in period 1992 − 1997. It implies that firms that had a higher share of
prime aged and expensive workers, were apt to offer fewer regular jobs to cut labour
cost at the beginning of Japan’s recession.
The trends for female non-regular employment are similar to previous findings,
where sectors that have seen a rise in their share of elder and less-skilled workers have
seen an increase in female non-regular workers. It is again suggested that changes
in the number of senior high school graduates have reduced the relative demand for
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female non-regular employment.
3.8 Conclusion
This is the first study using Japan as a case to explore the impact of technical
change on the development of the dual labour market with respect to gender. The
aim of this chapter was to discover how the regular/non-regular employment has
been changing differently for male and female workers over time in Japan, to find
out what are the important factors driving these changes, and how much the vari-
ation in the gender regular/non-regular employment gap can be explained by the
development of technology, drawing upon two aggregate level data sets from Japan’s
Employment Status Survey and EU KLEMS for 1987− 2007.
Following the job-polarisation idea of the Autor-Levy-Murnane model, it is re-
vealed that the total variation of Japan’s gender employment gap is remarkable,
accounting for an almost 12 percentage points change in favour of female workers
between 1987 and 2007. Most aggregate changes are observed between sectors indi-
cating that the restructuring of the economy and the crisis play the main role in the
shifts of Japan’s workforce structure associated with a marked increase in female
non-regular workers and a dramatic decrease in male regular employment since the
late 1990s. On the contrary, the rising relative demand for female regular workers is
found to be more significant within sectors, which implies that women losing regular
jobs is more likely because of their relatively lower human capital accumulation, or
due to technology shifts. It is worth noting that the gender gap in regular employ-
ment grows within sectors in the period of 1992 to 2002, with an increased demand
to hire men as regular workers and women as non-regular, though that was reversed
in the final period.
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In order to explore the implications of these within industry changes, regression
on the pooled data sets with time dummies was undertaken to examine how much
of the variation can be explained by the development of workers’ characteristics and
technology. Interaction terms were used to test whether the changes in Japanese
labour market structure are in line with the hypotheses of tasks biased technical
change or skill biased technical change.
The results indicate that sectors that have larger proportions of higher paid work-
ers, such as prime aged men and female university graduates, are apt to increase
(decreasing) their share of non-regular (regular) employment to cut their labour
costs. Better educational attainment moves men into regular jobs, but the opposite
story is found in the case of women. In addition, the share of non-regular employ-
ment has seen an increase in almost all type of jobs for both genders. It is revealed
that non-regular (regular) workers have grown (fallen) especially in the period of
1997 and 2002, which corresponds to the duration of Japan’s downturn. Besides,
the effect of technical change on Japan’s employment structure is not statistically
significant, which might be because of the strict workforce regulation limiting the
quantitative effects of technical development as Michaels et al. (2009) have sug-
gested.
The interactive effects between educational levels and technical change seem to
have a relatively weak effect on male employment, some weak evidence suggesting
that technical change increases male regular employment in sectors associated with
a higher proportion of higher educated workers. Female junior college graduates are
more likely to be pushed into non-regular jobs following an increase in ICT intensity,
which is opposite to the effect for lower educated women.
As for the interactive effect of technical change and different jobs type on the
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share of employment, it is revealed that industry ICT intensity increases male reg-
ular employment in higher-skilled and least-skilled jobs, while for middle-skilled
production related jobs it moves men out of regular work, which is in line with the
TBTC hypothesis. In contrast, technical change is found strongly to move profes-
sional women out of regular into non-regular employment. It implies that there may
be a gender bias in ICT usage within higher skilled jobs as a greater share of women
are probably engaged in less complex computer tasks relative to men, and those
tasks are easier to be substituted by computers and non-regular workers. Besides,
the result shows that technology has a great effect on moving women into regular
jobs in sectors that hire a larger share of unskilled sales/service workers, while for
other jobs it pushes women into non-regular jobs. It is worth noting that there
seems to be a pattern of gender segregation with respect to the impact of technical
change on the middle and lower skilled jobs. For men, the effect of ICT is found to
be statistically significant only on production related and security/driver jobs, but
for women, it is significant on clerical and sale/service workers.
Overall, the results indicate that the total gender employment gap in Japan is
falling considerably in the period 1987 − 2007 as a consequence of the crisis and
structural changes. Although the relative proportion of women in employment has
increased over time, this has not all been in good/regular jobs. In addition, the
results are consistent with the general idea of TBTC with evidence of a gender
bias in the rising relative demand for non-routine jobs at the top and the bottom
of the skill distribution following an increase in ICT intensity. Thus, a rising ICT
usage in sectors only increases the relative demand for female regular employment
in sales jobs, and it seems to be pushing most women into non-regular jobs, which
is opposite to the effect for men. Note that, with the limitation of the data, it
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is not clear whether the negative relationship between higher skilled professional
women and the regular employment is simply because those women themselves have
a higher chance to be employed in non-regular jobs, or that their existence would
push increased numbers of other women into non-regular track. However, what is
certain is that, on the contrary to other developed countries, many women seem to
pay the penalties, rather than gain the bonus, for the rising share of higher skilled
women in the Japanese labour market.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of Japan’s Economy
Source: World Development Indicator Database (2010)
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Figure 3.2: Changes in Total Employment
Source: Employment Status Survey (2011); and authors calculations
Note: A+B (Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing); C (Mining); D (Manufacturing); E (Electricity,
Gas, Heat Supply and Water); F (Construction); G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); H (Restaurant,
Hotel); I (Transportation, Warehousing and Communication); J (Finance and Insurance); K70 (Real
Estate Business); K71t74 (Renting of Machinery and Equipment, and Other Business Activities); L
(Government NEC); M (Education); N (Medical and Other Health Services); O (Other Community,
Social and Personal Services); NEC (Unclassified Industry)
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Figure 3.3: Workforce Composition: Regular and Non-regular Employ-
ment by Gender
Source: Employment Status Survey (2011); and authors calculations
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Figure 3.4: Changes in Regular and Non-regular Employment by Indus-
try
Source: Employment Status Survey (2011); and authors calculations
Note: D (Manufacturing); F (Construction); G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); H (Restaurant, Hotel);
I (Transportation, Warehousing and Communication); J (Finance and Insurance); K71t74 (Renting
of Machinery and Equipment, and Other Business Activities); M (Education); N (Medical and Other
Health Services); O (Other Community, Social and Personal Services)
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Figure 3.5: Total Employment by Education and Gender
Source: Employment Status Survey (2011); and authors calculations
Note: the total employment includes those who have never attended school
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Regular and Non-regular Employment
by Gender (%)
Regular Non-regular
Male Female Male Female
1987 2007 1987 2007 1987 2007 1987 2007
Panel A: Occupation
Prof 10.84 9.53 4.74 5.45 0.48 0.85 0.87 2.18
Clerical 9.74 7.73 9.26 7.51 0.51 1.22 2.86 6.23
Prod 20.64 15.15 4.72 2.08 2.77 4.05 5.28 5.62
Sal&Serv 10.48 9.05 4.63 4.18 0.81 2.36 3.87 7.44
Others 6.21 5.49 0.34 0.80 0.69 1.85 0.27 1.21
Panel B: Age
15-24 6.48 2.81 6.33 2.44 1.43 2.27 1.41 2.62
25-34 14.53 11.32 5.20 5.46 0.63 1.89 2.04 4.18
35-49 23.78 17.55 7.58 6.19 0.91 1.46 6.67 7.92
Over 50 13.11 15.28 4.57 5.94 2.29 4.71 3.03 7.97
Total 57.91 46.96 23.68 20.02 5.26 10.33 13.15 22.69
Source: Employment Status Survey (2011); and authors calculations
Note:
(1) Prof(Specialist, Technical, Administrative and Managerial); Sal&Serv (Sale and Service); Prod (Produc-
tion Process and Related); Others (Security, Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, Transport, Communication, and
NEC)
(2) Service workers refers to those who are engaged in personal services, not those professionals are engaged
in business services , and thus are considered unskilled workers
149
T
a
b
le
3
.2
:
B
e
tw
e
e
n
a
n
d
W
it
h
in
S
e
ct
o
r
D
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
b
y
M
e
n
a
n
d
W
o
m
e
n
(%
)
∆
E
ig
τ
∆
E
b R
M
τ
∆
E
b R
F
τ
∆
E
b N
R
M
τ
∆
E
b N
R
F
τ
∆
E
w R
M
τ
∆
E
w R
F
τ
∆
E
w N
R
M
τ
∆
E
w N
R
F
τ
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
8
7
-9
2
−4
.4
2
−1
.7
4
0.
16
0.
01
0.
68
−1
.1
7
0.
08
−0
.0
5
0.
54
9
2
-9
7
−1
.4
2
−1
.0
3
−0
.2
1
0.
28
1.
35
0.
03
−0
.9
4
0.
23
0.
74
9
7
-0
2
−2
.8
5
−3
.0
0
−0
.8
6
1.
52
2.
36
−1
.4
0
−1
.6
0
1.
57
1.
65
0
2
-0
7
a
−3
.0
6
−2
.4
3
0.
07
0.
91
1.
06
−1
.2
3
−0
.4
8
0.
94
0.
59
8
7
-0
7
−1
1.
75
−8
.3
5
−0
.7
7
2.
71
5.
45
−3
.7
1
−3
.0
4
2.
81
3.
56
a
D
u
e
to
th
e
d
a
ta
a
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y,
th
e
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
is
es
ti
m
a
te
d
b
y
3
8
se
ct
o
rs
.
J
a
p
a
n
es
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
ta
tu
s
S
u
rv
ey
p
u
b
li
sh
ed
th
e
d
a
ta
a
t
m
o
re
d
is
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
d
le
v
el
w
it
h
1
0
0
se
ct
o
rs
fo
r
2
0
0
2
a
n
d
2
0
0
7
,
th
e
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
is
a
ls
o
ch
ec
k
ed
w
it
h
1
0
0
se
ct
o
r,
th
e
re
su
lt
is
a
s
fo
ll
o
w
s:
∆
E
ig
τ
∆
E
b R
M
τ
∆
E
b R
F
τ
∆
E
b N
R
M
τ
∆
E
b N
R
F
τ
∆
E
w R
M
τ
∆
E
w R
F
τ
∆
E
w N
R
M
τ
∆
E
w N
R
F
τ
0
2
-0
7
−3
.0
6
−2
.5
0
0
.0
6
0
.9
0
1
.0
6
−1
.1
8
−0
.4
4
0
.9
0
0
.5
1
T
a
b
le
3
.3
:
G
e
n
d
e
r
D
iff
e
re
n
ti
a
l
in
B
e
tw
e
e
n
a
n
d
W
it
h
in
S
e
ct
o
r
D
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
(%
)
∆
E
ig
τ
∆
E
b R
M
τ
−
∆
E
b R
F
τ
∆
E
b N
R
M
τ
−
∆
E
b N
R
F
τ
∆
E
w R
M
τ
−
∆
E
w R
F
τ
∆
E
w N
R
M
τ
−
∆
E
w N
R
F
τ
(1
)
(2
)
−
(3
)
(4
)
−
(5
)
(6
)
−
(7
)
(8
)
−
(9
)
8
7
-9
2
−4
.4
2
−1
.9
1
−0
.6
7
−1
.2
5
−0
.5
9
9
2
-9
7
−1
.4
2
−0
.8
1
−1
.0
7
0.
97
−0
.5
1
9
7
-0
2
−2
.8
5
−2
.1
4
−0
.8
4
0.
21
−0
.0
8
0
2
-0
7
−3
.0
6
−2
.5
0
−0
.1
6
−0
.7
5
0.
34
8
7
-0
7
−1
1.
75
−7
.5
9
−2
.7
4
−0
.6
7
−0
.7
5
150
T
a
b
le
3
.4
:
B
a
si
c
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
W
o
rk
e
rs
C
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s
a
n
d
IC
T
In
te
n
si
ty
o
n
R
e
g
u
la
r
a
n
d
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
(F
E
(S
e
ct
o
r)
)
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
g3
04
9
−0
.0
05
9
−0
.0
01
5
0.
0
0
9
9∗
0.
0
0
8
2
0.
0
1
4
1
∗∗
∗
0.
0
0
8
4
∗
−0
.0
0
7
4
−0
.0
0
6
3
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
05
4
−0
.0
00
3
−0
.0
0
6
6
−0
.0
0
4
2
0.
0
0
4
9
−0
.0
0
1
0
0.
0
0
6
8
0
.0
0
3
8
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0.
02
17
∗∗
∗
0
.0
17
6
∗∗
0.
0
1
9
6∗
∗
0.
0
1
9
8∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
1
∗∗
−0
.0
1
8
3
∗∗
−0
.0
1
2
0
−0
.0
1
1
5
(0
.0
05
9)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0
.0
24
7∗
0
.0
23
5
∗
0.
0
0
8
0
0
.0
0
5
7
−0
.0
3
0
4
∗∗
−0
.0
3
0
7
∗
−0
.0
0
8
5
−0
.0
0
6
6
(0
.0
09
7)
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0
.0
19
4∗
∗
0
.0
14
8
∗
−0
.0
1
2
4
−0
.0
0
5
0
−0
.0
1
6
4
∗
−0
.0
1
5
2
∗
0.
0
1
5
0
0
.0
0
4
7
(0
.0
05
9)
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
P
ro
f
0
.0
07
1
0
.0
07
3
0.
0
0
3
7
0
.0
0
1
3
0.
0
0
9
1
0
.0
1
2
1
0.
0
0
8
3
0
.0
1
2
0
(0
.0
06
5)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0
.0
06
9
0
.0
04
4
−0
.0
0
5
3
−0
.0
1
1
7
0.
0
0
4
6
0
.0
0
8
0
0.
0
1
5
0∗
0.
0
2
3
4∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
01
2
0
.0
05
1
−0
.0
0
7
9
−0
.0
0
9
0
0.
0
1
8
8
∗∗
0.
0
1
2
2
0.
0
2
4
6∗
∗∗
0.
0
2
6
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
5)
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
−0
.0
00
5
0
.0
03
5
−0
.0
1
0
0
−0
.0
1
1
7
0.
0
1
9
2
∗∗
0.
0
1
3
8
∗
0.
0
1
8
5∗
∗
0.
0
2
0
4∗
∗
(0
.0
05
3)
(0
.0
05
4)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
IC
T
S
0
.0
03
2
0
.0
04
7
0.
0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
0
2
6
−0
.0
0
3
5
−0
.0
0
3
7
−0
.0
0
3
0
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
05
6)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
151
T
a
b
le
3
.4
:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
er
io
d
2
0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
4∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
3
−0
.0
00
4
−0
.0
0
0
5∗
∗
0.
0
0
0
7
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
4
−0
.0
00
2
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
4
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
7∗
∗∗
−0
.0
00
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
6
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
4
0.
0
0
0
2
−0
.0
0
0
0
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
14
8
14
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
R
2
0
.4
29
7
0
.4
74
2
0.
3
6
2
6
0
.4
4
3
7
0.
2
7
7
9
0
.3
4
4
2
0.
3
2
0
8
0
.4
5
0
5
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
1
4
8
.
152
T
a
b
le
3
.5
:
T
h
e
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l
C
h
a
n
g
e
(I
C
T
C
a
p
it
a
l
S
to
ck
)
a
n
d
D
iff
e
re
n
t
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
L
e
v
e
ls
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
R
e
g
u
la
r
a
n
d
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
(F
E
(S
e
ct
o
r)
)
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
g3
04
9
−0
.0
04
5
0
.0
00
4
0.
0
0
8
6
0
.0
0
7
0
0.
0
1
3
5∗
∗∗
0
.0
0
7
3
−0
.0
0
6
2
−0
.0
0
5
4
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
03
8)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
8)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
02
2
0
.0
02
7
−0
.0
0
7
1
−0
.0
0
4
6
0.
0
0
1
5
−0
.0
0
3
8
0.
0
0
6
9
0
.0
0
3
9
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0.
01
84
∗∗
0.
01
57
∗
0.
0
1
7
0
∗∗
0.
0
1
6
7
∗
−0
.0
1
4
9∗
−0
.0
1
4
8∗
−0
.0
0
9
5
−0
.0
0
8
6
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
7)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0
.0
11
8
0
.0
05
3
0.
0
2
7
9
∗∗
0.
0
2
1
0
∗
−0
.0
2
3
6∗
−0
.0
1
8
5
−0
.0
3
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
3
6∗
∗
(0
.0
10
7)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0
.0
17
2∗
0.
01
07
−0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
0
1
3
−0
.0
1
4
6∗
−0
.0
1
1
3
0.
0
0
8
1
0
.0
0
0
5
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
2)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
(0
.0
1
3
1
)
P
ro
f
0.
00
05
0
.0
00
8
0.
0
1
9
5
∗
0.
0
1
7
7
∗
0.
0
1
5
9∗
0
.0
1
8
5∗
−0
.0
0
8
8
−0
.0
0
4
9
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
4)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0
.0
01
7
−0
.0
02
9
−0
.0
0
7
2
−0
.0
1
0
6
0.
0
0
7
4
0
.0
1
3
0
0.
0
1
6
8
∗∗
0.
0
2
2
2∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
8)
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
04
3
0
.0
03
2
−0
.0
0
7
6
−0
.0
0
7
2
0.
0
2
2
0∗
∗
0
.0
1
4
6∗
0.
0
2
4
0
∗∗
∗
0.
0
2
4
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
5)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
−0
.0
05
4
−0
.0
01
2
−0
.0
1
2
2
−0
.0
1
3
3
0.
0
2
3
6∗
∗∗
0
.0
1
8
3∗
∗
0.
0
2
1
1∗
∗
0.
0
2
2
3∗
∗∗
(0
.0
05
4)
(0
.0
05
4)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
9)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
153
T
a
b
le
3
.5
:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
IC
T
S
−0
.0
07
4
−0
.0
12
1
0.
0
2
6
0
∗∗
0.
0
2
4
9
∗∗
−0
.0
0
2
1
0
.0
0
4
9
−0
.0
2
9
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
6∗
∗
(0
.0
09
9)
(0
.0
09
8)
(0
.0
0
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
IC
T
S
×S
H
0
.2
00
0
0
.1
38
4
0.
6
3
8
4
∗
0.
6
4
0
7
∗
−0
.3
6
2
3
−0
.2
6
4
6
−0
.6
3
3
1
∗
−0
.6
0
0
2∗
(0
.1
72
1)
(0
.1
68
2)
(0
.2
7
7
8
)
(0
.2
7
4
2
)
(0
.1
8
7
5
)
(0
.1
8
3
2
)
(0
.2
5
8
1
)
(0
.2
4
7
0
)
IC
T
S
×J
C
1.
21
00
∗∗
1
.3
53
5∗
∗
−1
.2
3
4
6
∗∗
∗
−1
.1
0
8
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.6
7
5
0
−0
.8
9
5
8
1.
3
4
1
2
∗∗
∗
1.
1
5
6
0∗
∗∗
(0
.4
48
2)
(0
.4
41
3)
(0
.2
9
4
7
)
(0
.2
9
6
4
)
(0
.4
8
8
3
)
(0
.4
8
0
8
)
(0
.2
7
3
8
)
(0
.2
6
6
9
)
IC
T
S
×U
&
G
0
.2
30
6
0
.3
48
0∗
−0
.2
1
3
2
−0
.2
7
1
5
−0
.1
4
4
6
−0
.2
7
5
0
0.
1
7
4
9
0
.2
0
8
3
(0
.1
61
1)
(0
.1
60
2)
(0
.3
6
7
9
)
(0
.3
5
8
2
)
(0
.1
7
5
5)
(0
.1
7
4
6
)
(0
.3
4
1
9
)
(0
.3
2
2
6
)
P
er
io
d
2
0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
P
er
io
d
3
−0
.0
00
5∗
−0
.0
0
0
4
∗
0
.0
0
0
7∗
∗
0.
0
0
0
5∗
∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
4
−0
.0
00
1
0.
0
0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
1
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
6∗
∗
−0
.0
00
4
−0
.0
0
0
5
∗
−0
.0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
7∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
6∗
∗
0.
0
0
0
4∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
14
8
14
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
R
2
0.
47
99
0
.5
32
9
0.
4
6
0
0
0
.5
1
5
7
0.
3
2
1
7
0
.3
9
0
7
0.
4
5
6
1
0
.5
4
1
7
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
1
4
8
.
154
T
a
b
le
3
.6
:
T
h
e
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l
C
h
a
n
g
e
(I
C
T
C
a
p
it
a
l
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
)
a
n
d
D
iff
e
re
n
t
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
L
e
v
e
ls
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
R
e
g
u
la
r
a
n
d
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
(F
E
(S
e
ct
o
r)
)
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
g3
04
9
−0
.0
05
4
−0
.0
01
3
0.
0
1
1
3∗
0.
0
1
0
9
0.
0
1
4
0∗
∗∗
0
.0
0
8
5
∗
−0
.0
0
9
5∗
−0
.0
0
9
5
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
01
4
0
.0
03
5
−0
.0
0
5
8
−0
.0
0
2
9
0.
0
0
3
0
−0
.0
0
2
6
0.
0
0
5
0
0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
05
0)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0
.0
18
6∗
∗
0
.0
15
6
∗
0.
0
1
8
4∗
∗
0.
0
1
6
5∗
−0
.0
1
9
1∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
8
∗
−0
.0
1
1
8
−0
.0
0
9
1
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0.
01
88
0
.0
12
7
0.
0
1
5
8
0
.0
1
0
3
−0
.0
2
8
0
∗
−0
.0
2
6
0
∗
−0
.0
1
6
2∗
−0
.0
1
0
9
(0
.0
10
0)
(0
.0
12
0)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0.
02
14
∗∗
0
.0
17
6
∗∗
−0
.0
2
0
6
−0
.0
1
4
1
−0
.0
1
8
1
∗
−0
.0
1
7
2
∗
0.
0
2
2
5
0
.0
1
2
3
(0
.0
06
4)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
6
)
P
ro
f
0
.0
00
2
0
.0
00
7
0.
0
0
4
9
0
.0
0
3
0
0.
0
1
1
6
0
.0
1
4
9
0.
0
0
7
0
0
.0
1
0
5
(0
.0
07
0)
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0.
00
22
−0
.0
01
3
−0
.0
0
9
2
−0
.0
1
2
9
0.
0
0
5
1
0
.0
0
9
4
0.
0
1
9
2∗
∗
0.
0
2
4
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
07
5)
(0
.0
07
6)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
3)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
05
7
0
.0
01
5
−0
.0
1
3
0∗
−0
.0
1
2
3∗
0
.0
2
0
4
∗∗
0.
0
1
3
9
0.
0
3
0
1∗
∗∗
0.
0
3
0
2∗
∗∗
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
4)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
−0
.0
04
8
−0
.0
00
3
−0
.0
1
4
4∗
−0
.0
1
5
2∗
0
.0
2
0
8
∗∗
∗
0.
0
1
5
6
∗
0.
0
2
3
2∗
∗∗
0.
0
2
3
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
05
7)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
1)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
155
T
a
b
le
3
.6
:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
IC
T
F
−0
.0
00
7
−0
.0
03
1
0.
0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
2
0
−0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
4
−0
.0
0
2
8
−0
.0
0
1
9
(0
.0
03
0)
(0
.0
03
2)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
IC
T
F
×S
H
0
.0
59
1
0
.0
45
5
0.
1
6
9
3
0
.1
5
6
8
−0
.0
3
7
2
−0
.0
3
3
2
−0
.1
3
0
1
−0
.1
1
3
4
(0
.0
58
6)
(0
.0
58
9)
(0
.1
1
7
7
)
(0
.1
1
4
1
)
(0
.0
6
4
5
)
(0
.0
6
4
3
)
(0
.1
1
1
5
)
(0
.1
0
5
0
)
IC
T
F
×J
C
0.
30
39
0
.3
30
3
∗
−0
.3
0
0
6∗
−0
.2
3
5
4∗
−0
.1
1
0
0
−0
.1
2
3
0
0.
3
0
7
0∗
∗
0.
2
2
5
4∗
(0
.1
54
2)
(0
.1
51
9)
(0
.1
1
7
6
)
(0
.1
1
6
7
)
(0
.1
6
9
8)
(0
.1
6
5
8
)
(0
.1
1
1
5
)
(0
.1
0
7
4
)
IC
T
F
×U
&
G
0
.0
27
0
0
.0
61
7
−0
.1
2
1
3
−0
.0
7
4
9
0.
0
1
8
9
−0
.0
0
7
9
0.
1
4
1
2
0
.0
9
6
6
(0
.0
84
1)
(0
.0
83
2)
(0
.1
6
2
7
)
(0
.1
5
9
2
)
(0
.0
9
2
6
)
(0
.0
9
0
8
)
(0
.1
5
4
3
)
(0
.1
4
6
5
)
P
er
io
d
2
0.
00
01
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
3
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
3
−0
.0
00
4
−0
.0
0
0
5∗
0.
0
0
0
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
6∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
4
−0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
00
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
7
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
4
0.
0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
14
8
14
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
R
2
0
.4
62
7
0
.5
02
1
0.
4
3
0
9
0
.4
8
2
8
0.
2
8
3
8
0
.3
4
8
0
0.
4
0
3
4
0
.4
8
8
9
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
1
4
8
.
156
T
a
b
le
3
.7
:
T
h
e
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l
C
h
a
n
g
e
(I
C
T
C
a
p
it
a
l
S
to
ck
)
a
n
d
D
iff
e
re
n
t
S
k
il
l
L
e
v
e
l
J
o
b
s
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
R
e
g
u
la
r
a
n
d
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
(F
E
(S
e
ct
o
r)
)
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
g3
04
9
−0
.0
04
8
0
.0
00
2
0.
0
0
8
7
∗
0.
0
0
7
5
0.
0
1
4
1∗
∗∗
0
.0
0
7
2
−0
.0
0
7
0
−0
.0
0
6
2
(0
.0
03
6)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
04
5
0
.0
01
5
−0
.0
0
3
2
−0
.0
0
0
5
0.
0
0
4
4
−0
.0
0
2
3
0.
0
0
1
8
−0
.0
0
1
1
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0.
01
96
∗∗
0
.0
14
6∗
0.
0
1
3
8
∗
0.
0
1
2
8
−0
.0
1
9
2∗
∗
−0
.0
1
5
9∗
−0
.0
0
5
6
−0
.0
0
4
0
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0.
02
27
∗
0
.0
18
4
0.
0
1
5
3
∗
0.
0
1
2
1
−0
.0
3
1
4∗
∗
−0
.0
2
8
1∗
−0
.0
1
5
4∗
−0
.0
1
2
7
(0
.0
10
0)
(0
.0
11
8)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
1
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0.
01
63
∗∗
0
.0
10
9
0.
0
0
2
4
0
.0
1
2
3
−0
.0
1
4
0∗
−0
.0
1
1
7
0.
0
0
5
6
−0
.0
0
7
5
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
5)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
0
)
P
ro
f
−0
.0
02
5
−0
.0
05
3
0.
0
3
8
1
∗∗
∗
0.
0
3
5
4∗
∗∗
0
.0
1
5
5
0
.0
2
2
3∗
−0
.0
2
3
3
∗
−0
.0
1
8
9∗
(0
.0
08
4)
(0
.0
08
4)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0.
00
06
−0
.0
03
3
−0
.0
0
3
0
−0
.0
1
1
1
0.
0
1
2
0
0
.0
1
6
1∗
0.
0
1
1
1
0
.0
2
1
4∗
∗∗
(0
.0
07
3)
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
9)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
01
8
0
.0
05
0
−0
.0
0
5
9
−0
.0
0
8
5
0.
0
2
3
9∗
0
.0
1
4
6
0.
0
1
9
4∗
∗
0.
0
2
3
5∗
∗∗
(0
.0
08
5)
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
1)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
0.
00
25
0
.0
07
1
−0
.0
0
5
6
−0
.0
0
5
8
0.
0
1
4
0∗
0
.0
0
8
1
0.
0
1
2
8
0
.0
1
2
2
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
157
T
a
b
le
3
.7
:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
IC
T
S
−0
.0
01
2
−0
.0
00
6
0.
0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
0
6
0.
0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
3
0
−0
.0
0
4
6
−0
.0
0
3
5
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
05
9)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
IC
T
S
×P
ro
f
0.
55
27
∗
0
.7
35
9∗
∗
−1
.0
3
9
0
∗∗
∗
−1
.0
7
3
3∗
∗∗
−0
.4
8
9
8
−0
.6
8
6
6∗
0.
9
2
7
2∗
∗∗
0.
9
7
2
2∗
∗∗
(0
.2
77
4)
(0
.2
72
9)
(0
.2
0
7
6
)
(0
.1
9
1
5
)
(0
.2
9
8
6)
(0
.2
9
2
5
)
(0
.2
0
3
2
)
(0
.1
7
9
7
)
IC
T
S
×C
le
r
0.
35
52
0
.3
16
7
−0
.0
3
1
4
0
.0
0
6
9
−0
.4
7
7
8
−0
.3
7
7
6
0.
1
0
7
1
0
.0
6
5
1
(0
.3
08
2)
(0
.2
97
3)
(0
.1
4
2
7
)
(0
.1
3
1
4
)
(0
.3
3
1
8
)
(0
.3
1
8
8
)
(0
.1
3
9
6
)
(0
.1
2
3
3
)
IC
T
S
×S
&
S
0.
05
65
0
.1
07
8
0.
3
3
4
5
0
.4
5
5
3
−0
.4
5
4
7
−0
.3
0
9
0
−0
.0
4
5
2
−0
.1
9
8
3
(0
.4
40
5)
(0
.4
35
4)
(0
.2
9
2
5
)
(0
.2
7
1
5
)
(0
.4
7
4
2
)
(0
.4
6
6
7
)
(0
.2
8
6
4
)
(0
.2
5
4
8
)
IC
T
S
×P
ro
d
−0
.4
30
1
−0
.4
98
9
−0
.4
7
4
2
−0
.6
9
0
0
0.
5
6
6
3
0
.6
2
7
7∗
0.
6
3
2
9
0
.9
7
0
1
(0
.2
78
1)
(0
.2
67
7)
(0
.6
2
1
9
)
(0
.5
9
6
8
)
(0
.2
9
9
4
)
(0
.2
8
7
0
)
(0
.6
0
8
8
)
(0
.5
6
0
0
)
P
er
io
d
2
0.
00
01
−0
.0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
4∗
∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
P
er
io
d
3
−0
.0
00
5∗
−0
.0
0
0
6∗
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
8∗
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
4
−0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
6∗
∗∗
−0
.0
00
5∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
4∗
−0
.0
0
0
2
0.
0
0
0
6∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
5∗
∗
0.
0
0
0
3
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
14
8
14
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
R
2
0
.4
71
0
0
.5
28
7
0.
5
0
4
3
0
.5
9
5
6
0.
3
2
6
2
0
.4
0
4
7
0.
4
4
5
8
0
.5
8
4
5
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
1
4
8
.
158
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
T
h
e
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l
C
h
a
n
g
e
(I
C
T
C
a
p
it
a
l
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
)
a
n
d
D
iff
e
re
n
t
S
k
il
l
L
e
v
e
l
J
o
b
s
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
R
e
g
u
la
r
a
n
d
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
(F
E
(S
e
ct
o
r)
)
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
g3
04
9
−0
.0
05
1
−0
.0
00
9
0.
0
0
9
6∗
0.
0
1
0
2
0.
0
1
3
7
∗∗
0.
0
0
7
1
−0
.0
0
7
6
−0
.0
0
8
6
(0
.0
03
8)
(0
.0
04
2)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
02
4
0
.0
02
7
−0
.0
0
7
5
−0
.0
0
4
2
0.
0
0
3
5
−0
.0
0
2
8
0.
0
0
7
4
0
.0
0
4
0
(0
.0
04
8)
(0
.0
05
1)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0
.0
20
1
∗∗
0.
01
70
∗
0.
0
2
4
9∗
∗∗
0.
0
2
1
5∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
4
∗∗
−0
.0
1
8
2
∗
−0
.0
1
8
3∗
∗
−0
.0
1
4
0∗
(0
.0
06
4)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
9)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0.
02
21
∗
0.
01
57
0.
0
1
1
3
0
.0
0
7
2
−0
.0
2
8
5
∗
−0
.0
2
5
6
−0
.0
1
1
4
−0
.0
0
7
9
(0
.0
10
1)
(0
.0
12
2)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0.
01
98
∗∗
0.
01
68
∗∗
0.
0
0
4
8
0
.0
0
4
3
−0
.0
1
6
8
∗
−0
.0
1
5
7
∗
−0
.0
0
7
3
−0
.0
0
9
2
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
4
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
P
ro
f
0
.0
00
7
0
.0
00
0
0.
0
0
7
6
0
.0
0
5
9
0.
0
1
2
2
0
.0
1
7
2
∗
0.
0
0
4
4
0
.0
0
7
8
(0
.0
07
9)
(0
.0
08
0)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0.
00
48
0
.0
02
1
−0
.0
0
8
1
−0
.0
1
1
7
0.
0
0
5
3
0
.0
0
9
9
0.
0
1
4
9∗
0.
0
2
0
5∗
∗
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
07
1)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
5)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
02
7
0
.0
04
7
−0
.0
2
4
9∗
∗∗
−0
.0
2
2
4∗
∗∗
0
.0
1
8
8
∗
0.
0
0
9
5
0.
0
4
2
4∗
∗∗
0.
0
4
0
4∗
∗∗
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
08
9)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
4)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
−0
.0
05
1
−0
.0
00
6
−0
.0
1
0
9
−0
.0
1
1
7
0.
0
2
0
7
∗∗
0.
0
1
4
5
∗
0.
0
1
7
9∗
∗
0.
0
1
8
6∗
∗
(0
.0
06
2)
(0
.0
06
5)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
7)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
159
T
a
b
le
3
.8
:
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
R
e
g
u
la
r
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
IC
T
F
0.
00
14
0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
3
9∗
−0
.0
0
3
9∗
−0
.0
0
0
2
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
3
5∗
0
.0
0
3
3∗
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
0)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
IC
T
F
×P
ro
f
0.
04
58
0
.0
85
4
−0
.3
2
1
1∗
∗∗
−0
.2
6
5
3∗
∗∗
−0
.0
3
8
3
−0
.0
8
5
6
0.
3
6
0
6∗
∗∗
0
.2
9
0
1∗
∗∗
(0
.1
02
3)
(0
.1
01
3)
(0
.0
7
1
8
)
(0
.0
7
5
2
)
(0
.1
1
1
4)
(0
.1
0
8
6
)
(0
.0
6
6
4
)
(0
.0
6
7
9
)
IC
T
F
×C
le
r
0.
04
64
0
.0
43
7
−0
.0
4
9
0
−0
.0
0
6
0
−0
.0
1
7
3
−0
.0
3
1
4
0.
1
3
2
6
0
.0
8
2
5
(0
.0
88
0)
(0
.0
88
1)
(0
.0
7
9
5
)
(0
.0
8
0
2
)
(0
.0
9
5
7
)
(0
.0
9
4
4
)
(0
.0
7
3
5
)
(0
.0
7
2
5
)
IC
T
F
×S
&
S
−0
.0
23
7
−0
.0
15
9
0.
4
6
7
6∗
∗∗
0.
4
0
3
1∗
∗
0.
0
1
4
8
0
.0
7
3
4
−0
.4
8
3
6∗
∗∗
−0
.4
0
7
5∗
∗∗
(0
.2
00
2)
(0
.1
99
1)
(0
.1
1
9
3
)
(0
.1
2
1
0
)
(0
.2
1
7
9)
(0
.2
1
3
4
)
(0
.1
1
0
3
)
(0
.1
0
9
4
)
IC
T
F
×P
ro
d
0.
09
09
0
.0
75
8
−0
.0
5
7
6
−0
.0
8
5
4
−0
.0
1
8
1
0
.0
3
7
4
0.
1
2
6
6
0
.1
5
8
6
(0
.1
34
7)
(0
.1
34
3)
(0
.1
4
1
0
)
(0
.1
3
9
1
)
(0
.1
4
6
6
)
(0
.1
4
3
9
)
(0
.1
3
0
4
)
(0
.1
2
5
7
)
P
er
io
d
2
0.
00
01
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
P
er
io
d
3
−0
.0
00
4
−0
.0
0
0
4∗
0.
0
0
0
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
5∗
∗
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
P
er
io
d
4
−0
.0
00
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
00
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0.
0
0
0
6
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
3
0.
0
0
0
2
−0
.0
0
0
0
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
N
14
8
14
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
1
4
8
R
2
0
.4
46
8
0
.4
86
6
0.
5
1
0
2
0
.5
4
1
2
0.
2
7
9
9
0
.3
5
1
8
0.
5
1
1
4
0
.5
6
2
9
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
1
4
8
.
160
T
a
b
le
3
.9
:
B
a
si
c
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
W
o
rk
e
rs
’
C
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s
a
n
d
IC
T
In
te
n
si
ty
o
n
R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
a
t
S
e
p
a
ra
te
d
P
e
ri
o
d
s
M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
1
9
8
7
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
A
g3
04
9
0
.0
09
6
−0
.0
12
2
−0
.0
01
1
0
.0
3
8
0
−0
.0
0
0
7
0.
0
0
1
9
−0
.0
0
3
7
−0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
9
−0
.0
0
7
2
(0
.0
09
1)
(0
.0
07
7)
(0
.0
12
6)
(0
.0
3
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
A
go
v
50
−0
.0
00
3
−0
.0
02
0
−0
.0
22
7
−0
.0
1
9
8
−0
.0
3
1
1∗
∗
−0
.0
0
6
0
−0
.0
0
5
8
−0
.0
1
6
3
−0
.0
2
0
3
−0
.0
2
2
6
∗∗
(0
.0
12
4)
(0
.0
08
8)
(0
.0
19
1)
(0
.0
2
6
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
0
.0
17
0
0
.0
21
1∗
∗
0
.0
06
4
0
.0
1
1
6
0
.0
0
7
2
0.
0
1
0
9
∗
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
3
4
5
0
.0
4
7
0∗
0.
0
2
2
4∗
(0
.0
12
2)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
15
2)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
2
1
2
)
(0
.0
2
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0
.0
12
9
−0
.0
11
0
−0
.0
08
7
−0
.0
4
1
2
0
.0
1
2
3
−0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
7
1
−0
.0
1
4
2
0
.0
2
0
2
−0
.0
0
8
5∗
(0
.0
25
7)
(0
.0
13
4)
(0
.0
19
8)
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
1
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
0
.0
20
4
0
.0
15
8∗
0.
03
42
0
.0
0
2
7
0
.0
3
4
5
∗
0.
0
2
2
7
0
.0
0
6
0
0
.0
1
4
4
0
.0
4
6
2
−0
.0
0
1
2
(0
.0
11
7)
(0
.0
06
5)
(0
.0
18
0)
(0
.0
1
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
2
5
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
P
ro
f
0
.0
04
5
0
.0
09
7
−0
.0
17
7
0
.0
2
6
7
−0
.0
1
0
3
−0
.0
0
8
1
0
.0
2
0
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
5
0
0
.0
1
5
8
0
.0
2
8
0∗
∗∗
(0
.0
16
1)
(0
.0
09
4)
(0
.0
14
3)
(0
.0
3
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
1
4
6
)
(0
.0
3
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0
.0
03
4
0
.0
17
5
−0
.0
03
3
0
.0
1
2
8
0
.0
4
5
2
0.
0
1
2
9∗
0.
0
0
3
4
−0
.0
1
3
7
−0
.0
1
2
3
0
.0
0
0
6
(0
.0
16
8)
(0
.0
11
4)
(0
.0
10
9)
(0
.0
2
4
1
)
(0
.0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
2
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
−0
.0
09
5
0
.0
14
0
0
.0
08
7
−0
.0
1
3
3
−0
.0
0
9
6
0.
0
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
3
7
−0
.0
1
1
8
−0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
5
6
(0
.0
13
1)
(0
.0
09
9)
(0
.0
13
7)
(0
.0
1
4
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
−0
.0
01
5
0
.0
10
4
0
.0
02
8
0
.0
2
5
6
0
.0
3
6
1
∗
0.
0
0
9
1
0
.0
1
1
2
∗
−0
.0
2
5
9
−0
.0
2
6
9
0
.0
1
0
7
(0
.0
17
3)
(0
.0
14
9)
(0
.0
10
7)
(0
.0
1
3
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
IC
T
F
0
.0
04
5
0
.0
02
5
0
.0
05
3
0
.0
0
8
7
0
.0
0
0
8
0.
0
0
2
1
−0
.0
0
2
5
−0
.0
0
1
9
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
7
1∗
(0
.0
03
8)
(0
.0
01
6)
(0
.0
06
3)
(0
.0
2
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.0
00
3
∗
−0
.0
00
4∗
−0
.0
00
9
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
0
1
7
∗
−0
.0
0
0
2
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
3
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
N
37
37
37
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
R
2
0.
52
70
0
.7
07
9
0
.5
91
7
0
.3
8
0
3
0
.6
8
8
2
0.
5
7
1
3
0
.5
9
1
4
0
.7
6
5
8
0
.8
6
3
1
0
.9
3
0
9
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
3
7
.
161
T
a
b
le
3
.1
0
:
B
a
si
c
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
W
o
rk
e
rs
’
C
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s
a
n
d
IC
T
In
te
n
si
ty
o
n
N
o
n
-R
e
g
u
la
r
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
a
t
S
e
p
a
ra
te
d
P
e
ri
o
d
s M
a
le
F
e
m
a
le
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
1
9
8
7
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
A
g3
04
9
0
.0
14
6
0
.0
10
0
∗
−0
.0
00
8
−0
.0
2
7
1
0
.0
0
7
7
−0
.0
0
1
7
0
.0
0
5
2
0
.0
0
5
0
−0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
7
(0
.0
13
5)
(0
.0
04
0)
(0
.0
15
3)
(0
.0
2
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
1
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
A
go
v
50
0
.0
09
6
0
.0
01
4
0
.0
16
2
0
.0
0
8
0
0
.0
1
7
9
0.
0
0
7
9
0
.0
0
8
5
0
.0
2
3
4
0
.0
2
6
7
0
.0
3
4
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
14
4)
(0
.0
03
7)
(0
.0
20
7)
(0
.0
2
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
3
)
(0
.0
2
2
7
)
(0
.0
1
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
S
en
i
H
ig
h
−0
.0
30
4
−0
.0
13
5
∗∗
−0
.0
07
7
−0
.0
1
5
2
−0
.0
1
4
1∗
∗
−0
.0
1
4
8
∗
−0
.0
0
3
4
−0
.0
3
2
6
−0
.0
4
6
8
−0
.0
3
0
0
∗
(0
.0
18
6)
(0
.0
03
9)
(0
.0
19
3)
(0
.0
1
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
2
3
5
)
(0
.0
2
3
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
J
u
n
i
C
ol
le
0
.0
16
9
0
.0
07
8
0
.0
10
5
0
.0
2
5
2
−0
.0
1
2
2
0.
0
0
3
6
0
.0
1
1
1
0
.0
1
2
0
−0
.0
2
5
5
0
.0
0
9
1
(0
.0
30
0)
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
23
7)
(0
.0
2
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
3
2
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
U
n
i&
G
ra
d
−0
.0
19
0
−0
.0
08
4∗
−0
.0
24
9
−0
.0
0
5
7
−0
.0
2
6
1
−0
.0
0
8
5
−0
.0
1
3
6
−0
.0
1
5
1
−0
.0
4
4
7
−0
.0
0
3
9
(0
.0
14
0)
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
19
0)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
(0
.0
2
7
6
)
(0
.0
3
2
6
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
P
ro
f
0
.0
20
3
0
.0
02
4
0
.0
29
1
−0
.0
1
2
1
0
.0
3
2
8∗
0.
0
1
1
3
−0
.0
1
0
9
0
.0
1
2
1
0
.0
1
8
9
−0
.0
0
9
8
(0
.0
18
3)
(0
.0
04
5)
(0
.0
15
4)
(0
.0
2
5
6
)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
2
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
C
le
ri
ca
l
0
.0
26
1
−0
.0
04
7
0
.0
14
6
−0
.0
0
0
3
−0
.0
1
9
6
−0
.0
0
1
6
0
.0
0
8
2
0
.0
2
8
3
0
.0
1
8
9
0
.0
0
8
0
(0
.0
14
8)
(0
.0
02
6)
(0
.0
14
5)
(0
.0
2
1
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
1
7
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
0.
03
37
0
.0
01
8
0
.0
08
8
0
.0
2
7
9∗
0.
0
2
5
1
0.
0
1
5
2∗
∗∗
0.
0
2
0
9
∗
0.
0
1
6
1
0
.0
0
7
5
0
.0
0
6
1
(0
.0
19
3)
(0
.0
03
6)
(0
.0
20
3)
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
)
(0
.0
2
3
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
S
al
&
S
er
v
0.
03
29
−0
.0
04
0
0
.0
11
7
−0
.0
0
3
3
−0
.0
1
0
1
0.
0
1
0
2
0
.0
0
4
2
0
.0
4
2
2
0
.0
4
9
4
∗
−0
.0
0
1
9
(0
.0
20
0)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
1
)
(0
.0
2
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
IC
T
F
−0
.0
02
8
−0
.0
00
8
−0
.0
03
2
−0
.0
0
4
7
−0
.0
0
4
1
−0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
9
0
.0
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
4
7
−0
.0
0
8
3
(0
.0
04
4)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
1
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
00
04
0
.0
00
3∗
0.
00
08
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
2
0
∗∗
0.
0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
0
6
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
N
37
37
37
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
R
2
0.
51
47
0
.6
73
7
0
.2
01
3
0
.3
6
7
9
0
.6
3
1
3
0.
6
8
1
6
0
.5
6
4
1
0
.8
1
8
3
0
.8
1
5
5
0
.9
0
6
7
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
:
N
E
C
se
ct
o
r
is
o
m
it
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
a
s
th
e
d
a
ta
o
f
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
is
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fo
r
th
e
se
ct
o
r,
w
h
ic
h
le
a
d
s
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
to
3
7
.
162
Appendix 3A
Figure 3.6: Changes in ICT Capital Stock by Industry
Source: EU KLEMS (2011); and authors calculations
Note: A+B (Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing); C (Mining); D (Manufacturing); F (Construction);
G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); H (Restaurant, Hotel); I (Transportation, Warehousing and Com-
munication); J (Finance and Insurance); K71t74 (Renting of Machinery and Equipment, and Other
Business Activities); M (Education); N (Medical and Other Health Services); O (Other Community,
Social and Personal Services)
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Figure 3.7: Changes in ICT Capital Formation by Industry
Source: EU KLEMS (2011); and authors calculations
Note: A+B (Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing); C (Mining); D (Manufacturing); F (Construction);
G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); H (Restaurant, Hotel); I (Transportation, Warehousing and Com-
munication); J (Finance and Insurance); K71t74 (Renting of Machinery and Equipment, and Other
Business Activities); M (Education); N (Medical and Other Health Services); O (Other Community,
Social and Personal Services)
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Table 3.11: Definition of Variables
Sector
A+B Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
C Mining
D Manufacturing
E Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply and Water
F Construction
G Wholesale and Retail Trade
H Restaurant
I Transportation, Warehousing and Communicaiton
J Finance and Insurance Industry
K70 Real Estate Business
K71t74 Renting of Machinery and Equipment, Other
Business Activities, and Professional Services NEC
L Government NEC
M Education
N Medical and Other Health Services
O Other Community, Social and Personal Services
NEC Unclassified Industry
Agbl30 Age Below 30 (Reference Group)
Ag3049 Age Between 30 and 49
Agov50 Age 50 and Over
Low Edu Non-Educated, Primary School
or Junior High School (Reference Group)
Seni High (SH) Senior High School
Juni Colle (JC) Junior College
Uni&Grad (U&G) College or University and Graduate School
Prof Specialist and Technical
Administrative and Managerial
Clerical (Cler) Clerical
Product (Prod) Production Process and Related
Sal&Serv (S&S) Sales
Personal Service
Other Security (Reference Group)
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
Transport and Communication
NEC
ICTS Technical Change by ICT Capital Stock
ICTF Technical Change by ICT Capital Formation
Period1 1987− 1992 (Reference Group)
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Table 3.11: Continued
Period2 1992− 1997
Period3 1997− 2002
Period4 2002− 2007
Period5 1987− 2007
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Table 3.19: Important Events in the Period of 1987 to 2007 in Japan
Period Events
1987-1992
1989 The Bank of Japan implemented serveral contractionary monetary
to restrain the economic bubble, raising the discount rate five times
to 6 percent in the period 19891990, then the bubble burst. Japanese
economy entered its long term recession.
1992-1997 Aftermath of the bursting bubble
1997-2002
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The modification of the EEO Law
1999 Deregulation for dispatched workers
2002-2007
2003 Stock price start rising
2006 Zero rate policy end
Note: For country classification, this table only displays the countries included in the meta-regression analysis
in this chapter. Figure 2.1 to 2.3 present the results using global data.
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4 The Evolution of the UK Glass Ceiling
Summary
• Using data from the New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (ASHE) and the Labour Force Surveys, this chapter demonstrates
how the female relative wage in the top decile of the wage distribution has
evolved over the period 1975− 2011.
• A cohort analysis and regression method are adopted to investigate the chang-
ing pattern of female relative pay in the top decile of wage distribution in terms
of different labour market sectors, occupations, over their working lives, and
across generations.
• The findings of this chapter suggest a downward trend for the gender wage
differential at both the mean and the top of the wage distribution, yet it
remains large. Of these, the differential is found to be lower in professional and
technical occupations, while the opposite holds for low-level male-dominated
jobs and the top management jobs.
• Although female relative pay was significantly lower in the private sector for
the older generations, it has more than caught up the public sector in the
current generation. Further evidence confirms that the relative rewards for an
individual top-earning woman are now better in the private sector compared
to the public sector.
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4.1 Introduction
The UK average gender pay gap has often been pinpointed as one of the largest
amongst European countries39 (Eurostat, 2013). Although it has shown some no-
table decline since the introduction of the Equal Pay Act in the 1970s, the gap
has remained substantial40 over time. Many studies have attributed this remark-
ably persistent gender gap to a significant proportion of women working part time,
educational differences, occupational segregation, and the job characteristics of the
workforce (Manning, 2006; Thomson, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; International
Trade Union Confederation, 2008; Metro, 2009; Mumford and Smith, 2009; Euro-
stat, 2013). The Women and Work Commission (2006) suggested the importance of
pre-entry labour market policies for reducing occupational gender segregation at the
beginning of women’s careers through education, by reducing gender stereotyping in
schools, and inspiring females to participate in male-dominated fields both for the
subject of study and the choice of occupations. In contrast, being sceptical about
this idea, Manning (2006) argues that to understand why women are failing to ‘get
on’ in the labour market is much more important than pre-entry considerations. It
is found that the gender gap in the employment of managers is significantly large,
whereas there was no gap found when examining workers in their early twenties or
before, but which becomes dramatically wider after their late twenties (ibid). This
suggests the existence of a glass ceiling effect41. Perfect (2011) also suggests that the
39Across Member States of the European Union the gender pay gap varied with a range of 2% in
Slovenia to 27% in Estonia in 2011, with the UK as the sixth largest amongst the 27 countries at
about 20% (Eurostat, 2013).
40During 1970 − 2010, the UK hourly earnings gap between full-time female and male workers
decreased from 36.2% to 15.5%, and the gap between part-time female and full-time male employees
decreased from 48.5% to 34.5% (Perfect, 2011).
41The term ‘glass ceiling’ describes the phenomenon whereby women face a barrier to further progress
in their career once they have reached a certain level.
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greater full-time gender pay differential for the mean rather than for the median42
is due to the impact of the very high earnings of some male workers with the dom-
ination of men in the highest paid occupations and the predominance of women in
the lower paying fields. All these indications have shown that to improve the gender
parity in Britain, it is very important to understand what has happened at the top
of the wage distribution. It hence leads to the broad question of this chapter − how
the UK gender gap at the top end of the wage distribution (the ‘glass ceiling’) has
evolved over time.
Following the idea that a glass ceiling occurs at the higher end of the wage
distribution, some research has particularly concentrated on investigating female
relative labour market outcomes in both pay and employment in specific top-level
jobs. It has been concluded that the share of female employment at the highest-
level corporate management has played a very important role in lowering gender
bias in pay (Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Matsa and Miller, 2011), as women in the
top-ranking positions can be the role models for other women at lower positions
in the hierarchy and hence influence choices over their career life, or provide more
opportunities for development and sponsorship (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010;
Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Leah, 2011).
Over the last few years, a number of studies have discovered different changing
patterns of the average gender pay gap from the perspective of the entire wage dis-
tribution in many developed countries. For instance, the gender earnings gap at the
mean in Sweden is found to be narrower than in the US, but the gap at the higher
end of the wage distribution is much greater in Sweden than the US (Albrecht et
al., 2003). Similar stories have also been revealed in several European countries,
42 In 2010, the UK gender gap for hourly wage was 15.5% at the mean, and was 10.2% at the median.
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the US, and Australia for different segments, i.e. different educational groups, occu-
pations, or labour market sectors (Public or Private) (Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et
al., 2007; De la Rica et al., 2008; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010; Russo and Hassink,
2012; Chzhen and Mumford, 2011), with an increasing gender gap throughout the
wage distribution and being particularly greater amongst the highest earners. This
phenomenon has been considered corresponding to the term ‘glass ceiling’ by many
researchers (ibid) and hence is regarded as a representative of the existence of a
glass ceiling.
Such evidence on the existence of the glass ceiling has been discussed extensively
in the empirical literature. However, knowledge about where the glass ceiling is
located and how it has been changing over time has remained unclear. Moreover,
although the link between the cohort effects and the gender gap at mean earnings
has been addressed frequently (England 1992; O’Neill and Polachek, 1993, Morgan
1998; Fitzenberger et al., 2002; Manning, 2006), with the higher female relative
pay for younger cohorts than older cohorts as a result of the development of female
human capital and the lesser discrimination in work environments, most research on
the gap at other points of the wage distribution has not yet taken such cohort effects
into account. Against this background, with a concern that women may not face
only one glass ceiling over the entire wage distribution or in managerial positions
but multiple glass ceilings at different job levels (Russo and Hassink, 2012), as well
as the quite different shifting patterns of the glass ceilings across the public and
the private sectors (Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark,
2010), the main objective of this chapter is to provide detailed information on how
the UK gender pay gap at the top end of the wage distribution (the ‘glass ceiling’)
has evolved over the period of 1975 − 2011 with respect to different labour market
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sectors, occupations, and different cohort groups, both within cohorts over their
lifetime, and across cohorts. Overall, the results indicate that the top female relative
pay in Britain has improved across labour market sectors and occupations, both
within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts during the period 1975−2011.
In addition, gender-specific policies seem to be less efficient over recent years in
particular for the top-ranking women in the public sector and in the highest-level
management jobs. However, what has really kept these women from reaching the
highest levels remains obscure and needs to be further investigated.
The next section of the chapter presents the empirical findings relating to the
gender gap across the wage distribution as well as the evidence on glass ceilings.
Section 4.3 describes the data sets and some of their important features that need
to be taken into account when interpreting the results, and section 4.4 discusses
the conceptual framework. Section 4.5 applies a comprehensive descriptive analysis
showing how the glass ceilings have been changing differently for different cohort
groups, and for both full-time and part-time workers in different labour market sec-
tors over their life cycles. Section 4.6 uses individual level panel data to examine
how female relative wages within the top decile of the female wage distribution have
been changing within particular occupations, age groups and age cohorts associated
with their employment status (full-time/part-time), and the sectors and the region
they work. Section 4.7 then examines the relationship between women’s charac-
teristics including demographic factors and the location of the glass ceiling at the
occupational level. The final section concludes.
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4.2 Literature Review
In recent years, the empirical literature on the gender pay differentials has
shown a growing interest in the relatively high-performing female workforce. It is
argued that there seems to be an effect that keeps women from reaching the top in
that the career progression of women seems very likely to stop once they have reached
a certain level of management and public service positions − that is they are facing
an invisible glass ceiling. However, although the concept of the term ‘glass ceiling’ is
clear, there is no precise definition for it, leading to the empirical research in relation
to the ‘glass ceiling’ from different aspects. For instance, some studies concentrate
on the female relative labour market outcomes in specific top-level jobs, arguing
that if there is a gender gap in employment or wage within those jobs, the existence
of a glass ceiling is suggested. Some others investigate the shifting magnitude of
the gender wage differential across the entire distribution by applying an Oaxaca-
Blinder type decomposition within a quantile regression framework, proposing that
if the gender differential increases moving up the pay distribution, the glass ceiling
exists.
4.2.1 Female Relative Labour Market Outcomes in Top-Level Jobs
Looking at three top corporate jobs in Denmark, Smith et al. (2011) find
evidence of glass ceilings associated with a large estimated gender wage gap amongst
CEOs in 2000 private firms, as well as sticky floors43 in response to a substantial
gender differential for Vice-Directors, and potential top executives. It is indicated
that although the proportion of women in the three top corporate jobs has been
43 In contrast to the ‘glass ceiling’, the term ‘sticky floor’ refers to the existence of a wider gender
gap at the lower end of the wage distribution.
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increasing over time, the persistent gender pay gap suggests that Danish women are
still unable to chip away at the glass ceiling. A similar story is revealed in the US by
Elkinawy and Stater (2011), with the wages of female executives about five percent
lower than their male counterparts in the period 1996−2004. The authors conclude
that the male-dominated governance structures may be the important factor in
explaining why full gender pay equity has not occurred together with the better
representation of female executives. With a concern that the magnitude of the
gender wage gap varies at different levels of executives, Bugeja et al. (2012) focus
only on CEOs in a sample of 291 US firms between 1998 and 2010. Their results
show there is no gender gap in CEO compensation indicating the absence of gender
bias in pay once women have been able to reach the very top ladder of corporate
management.
A few studies have suggested a strong link between the share of women at the
highest-level of corporate management/the decision-making position and the glass
ceiling effects. It is put forward that gender parity in top management can crack the
glass ceiling from above. Top-ranking women can help other women at lower ranks
move to the top by being effective role models, affecting choices of other women over
their career life, or providing more opportunities for development and sponsorship
(Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010; Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Leah, 2011). Some
supporting evidence is found in the case of the US −Matsa and Miller (2011) observe
a positive relationship between the share of women on corporate boards and the share
of women in top management, and Elkinawy and Stater (2011) find that the firms
with more male-dominated boards are associated with a larger gender pay gap. On
the contrary, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) reach the opposite conclusion when
investigating the relationship between gender differences in the chances of success
190
for positions in the four major Corps of the Spanish Judiciary and the gender of
their examiners. It is found that candidates are less likely to be employed where
the share of the evaluators of the same gender as the candidates is higher. Further
evidence suggests this occurrence is due to the overestimation of male candidates
by female-majority committees.
4.2.2 The Gender Gap across the Wage Distribution
Using the quantile regression framework, Albrecht et al. (2003) observe strong
evidence for a glass ceiling effect in Sweden with a rising gender gap throughout
the wage distribution. The gap is particularly wide amongst the highest earners,
and the effect has been increasing over time. Besides, the results of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition indicate that the gender gap at the top end of the wage
distribution is primarily a result of the gender differential in returns to labour market
characteristics rather than their educational and demographic differences. Chzhen
and Mumford (2011) also discover a glass ceiling effect for female full-timers in
Britain, with the effect significantly associated with high-skilled occupations and
workers having managerial duties. They additionally suggest the gender gap along
the wage distribution would vanish if the rewards to characteristics for British female
full-timers were the same as for their male counterparts.
Some studies further point out that multiple glass ceilings seem to exist in dif-
ferent segments of the labour market rather than there being a single glass ceiling
over the entire wage distribution. In the case of Australia, the findings from Kee
(2006) indicate the existence of a glass ceiling in the private sector but an absence
in the public sector. By contrast, Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010) observe the glass
ceiling effects in both sectors, besides, a positive relationship between occupational
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segregation and female relative pay is observed for almost all women except those
in the top-paid jobs. Both the papers agree that the more pronounced gender wage
differential in the private sector can be ascribed to the more intensive enforcement
of gender-specific policies together with the specific wage-setting mechanisms in the
public sector. Moreover, in line with the findings of Albrecht et al. (2003), these two
studies have found that educational and demographic differences are unimportant
factors in explaining the gender gap at the top end of the wage distribution, whereas
Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010) additionally discover that labour market experience
has a strong impact on female wages in the private sector.
Looking at eleven European countries, Arulampalam et al. (2007) reveal the
existence of a glass ceiling for most of the countries, including Britain, with the
exceptions being Ireland and Spain. The estimated wage gap at the top end of the
distribution is found to be greater in the private sector than in the public sector apart
from in Denmark and Finland. Moreover, it is suggested that the countries which
have more generous family friendly policies (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands)
are associated with a larger gender gap at the top of the earnings distribution but
a smaller gap at the bottom. With regards to different educational levels in Spain,
De la Rica et al. (2008) discover the gender differential grows when moving up the
pay distribution for the high educational group, but for the low educational group,
it grows when moving down the pay distribution. Investigating the shifting gender
wage gap in both vertical (inter-job levels) and horizontal (intra-job levels) margins,
Russo and Hassink (2012) find the existence of glass ceilings at both margins in the
Netherlands. The growing unexplained portions of the gap across both inter- and
intra- job levels indicate that women face multiple glass ceilings − one for each job
level.
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4.2.3 Cohort Effects on the Glass Ceiling
There has been little literature exploring the relationship between the glass
ceiling effect and the cohort effect. One of the exceptions is Morgan (1998), who
uses data for 1982−1992 for the US to examine whether the full-time gender gap for
engineers is a result of the effects of glass ceiling44 or cohort. The findings indicate
that the gender pay differential for US engineers is a result of a cohort rather than
a glass ceiling effect, as the time that women started their career is more important
than the length of their career for earnings penalties, in that female engineers who
started working later face a lower gender gap than those that started earlier.
Fitzenberger et al. (2002) apply a comprehensive descriptive analysis to inves-
tigate the gender wage differential across the distribution in different skill groups
over the lifecycle and birth cohorts in West Germany in the period 1975 − 1995.
It is observed that the female lifecycle wage growth is much lower than their male
counterparts, and the growth for female part-timers is lower than for female full-
timers. By contrast, female wage growth alongside a time trend has been found
to be stronger than for their male counterparts in the lower parts wage distribu-
tion, particularly for those in lower- and medium-skilled groups, but it is much less
beneficial in the upper part of the distribution. Finally, they found no evidence to
support the hypothesis that female relative wages in West Germany are driven by
cohort effects.
44The hypothesis of the glass ceiling effect in this paper is “Women professionals (engineers) face a
glass ceiling regardless of when they started their careers (i.e., male-female earnings differentials
increase over time for all cohorts)” (Morgan, 1998, p.482).
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4.2.4 Limitations of the Empirical Literature and the Motivations be-
hind this Chapter
All of the above studies have revealed very good insights about the existence of
a glass ceiling. However, information about the location of the ceiling and how it has
been moving over time has not been a focus of any of them. This chapter thus aims
to provide more detailed information on how the UK glass ceiling has evolved over
time and to determine the important factors that explain these changing patterns.
By a glass ceiling, the idea is to look at the location of the earnings of a woman at
the top decile of the female wage distribution, in terms of her position in the male
wage distribution. If there is no glass ceiling, the wage of the woman at the 90th
percentile of the female wage distribution will also be at or about the 90th percentile
of the male wage distribution. However, if this well-paid woman is at a much lower
position in the male pay distribution, this would suggest that the top-ranking women
are hitting a glass ceiling, and there are many men paid above them. As the analysis
is concerned with what has happened to the top decile and within the top decile
group, it will mainly focus on the top female relative wage and therefore is silent on
the shifting gender differential elsewhere in the wage distribution.
Although evidence on cohort effects on the average gender wage gap has often
been discussed (England 1992; O’Neill and Polachek 1993, Morgan 1998; Manning,
2006), there has been surprisingly little research considering such effects on the gap
at the top end of the wage distribution. This chapter will thus investigate the shifting
glass ceiling for different cohorts, both within cohorts across their lifetime, and across
cohorts, to find out whether the changing pattern of female relative pay at the 90th
percentile of the wage distribution is similar to the pattern of the average gender
differential. The analysis will also be undertaken for different segments of the labour
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market, as the sizes of, and the changes in, the gender gap and the glass ceiling are
quite different across the public and the private sectors (Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et
al., 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010), and women may face multiple glass ceilings
at different occupations, rather than just one glass ceiling across the whole wage
distribution or in managerial positions (Russo and Hassink, 2012). Thus, the effects
of full-time employed status, regional setting, educational levels, marital status, and
the presence of children on the changing positions of the glass ceiling will also be
explored.
4.3 Data
The data for the analysis in this chapter comes from two sources. The primary
source is the New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE), which supplies rich information on hourly earnings of individuals covering
the years 1975−2011. The major drawback of this survey is its lack of demographic
information especially for the measurement of education and family status. The
successive Labour Force Surveys 1983 − 2011 hence serve as a supplement to the
demographic data for the multivariate analysis, by matching the two-digit occupa-
tion groups to construct a consistent occupation-level panel dataset45. The sample
of this analysis for both datasets is restricted to individuals in the 16 to 59 age
bracket, considering that women were entitled to claim state pension at age 60 in
Britain until 2010.
45Both the NES/ASHE and the LFS are collapsed down to the two digits occupation level, and the
resulting data sets appended together to create an occupation level data set. Since both use the
standard occupational classifications, there is little risk here of using data from multiple sources.
Appendix Table 4.14 provides the information for the matched occupation-level panel dataset in
the period 1975−2011. The significant smaller number of observations for the variable indicating
the presence of children in the family (Kid) is due to the data not being available until 1983. This
study hence restricts the matched dataset to the period 1983 2011.
195
4.3.1 The New Earnings Survey
The New Earnings Survey (NES) and its successor the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (ASHE) is one of the largest consistent surveys providing the most
accurate information on individual earnings in the UK. It is a panel dataset that was
launched in 1968, and has been carried out annually since 1970, although computer-
ized data is only available after 1975. The ASHE, developed from the earlier NES,
replaced the NES in 2004 and is conducted in April of each year. The survey has
taken the form of a 1% fixed sample of the workforce, with the National Insurance
numbers (NINO) of respondents that end in a specific pair of digits. Information is
collected from employers on earnings and paid hours, usually sent directly from their
payroll records ensuring the accuracy of the data. The sample does not contain any
jobs within the armed forces and company directors treated as self-employed as it
is a survey of employee jobs. In addition, individuals would not be included if their
earnings were reduced due to sickness, short-time working, or temporary withdrawal
from the labour force, etc. A comparable back series for 1998 − 2003 by applying
ASHE methodology to the NES data has been created by the Office for National
Statistics (ONS), this analysis hence uses the NES for the period 1975 − 1997 and
the ASHE and its comparable data from 1998 onwards.
Regardless of the accuracy of the NES/ASHE data, some things have to be borne
in mind while interpreting the results and comparing the earnings at different time
points. One of the concerns is that the ASHE contains important improvements
over the NES, for instance, the sample coverage of ASHE is larger than NES, and
sampling weights on ASHE correspond to the number of jobs in the Labour Force
Survey (Bird, 2004). It is suggested that the part-time workers are under-sampled in
the NES as many of their earnings are under the minimum threshold for the payment
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of national insurance (Elias and Gregory, 1994 cited in Williams, n.d., p.18), though
such problems have been solved in the survey design of ASHE. Thus some disconti-
nuities may be found between pre- and post-1997 periods and/or pre- and post-2004
periods as a result. Besides, one of the major shortcomings of the NES/ASHE is its
lack of demographic socioeconomic characteristics of individuals. In particular to
measure education and family status, a supplement to the demographic information
would be required for further analysis.
The analysis of this chapter is based upon hourly earnings46 allowing the in-
clusion of part-time workers to discover how the UK gender gap at the top end of
the wage distribution within different segments has evolved over time. The wage
has been adjusted by the Retail Prices Index (RPI) inflation and is given in 1987
prices. The rich information of individuals from the NES/ASHE datasets also en-
ables the implementation of cohort analysis to explore the shifting patterns of the
glass ceiling in different sectors and occupations for different cohort groups, both
within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts.It is worth noting that the use
of the NES/ASHE dataset means that all the analyses in this chapter are conditional
upon being employed in the first place, as the information is directly collected from
employers. This will cause some concerns in interpreting the results, for instance,
as there are no data for those who are unemployed, the results associated with part-
time employment can only be compared to the full-time, and so greater penalties
to part-time work might be the inevitable consequence despite the fact that the
part-time employed may be better off then the unemployed.
Data Cleaning
Considering what has been noted by the ONS (2003) there are some cases
46Bonus or ex gratia payments are not included, as the analysis focuses on guaranteed payments
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where the same NINO may belong to different individuals, leading to the same ID
number in the datasets shared by different individuals. A data cleaning procedure
is thus necessary to be conducted before carrying out the estimations. There are
several types of miscoding found.
The most typical one is that for some individuals, age is coded the same in
2004 and 2005, due possibly to the replacement of the NES by the ASHE in 2004.
This can be simply corrected by creating a new age series variable calculated by
taking their age when first observed as a starting point, then each subsequent time
they are observed adding on the number of years between that observation and
their previous observation. By doing this, however, more needs to be taken into
account. It is essential to assure that the first occurrence for each individual is not
miscoded. There are some instances found where the age of the first occurrence for
some individuals was coded mistakenly and followed by the real/correct sequence
of age (i.e. an individual was 55 years old in 1975, but 23 in 1976, 24 in 1977,
and so on). This single noise in first occurrence is dropped as it is not certain
whether this single observation is simply miscoded or actually belongs to another
employee. In contrast, if it is the case that the same ID number is shared by different
people, one of them is retained with the same ID and the others are assigned new
ID numbers. Besides, a minority of individuals are dropped because their ages and
gender fluctuate throughout the lifetime leaving no possible treatment for miscoding.
The new age and sex variables were not constructed before these noises had been
cleaned.
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4.3.2 The Labour Force Survey
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a nationally representative survey of the
UK population which was first conducted in 1973, under the terms of the Treaty of
Rome to monitor regional unemployment. It was carried out every two years until
1983 before becoming annual. A quarterly element and a panel component were
then introduced in 1992. The LFS is based upon a stratified sample and the data
includes sampling weights to assure that statistics that are representative of the
underlying population can be computed. The surveys are questionnaires, completed
by proxies on behalf of individuals, or self-reported by respondents47. Each quarterly
LFS sample consists of five waves, and each wave is interviewed in five consecutive
quarters. It results in the sample containing multiple observations on the same
person, and hence, the data for this analysis only includes the observations from
their first interview. Also only data from 1983 onwards are used as the information
for the presence of children in the family is not available until 1983.
4.3.3 Creating a Consistent Occupational Classification
Three occupational classification systems, KOS, SOC90 and SOC2000, have
been applied within the NES/ASHE series. Occupations are coded to KOS in the
period 1975−1990, to SOC90 from 1991 to 2000, and to SOC2000 for 2001 onwards.
The 1990 NES contains double-coded information to both KOS and SOC90 classifi-
cations, and the 2000 NES gives double-coded data for SOC90 and SOC2000. These
hence provide a mapping matrix to construct a consistent occupation classification
system based upon the observed frequencies of an occupation in one occupational
47This analysis does not adopt the LFS pay data, due to the use of proxies causing a concern for the
accuracy of individual wages, which may mislead the results
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category being classified under the other system. All the occupations are recoded
to the two-digit SOC90 classification throughout 1975− 2011.
As for the LFS series, four occupational classification systems, CO80, Condensed
SOC, SOC90 and SOC2000, have been used. Occupations for the data of 1983 and
1984 are coded to CO80, and of 1985− 1990 are under the Condensed SOC system.
Both of the classifications can be simply mapped to the KOS and then recoded
to SOC90. Following the same procedure, the 2001 onwards data applying the
SOC2000 classification have been recoded to the two-digit SOC90 system. Overall,
76 occupations are left in each survey year.
4.3.4 Creating the Relative Wage Data (The Measure of the ‘Glass Ceil-
ing’)
Unlike most of the empirical research focusing on the existence of the glass
ceiling and where the widest gaps are throughout the overall wage distribution, the
main idea of this chapter is to discover the shifting position of the glass ceiling over
time. In other words, it aims to find out where the earnings of a well-paid woman
would rank on the men’s scale, and also to explore whether the female earnings at the
top end of the distribution have been increasing relative to men’s, over the period in
which it is already known that the ratio of female to male wages at the mean has been
rising. To examine this, it is required to construct a random variable by calculating
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the income of a comparison group
relative to a reference group. A set of observations, the relative data, is produced
by this calculation called the“grade transformation” (Handcock and Morris, 1998),
which represents the mapping of scores in one distribution to the percentile position
in another distribution. Thus it is the rank of the original comparison value related
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to the CDF of the reference group.
To be more formal, let F0 and F represent the CDF of hourly earnings for men
as the reference group and for women as the comparison group respectively. The
F0 and F are assumed absolutely continuous with common support. For any female
wage, Y , from F , this can be transformed to a random variable RD by applying the
male CDF, F0 (Cwik and Mielniczuck, 1989 cited in Handcock and Morris, 1998,
p.59):
RD = F0 (Y ) (4.1)
RD is continuous within outcome space [0, 1]. The set of observations for RD
is referred to as the relative data. In this analysis, it is the CDF of the female
real hourly wage compared to the male real hourly wage within a particular birth
cohort k at age a for the cohort analysis (more detailed discussions are in Section
4.4.1) or for a specific occupation/cohort/age cohort) j at time τ for the regression
estimations (more detailed discussion are in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3). In practical
terms, it represents the proportion of men paid less than Y , where the Y in most
cases in this analysis is considered as the wage at the 90th percentile of the female
distribution.
The empirical research related to the top income distribution or the glass ceiling
usually uses the 90th percentile as a set point. Ideally a more sufficient analysis on the
top earners could be looking at the different points within the top decile of the wage
distribution (i.e. the comparison between the 90th, 95th and the 99th percentiles)
as the changing patterns of the glass ceilings may be quite different at each of the
points especially the highest one percent. It is known that the income growth within
the top one percent of the wage distribution has been changing dramatically over
the most recent decades across the world (Atkinson et al., 2011), which may be
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interesting to discover what these changes would do to female relative incomes. Yet
as the analysis in the chapter is aimed at those who are employed to investigate
how in general the top female labour incomes, particularly from their wage, are
associated with those of male workers, the analysis is thus mainly focussed on the
90th percentile of the female distribution. Nevertheless, with a concern that focussing
only on the average pay gap at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution might
miss important information, the individual-level panel regression will consider the
relative wage of every female individual whose earnings are within the top decile of
the female wage distribution (Section 4.4.2 gives more detailed explanation on this
point).
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 The Cohort Analysis
Cohort analysis provides a framework for determining age, period, and cohort
effects simultaneously on substantive issues. In most cases, taking any one of these
effects into account without considering the others is a misleading evaluation.
Age effects demonstrate intra-cohort changes showing what happens as people
age. They compare, for instance, the wages of the 1960 − 1964 birth cohort at
age 25 − 29 with the wages of that cohort 10 years later when its cohort members
would then be aged 35 − 39, and compares them both with the same cohort 10
years later at age 45 − 49. Yet obviously as people age, time is changing too. It is
difficult to separate the effects, but it needs to be known whether the wage changes
observed over the lifecycle are due to their age or is it a real wage increase over time
experienced by all ages.
Cohort effects demonstrate the shifts of the same age category in different birth
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cohorts. For instance, it compares the wages of those aged 25−29 in the 1960−1964
birth cohort with those aged 25− 29 in the 1965− 1969 cohort, and compares them
both with the same age group in the 1980−1984 cohort group. Yet again, observing
different cohorts at the same age means the date must be different, so there could
be time effects again. As simple as it may seem, it is actually difficult to identify
the effects of age, period, and cohort effects in standard cohort tables and graphs,
which still remains a complication in cohort analysis to date.
In the typical notation of an age-period-cohort model:
Yijk = β0 + Ai + Pj + Ck + εijk (4.2)
where Yijk denotes the real hourly earnings in the i
th age group, jth period and kth
cohort; β0, the intercept; Ai is a set of age dummies with the estimates of ai for the
effect of the ith age category (i = 1,2,...,I ); Pj is a set of time dummies with the
estimates of pj for the effect of the j
th period (j = 1,2,...,J ); Ck is a set of birth
cohorts dummies with the estimates of ck for the effect of the k
th birth cohort (k =
I-i+j when I = 1,2,...,I ); and εijk is the error term.
It is obvious that there is a linear dependency between age, period and cohort
effects, and so the estimates of ai, pj, and ck are non-identifiable, or unique (where
cohort = period−age). Much discussion has been had to develop various techniques
to overcome this statistical confounding. One of the commonly used strategies is to
drop one additional dummy variable of a specific group, assuming the two omitted
dummies have equivalent behaviour. Note that this can only be fulfilled under the
condition that the effects of age, period, and cohort are only additive − each of the
effects must be consistent over the range of the others. The unique effects would
then be possible to be observed with this assumption (Thomas, et al., 1994; Leung,
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et al., 2002), though whether these restrictions are realistic still remains of much
concern. For this reason, this analysis will not only strictly rely on statistical models
but also consider different dimensions through graphical and theoretical grounds to
guide possible interpretation of the changing patterns in the data.
On the basis of the NES/ASHE datasets, a cohort analysis is conducted to study
the behaviour of lifecycle earnings/glass ceilings profiles. As the term is generally
used, a cohort consists of a group of individuals followed over time. The average real
hourly earnings and the top female relative wage (90th percentile) for a cohort have
been followed from the time it enters the labour market at the age of 16 until the
age of 59. Individuals are grouped into 5-year age groups (from 16− 19, 20− 24,....,
55−59 years old), and the birth cohort groups are divided into 5-year intervals from
1920− 1924 to 1985− 1989.
It has been well-documented that the average woman who entered the labour
market later faces fewer career obstacles and a lower gender gap than did those who
entered earlier as the work environment becomes less discriminatory (England, 1992;
O’Neill and Polachek, 1993; Morgan, 1998). This chapter emphasises the shifting
glass ceiling for different cohorts groups, both within cohorts across their lifetime,
and across cohorts, to find out whether the changing pattern of female relative pay
at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution is similar to the pattern at the average.
The graphical analysis is conducted separately for both males and females, and
for both full-time and part-time workers. With the significantly larger number of
female part-timers, research on labour market outcomes usually pays more attention
to the women who work part-time but ignores men who work part-time. Although
the number of male part-timers has been very small in Britain48 over time, neglect-
48The proportion of female part-timers in employment in the public sector was 0.134 in 1975 and
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ing them in the analysis might lead to “the possibility that the relationship between
earnings and gender is confounded with the relationship between earnings and oc-
cupation or working part-time” as Mumford and Smith (2009, p.i57) have stated.
The analysis is also undertaken separately for the public and private sectors as it
has been noted previously that the size of, and the changes in, the gender gap and
the glass ceilings are quite different across the sectors (Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et
al., 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010), due possibly to the stringently enforced
gender equality law as well as relatively less influence from the market economy on
the wage settings in the public sector than in the private sector.
4.4.2 Regression: Relative Position Changes by Individuals
Considering that women may not only face one glass ceiling across all the
wage distribution, but multiple glass ceilings in different segments of the labour
market, this subsection carries out more detailed investigation on all the female
individuals whose earnings are within the top decile of the female wage distribution.
Drawing upon the NES/ASHE, regression of the individual panel datasets with time
dummies from 1975 to 2011 is thus applied to examine, within particular occupation
(age groups, age cohorts), the relationship between female workers’ characteristics
on the one hand, and the relative percentile position of a well-paid woman in the
male wage distribution on the other. Ideally, a more efficient way would compare
a top-ranking female individual to the male distribution in the same occupation-
age-cohort cell, but the cell sizes would be too small to obtain accurate estimates
of the distribution of wages within each cell. The dependent variable is generated
increased to 0.266 in 2010, and of male part-timers was 0.004 in 1975 and increased to 0.033 in
2010; the proportion of female part-timers in employment in the private sector was 0.089 in 1975
and increased to 0.194 in 2010, and of male part-timers was 0.004 in 1975 and increased to 0.072
in 2010 (Appendix 4A Table 4.6)
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by calculating where the wage of a woman within the top decile of the distribution
in her specific occupation (age, cohort) group would rank on the men’s scale in the
same group at each time point.
The regression estimation is formed as follows:
RDijτ = β0 + β1Ageiτ + β2Cohorti + β3Periodτ + β4LFiτ + εijτ (4.3)
where
i is the female individual whose income is within the top decile of the female wage
distribution.
j is the particular occupation, age or cohort group
τ is the time.
RDijτ represents the position of the female individual i in the male pay distribution
in the same specific group j, at time τ .
Ageiτ is a set of age dummy variables with 10-year intervals that the female indi-
vidual i belong to, at time τ .
Cohorti is a set of cohort dummy variables with 10-year intervals that the female
individual i belong to.
Periodτ is a set of time dummy variables to remove the common time trend for
four periods of 1975 − 1984 (the reference period), 1985 − 1994, 1995 − 2004, and
2005− 2011.
LFiτ is the working status of the female individual i, such as working as full-time,
in the public sector, and in London, at time τ .
εijτ is the error term.
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4.4.3 Regression: Relative Position by Occupations
This chapter is also interested to determine how the educational levels, marital
status, and the presence of children of top women would affect the locations of the
glass ceiling in occupations. With a consistent occupation classification, it is possible
to construct an occupation panel dataset by matching the NES/ASHE to the LFS to
study the relationship between demographic characteristics and the shifting pattern
of the glass ceiling within occupations. Overall, there are 76 occupation categories
in 29 years from 1983 to 2011, resulting in 2204 observations. Note that some
observations will be omitted from the estimated models as the data for the presence
of children in the family and marital status are not fully available in the form of
two-digit occupations in the earlier years. Moreover, a lower number of observations
in the specification for the part-time relative wage position will occur owing to the
missing information on part-time workers in some occupations at some time points.
This subsection applies the constructed occupation-level panel datasets to dis-
cover the extent to which the changes in female employment with specific charac-
teristics will affect the changes in the UK glass ceilings in occupations during the
period 1983 − 2011. In order to determine the presence of glass ceilings, the de-
pendent variables are measured by the positions of women at 90th percentile of the
female wage distribution, for the total, full-time, and part-time women respectively,
in the total male wage distribution in each occupation (two-digit) at each time point.
The independent variables, except the measure of femaleness (Female) at the occu-
pational level (the share of women in the total employment), are the proportions of
female workers with particular characteristics in the total female employment within
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a given occupation-year.
RDwgτ = β0 + β1Femalegτ + β2Agegτ + β3Edugτ
+β4Familygτ + β5LFgτ + β6Periodτ + εwgτ
(4.4)
where
w represents the earnings of full-time, part-time, or all working women.
g is the two-digit occupation.
τ is the period of year.
RDwgτ represents the position of the 90
th percentile female wage w, in the male
wage distribution in occupation g, at time τ .
Femalegτ is the proportion of women in total employment in occupation g, at time
τ .
Agegτ is the share of female employees in the specific age group in the total female
employment in occupation g, at time τ .
Edugτ is the share of female employees who hold qualifications of first degree or
above in the total female employment in occupation g, at time τ .
Familygτ are the family status controls, such as marital status and the presence of
children at home as a share of the total female employment in occupation g, at time
τ .
LFgτ is the working status, such as working as full-time, in the public sector, and
in London, as a share of the total female employment in occupation g, at time τ .
Periodτ is a set of time dummy variables to remove the common time trend for
four periods of 1983 − 1989 (the reference period), 1990 − 1996, 1997 − 2003, and
2004− 2011.
εwgτ is the error term.
208
The analysis not only examines the changing glass ceiling in occupations as a
whole but also separately by different levels of occupation to see how the glass
ceiling is changing for the women at different levels of occupation, where the ‘top’
occupations are defined as the first three categories of one-digit occupations, which
are managers, professional occupations, and associate professional and technical
occupations, the ‘middle’ the next three − clerical and secretarial occupations, craft
and related occupations, and personal and protective service occupations, and the
‘bottom’ the final three − sales occupations, plant and machine operatives, and
elementary occupations.
4.5 Cohort Analysis
4.5.1 The Mean Wage
Starting with the type of trend that most research on earnings changes has
dealt with to date, Figures 4.1 to 4.3 depict age-earnings profiles in terms of real
hourly wages for the sample of full-time and part-time workers in both public and
private sectors between 1975 and 2011. The curves correspond to birth cohorts, and
are labelled according to the range of years during which a cohort member would
have been born. Each cohort is first observed when individuals are aged 16 − 19,
or their age in the first year of data for the older cohorts, and then in subsequent
five-year widows throughout their lives corresponding to the five-year cohort groups
and time periods.
Figure 4.1 suggests clear age effects in overall results that show that mean hourly
earnings have a tendency to increase with age, reflecting the premium on experience
and knowledge acquired throughout workers’ lifetimes. The rise in female wages
with age has been quite concentrated with the most pronounced changes amongst
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those under age 30 with more modest gains for older women. For women, the overall
level of part-time earnings is lower than for full-time women by about 1 to 2 pounds.
Despite the fluctuation for the part-timers (due to small numbers, see Appendix 4A
Table 4.6), a substantial increase in male wages until aged in their 40s is found,
followed by a much gentler decline in their 50s. Note that the part-time male wages
are close to and even exceed full-time wages, reflecting the fact that men working
part-time are not necessarily found to be in low-level jobs.
With each successive cohort generally showing real wage rates greater than the
preceding cohort, positive cohort effects are revealed, with those born after 1960
experiencing a rather slower growth across cohorts, so that the gains for the 1980s
cohorts are less than for the older cohorts. For full-time workers, the rise in wages
across cohorts has been gradual and similar in size for both genders, while for the
part-timers, the men have experienced a different pattern to the women. The shifts
in part-time male earnings across cohorts are obscured until age 35, before starting
to grow significantly. Combining the age and cohort effects provides a measure of
trend wage rates for each age group, which suggests a more pronounced increase
within the 30− 59 age group for both sexes working full-time, by at least 3 pounds
between the most recent and the oldest cohorts, following a relatively smaller change
for those aged 16− 24.
The changing patterns of the gender pay gap throughout workers’ lifecycles are
similar for all cohorts, as the gaps seem not exist for those under age 25 but contin-
uously widen afterwards. Nevertheless, the gender differential for those aged over
30 has been on a downward trend: for prime-aged full-time workers (those in their
mid 30s and 40s) women were paid about 70 percent of male wages amongst those
born in the late 1930s and 1940s, but this has moved up to at least 77 percent for
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those born after 1960.
In the public sector (Figure 4.2), unlike what have seen in the previous pictures,
the growth of female earnings continues with age even after age 30, with only one
pound difference between the full-time and the part-time workers. This somewhat
reflects the positive impact of collective bargaining, nationally agreed pay scales,
government objectives and policies, where the gender-specific policies, such as anti-
discrimination laws, equal employment opportunities, parental leave schemes, and
the provisions of childcare, are more stringently enforced in the public sector (Kee,
2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010). As for the men,
following a similar pattern to Figure 4.1, the better gains have been for the part-
time workers in particular to those in their late 30s and above (though recall again
that the numbers of men in part-time work are very small, so that the results may
not be very robust (Appendix 4A Table 4.6).
Showing a broad increase in the average hourly wages, except for those born in
the 1980s, cohort effects are observed, and are similar in size for both genders who
work full-time. The most noticeable changes across cohorts are found for those aged
over 40, where the wages have gone up by at least 3 pounds to about 8.5 pounds
for men and to around 7 pounds for women. On top of that, the growth seems at a
faster pace for those born before 1950 compared to the younger cohorts. As regards
part-time employees, the results also indicate that the pay rates of each successive
cohort are generally higher than those of the preceding cohort, even though the
shifts for men have not followed a uniform pattern. Overall, based upon the very
small number observations, it is somewhat suggested that some part-time prime-
aged men are paid extremely highly, receiving over 12 pounds per hour in some
specific cohorts. Over the 37-year period, the gender wage gap in the public sector
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has narrowed remarkably for full-time workers, but not clearly for the part-timers
alongside dramatic fluctuations of the male wages. For instance, changing from 15
percent to naught, the disappearance of the gender gap for the full-timers is most
pronounced at age 16 − 29. Moreover, for those in their 30s and 40s, women were
paid about 80 percent of men’s wages in the oldest cohort, which increased to over
85 percent for the most recent cohort.
Turning to the private sector (Figure 4.3), regardless of some complex patterns
for women, the full-time earnings generally have seen a significant increase with age
amongst the young, followed by some stability and then a minor dip for the oldest
workers. The part-time earnings for men change in a similar way to the previous
findings for public sector workers, with a dramatic increase after their late 30s, but
for women they grow at a very slow pace hovering around a consistently low-level.
With an approximate rise of 4 pounds to just less than 8.5 pounds for the men
and to 6.5 pounds for the women, cohort effects are found to be most pronounced
for the aged 30s women and the 40s men. In addition, the increases over cohorts
appear mostly absent to those born after 1960 and the earnings of the 1980s cohorts
have fallen behind earlier cohorts. It is worth pointing out that the lifecycle earnings
profiles of the full-time women of the 1960s and later cohorts are quite different from
their predecessors, whose earnings increased more gradually, but for the younger, a
sharp increase is found in their 20s followed by a modest decline at childrearing age.
There are some indications that, over the 37-year time span, the wage differ-
ential between the full-time and the part-time women has widened in the private
sector. Following a significant growth of the full-time average real wage but almost
no change in the part-time real wage, the differential has gone up by 10 percent
across cohorts, but the reverse is true in the public sector. Moreover, a positive
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age effect and negative cohort effect on the gender pay gap are revealed, in spite of
the unclear patterns for the part-timers. For instance, for full-time employees, the
gender inequality of the earliest cohorts increased from about 15 percent in their
20s to around 35 percent for those aged over 30; and of the most recent cohorts,
it increased from nearly zero to around 10 percent from age 20 to 30 and hovered
around 30 percent for the older workers. As for the part-timers, the inequality de-
clined from over 30 percent to almost zero across cohorts for those in their 20s, and
from about 40 to below 25 percent for those in their 30s.
To sum up, the effects of age, cohort and period on the UK average wage in
the period 1975 − 2011 are clearly evident. Apart from the part-time men, who
experience a rather slow growth at a young age with a surge in their late 30s and 40s,
the rise of wages is observed consistently and gradually over the lifetime in the public
sector, but quite concentrated amongst the young followed by some stability and a
tendency to decline for the old in the private sector. Similar in size for both genders,
positive cohort effects appear weaker for those born after 1960 with some evidence
suggesting a negative effect for the 1980s cohorts. Besides, the most noticeable
change over cohorts is found for those over age 40 in the public sector, and for the
aged 30s women and the 40s men in the private sector. Note that regardless of the
inferior pay in the private sector, the amount of wage growth over cohorts is higher
than in the public sector, suggesting narrowing full-time wage differences between
the sectors over time. Moreover, the overall level of female part-time earnings is
lower than for full-timers by about 1 to 2 pounds, along with a rising difference
between them across birth cohorts in the private sector, but for men the part-time
wage is close to or surpasses the full-time rate. It implies that although there is only
a small share of men working part-time, many of them have been hired in high level
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jobs.
Alongside a slower growth of female wages, the gender average wage gap in
Britain has continuously increased at around ages in the late 20s, the childrearing
age, which is especially explicit in the private sector. This suggests that women’s
earnings are subject to their family commitments, and that they tend to be more
disadvantaged in the private sector than in the public sector. It also implies that
women have seen only limited wage progress as many of them hold low-level jobs,
some maybe hired at a higher level and be desperate for a better paid position but
facing a wage barrier − a glass ceiling. Besides, the gaps are driven by a cohort
effect, with the younger cohorts of women paid better than the older cohorts relative
to men and that these relative wage gains extend across the lifecycles. Compared
to the public sector, the gender gap, decreasing more significantly in size, has been
found to be wider for full-time workers, but narrower for the part-timers in the
private sector both within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts.
4.5.2 The Locations of Glass Ceilings
Figures 4.4 to 4.5 present the positional changes in the male wage distribution
of the higher paid women (at the 90th percentile of the female wage distribution),
observed during the period 1975 − 2011. If the earnings of the woman at the 90th
percentile of the female wage distribution are at a much lower position in the male
wage distribution, this would suggest that the top-ranking women are hitting a glass
ceiling, and there are many men paid above them. These plots will provide some
insights on the general idea of the changing patterns of the glass ceiling for different
cohort groups, both within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts in the
public and the private sectors. As in the previous section, the lines correspond to
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separate birth cohorts, observed first when aged 16 − 19, or their age in the first
year of data, and then in five-year intervals, corresponding to five-year age intervals
and time periods. The glass ceilings are calculated in four specifications in order
to have a more detailed investigation: (i) the position of the 90th percentile female
full-time wage in the full-time male wage distribution (Full-Time/ Full-Time); (ii)
the position of the 90th percentile female full-time wage in the overall male wage
distribution (Full-Time /Total); (iii) the position of the 90th percentile female part-
time wage in the part-time male wage distribution (Part-Time/ Part-Time); and
(iv) the position of the 90th percentile female part-time wage in the overall male
wage distribution (Part-Time /Total).
Figure 4.4 reveals clear age effects in the public sector that show the position
of the glass ceiling has experienced a U-shaped pattern, falling across prime ages,
with a gentle rebound at older ages. For full-time workers, the top-ranking female
incomes are relatively low for the new entrants, and then catch up with the men’s in
their early 20s with a minor dip around age 30. Conversely, the part-time starting
wages appear similar or even higher than their male counterparts (Part-Time/ Part-
Time) followed closely by a precipitous decline. Note that a slightly more modest
fall, especially for those in the age 20s bracket, is shown in the comparison of the
top part-time women to the total men (Part-Time/Total), which confirms what was
observed from the previous section that the part-time men do fare better than the
full-timers in the public sector and their wages start to grow dramatically in their
20s.
With each successive cohort broadly situating at a higher position in the male
wage distribution than the preceding cohorts, the positive cohort effects (increases
between successive cohorts) on the glass ceilings are found to be more pronounced
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for those born before 1960 and the part-timers. In contrast to the top tenth full-
time women, whose relative earnings have hovered around the 80th to 91st percentile
of the male pay distribution, the lifecycle earnings profiles of the top part-time
women of the 1960s and later cohorts are quite different from their predecessors.
In particular, the top decile of female relative pay increases significantly with age
for the 1950s and earlier cohorts, with a range from a low of the 25th to a high
of the 75th percentile of the male part-time wage distribution, but decreases with
age for the later cohorts with a range from a high of the 95th to a low of the 65th
percentile. In the private sector (Figure 4.5), the position of the glass ceiling has
seen a tendency to lower (i.e. women doing relatively less well) with age, before
starting to rise again slightly when women are aged in their 50s. The top percentile
female incomes for the full-time new entrants are found to be similar to their male
counterparts, followed by a decline at age 30 and rebound in their 40s. Unlike what
was observed in the public sector, the high-paid part-time women seem, in general, to
be faring relatively close to their male counterparts (Part-Time/ Part-Time), despite
the inconsistent changing patterns over the lifecycle for different cohort groups.
However, in the other comparison (Part-Time/ Total), the top female part-time
earnings drop dramatically with age and remain at below the 70th percentile of the
overall male wage distribution after their early 20s, suggesting the part-time wages
for both genders are considerably lower in the private sectors.
Similar to the previous findings, the results pinpoint the 1960 born as the water-
shed for the changes in the top female relative incomes. Compared to the younger
cohorts, the top decile of female incomes ranked considerably low on the men’s scale
for those born before 1960 with the significant increases in this relative position be-
tween cohorts. For the full-timers, the well-paid women in the 1930s cohorts gained
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only better than 40 to 68 percent of the men, while those born in the 1960s and later
cohorts have been better than over 80 percent of men throughout their lifetime. As
for the part-time comparison, the female relative earnings fluctuates with age for
those in the earlier cohorts, but remain stable at around the 80th to 90th percentile
for the recent cohorts.
Taken together, the results have demonstrated the significant effects of age, co-
hort and period on the shifting glass ceilings over the period 1975− 2011 in Britain.
It is worth noting that the figures for the private sector are very different to those in
the public sector, with women having more catching up to do in the private sector.
The top female relative pay in both sectors has a tendency to initially decline with
age, followed by a gentle rebound at older ages, which is especially pronounced for
the part-time workers. Similar to the findings for the changes in average wages, pos-
itive cohort effects on the position of glass ceilings appear stronger for those born
before 1960, for whom the most noticeable change is found for those aged in their
late 20s to 40s and those working in the private sector. The 90th percentile female
full-time wage in the public sector has hovered around the 80th to 91st percentile
of the male wage distribution across cohort groups, and in the private sector, it
has increased by over 40 percentile points to above the 80th percentile. As for the
part-timers, the extent of the rising position of glass ceilings across cohorts is similar
in both sectors, with some evidence suggesting that men fare much better in the
public sector than other workers, but both genders are paid considerably lower than
full-timers in the private sector.
Overall, the results confirm that younger generations of women in Britain have
done better relative to men than the older generations no matter whether we con-
sider the average or the top-earners, but the pace of improvement has stagnated for
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those born after 1960. According to Manning (2006), the pronounced increase in
female relative earnings across older cohorts can be largely attributed to the strong
impact of the 1970 Equal Pay Act on reducing the discriminatory work environment,
whereas the cause of the slow progress of women in the current generation is more
subtle and difficult to influence directly by policy. Besides, the more significant
rise in female employment for the earlier cohorts than the latter has also played an
important role in explaining theses patterns.
In line with the previous findings (Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Baro´n
and Cobb-Clark, 2010), the size of and the changes in the gender gap at both the
mean and the top of the wage distribution have shown very different behaviours
between the public and the private sectors. The results in general suggest that the
wage settings in the UK are subject to government objectives and policies in the
public sector and to the market economy in the private sector. For instance, female
relative pay has been relatively stable over the lifecycles in the public sector, but a
notable decline in pay at childrearing age has been observed in the private sector.
In addition, although women do fare better in the public sector both within cohorts
over their lifetime, and across cohorts, it has been seen that top female wages relative
to men have more catching up to do in the private sector across cohorts. It seems
not only to indicate the absence of the between sectors wage gap for the current
generation of women, but also that the work environment discrimination in Britain
has been significantly lessened over time. However, the extremely high earnings for
male part-timers in the public sector seems to be trying to tell another story. It
seems like the highest paid jobs in the public sector are more likely to be part-time
and to be held by men.
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4.6 The Shifting Patterns of the UK Glass Ceilings by Oc-
cupations, Age and Cohort Groups at Individual Levels
The previous section provides evidence that the changes in the gender gap both
on average and at the top-end of the pay distribution have varied noticeably by age,
birth cohort, full-time/part-time work, and public/private sector. The remainder
of the chapter conducts a more comprehensive analysis particularly focusing on the
changes within two-digit occupations. The concern is that women may not only
face one glass ceiling across all the wage distribution, but multiple glass ceilings at
different job levels (Russo and Hassink, 2012). Thus this section explores the changes
in the UK glass ceiling in more detail by two-digit occupations. It estimates where a
well-paid (90th percentile) women would rank on the men’s scale in each occupation,
and to what extent the age and cohort groups and other workers’ characteristics will
affect the ranks over the period of 1975− 2011.
4.6.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.1 presents the ratios of female-to-male average hourly wages within
one-digit occupations over the 37-year period. The results somewhat support the
contention that women’s pay disadvantage depends upon the jobs they hold. Women
on average are paid much closer to men in professional and the clerical related oc-
cupations than in other occupations. However, their average relative pay in the
professional occupations has been found to be declining over time, and women work-
ing in the highest-level of occupation (Soc 1 managers) have achieved limited wage
progress, despite the fact that a substantial increase in the earnings ratio has been
observed in all other occupations (except professional occupations).
With respect to the changes in the positions of the 90th percentile woman in
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the male pay distribution, as shown in Table 4.2, in all cases, the top women have
been paid considerably lower in the men’s distribution, regardless of the significant
increase within the same jobs, indicating the existence of glass ceilings in different
occupations. It is not surprising that the high-end female relative pay is much
lower in the male dominated49 occupations, such as managers, craft, and machine
operatives. However, the noticeably lower pay in the clerical occupations50 confirms
the empirical statement that in the female-dominated occupations the lower level
jobs have been held by the majority of women (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Lindley,
2011).
4.6.2 Relative Position Changes by Individuals
It has already been seen that there are significant differences in the location
of glass ceilings by different age, birth cohort, and segment of labour market, which
leads to a question whether these differences partly reflect the effects of other factors.
This sub-section is therefore interested in whether there are differences by each of
age, birth cohort, and occupation once the others are controlled for and once factors
such as full-time/part-time status, public/private sector, and region are controlled
for. To examine the position of women in a particular occupation (age, cohort
group), the wage of each well-paid woman within the top decile of that distribution
is observed, and then used to determine where that wage would put her in the
distribution of male wages within the same specific group (occupation, age or cohort)
at each time point over the period 1975− 2010. This is then used as the dependent
49 In craft and related occupations, men (women) represent 15.8% (1.8%) in 1975 and 5.4% (0.3%) of
total employment in 2010, and in machine operative occupations, men (women) represent 13.6%
(4.4%) in 1975 and 5.2% (1.1%) of total employment in 2010 (Appendix 4A Table 4.7)
50The share of clerical women (men) in total employment was about 14.2% (6.2%) in 1975, and
declined to 11.3% (5.9%) in 2010 (Appendix 4A Table 4.7)
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variables in the individual-based regressions, allowing an examination of how her
characteristics determine her position within such a group (Equation 4.3).
The estimated results with different specifications are shown in Table 4.351, where
the first two columns present the changing relative wage position within particular
occupations, the next two are the within-age-group changes, and the final two the
within-cohort-group changes. In each case, the first column shows the results from
an OLS specification, and the second column from an individual Fixed Effects spec-
ification, which allows for the analysis focusing on within individual variation and
reduce the risk of omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. Note that
the interpretation of the same variable will vary in different specifications. If one
looks at the coefficients of the age categories for example, columns 1 and 2 com-
pare women at a given age to the average male distribution across all ages in the
same occupation (since the comparison is within occupations in those columns), but
columns 3 and 4 look at a woman of a given age and compare her position to the
male distribution of men in the same age group (since those columns look within
age group).
Looking within occupations (columns 1 and 2 ), it can be seen that a top woman
earns significantly less than a larger proportion of the men in the craft and machines
operatives occupations, compared to a well-paid woman in other occupations. Thus,
her pay relative to the male wage distribution in these two occupations is lower than
if she is engaged in managerial jobs (the base occupation) by 7 to 10 percentage
points and significantly different from zero. To be more specific, the estimations
with two-digit occupational dummies (Appendices Table 4.8) indicate that her rel-
51Table 4.3 shows the results with two omitted cohort variables in order to avoid the linear depen-
dency as mentioned in the Methodology section. It actually does not make any difference where
the extra omitted category is chosen (See Appendix 4A Table 4.9 and 4.10).
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ative pay is especially lower in the low-level male-dominated jobs (SOCs 81-86 ), in
particular in the metal-making jobs (SOC 83 ). However, the positive Fixed Effects
coefficients suggest a rise in her relative wage if she moves into those low-level oc-
cupations. This suggests that a top woman working in those lower-skilled jobs has
lower unobserved characteristics, and hence lower relative wages, than women in
other jobs, but that she would be paid higher in such jobs than she would elsewhere.
Corresponding to Table 4.2, it seems that a higher-paid woman gains slightly
better in the professional and technical occupations, where the difference in her
relative position between each of these two and the base occupation (managers) is
at least 5 percentage points and significantly greater than zero. Although the sizes of
the coefficients for occupations in SOCs 20-39 are not dramatically higher, they are
positive and rather stable within that group, compared to other occupations. What
has to be noted here is that the well-paid women have struggled to catch up their
male counterparts in the very top jobs within all occupations, but they are doing
remarkably better relative to the men within most of the occupations compared to
the highest management occupations (SOC 10 ).
The top female relative pay increases with age within occupations, and the
younger cohorts are in a better position relative to men than the older cohorts52.
Working in London will benefit a well-paid woman, and her wage is significantly
increasing over time. Moreover, it is found that the relative position of a top full-
time women is lower than of a part-time woman by about 1.6 percentage points, and
her position will decline by 2.5 percentage points when moving from part-time to
full-time work as the Fixed Effects coefficient has shown, which somewhat implies
52Note that the Fixed Effects estimates of cohorts are expected to be dropped, as it is not possible
for an individual to move from one birth cohort to another.
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that part-time work does not seem to hurt the top women in the way it hurts the
average women, suggesting that the women who earn more per hour may choose to
work part-time. This finding is consistent with Chzhen and Mumford (2011) who
found that amongst the top earners, many more part-timers than full-timers have
young children, suggests that part-time work is a choice, and that with the arrival of
children, these top earning women can afford to change to part-time work, in order
to spend more time with their family.
Turning to the comparisons within specific age groups (columns 3 and 4 ), the
wage of a top woman is found to be ranking at a higher point in the distribution
of male wages in the same age group at younger ages, where, for instance, her
relative wage in her 20s is higher than when in her 50s by about 6.7 percentage
points. Besides, the top women face the greatest gender pay gap over their lifecycles
when they move into their 40s. This is consistent with the findings in previous
sections that female wages grow at a much slower pace and remain at a similar
level from their 30s onwards, while men start experiencing a significant increase
to a peak in their 40s. Within the same age group, a top woman working in the
professional occupations will be paid closer to men than in the other occupations.
In addition, it is found again that the top full-time women are at a lower position
in the male wage distribution in the same age group than part-time women, and
those working in London are at a higher position than in other areas. Although
it has been well documented that the mean gender gap is narrower in the public
sector (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005), as the gender-specific policies are
more stringently enforced, it does not seem to happen at the higher end of the wage
distribution. Thus, it is revealed that, for those in the public sector, the relative
position of the top women is lower than those in the private sector by about at 1.6
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percentage points.
To a significant degree, the positions of glass ceilings are driven by cohort effects.
Columns 5 and 6 clearly reveal that the incomes of well-paid women in the younger
cohorts are associated with a better rank on the pay scale of men in the same cohort.
With respect to the changes over the lifecycle within the cohorts, the higher-paid
women at young ages have obtained a higher position in the male wage distribution,
followed by a lower point in their 30s and 40s, with a rebound in their 50s. Similar
to the previous results, the top women working in the professional occupations or
in London will fare better relative to men in the same cohort than those who are
not, and their pay is positively related to the time trend. On the contrary, the top
women working full-time or in the public sector will move down the male pay scale.
To sum up, the results suggest significant independent differences across occupa-
tions, age groups, and birth cohorts when the other two, plus additional factors, are
controlled for. It indicates that a higher-paid woman is more advantaged, relative
to men, in professional and technical occupations, but is relatively more disadvan-
taged in low-level male-dominated jobs (SOCs 5 and 8 ) and the top management
jobs (SOC 1 ), than in the other occupations. In contrast to the very low female
employment in SOC 5 and 8 occupations (Table 4.7), with evidence that the top
female relative wages in SOC 2 are notably higher than those in SOC 1 despite
the similar share of women in both occupations, the results seems to imply that a
top-ranking woman has been paid significantly less well than men particularly in
the highest-level management than in other jobs. It is also suggested that she would
be paid much closer to her male counterparts at age 16 − 29, but then face the
largest gap of her lifetime in her 40s. In line with the previous findings (England
1992; O’Neill and Polachek 1993, Morgan 1998; Fitzenberger et al., 2002; Manning,
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2006), a positive cohort effect on the UK glass ceilings is observed, each generation
of women having done better relative to men than the previous generation.
As for other factors, working in London and the time trend have positive effects
on the top female relative pay, in contrast, working full-time or in the public sector is
negatively associated with the relative pay. With supporting evidence from Chzhen
and Mumford (2011), a negative coefficient on the full-time variable is likely to
suggest that being in part-time work does not cause a lower position in the wage
distribution, just that the highest female earners are more likely to choose part-time
(and so less likely to choose full-time) work due possibly to the family commitments.
Furthermore, in contrast to previous empirical works (Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer, 2005; Kee, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010),
it is found that the top female relative pay seems to be higher in the private sector
than in the public sector, which somewhat implies that the highest paid British
women working in the latter sector are less likely to be able to move up to the very
top jobs. What might have kept those women from reaching the top in the public
sector is quite subtle, but there are still several possible explanations that can be
offered. One might be the negative impact of the more stringently enforced use of
family friendly policies, as Gupta et al. (2006) point out that the absence from paid
employment for shorter or longer periods is much more harmful for women at the
top of the hierarchy than women at the bottom of the labour market. It might also
be because the governance structures have remained male-dominated (Elkinawy and
Stater, 2011), and better paid jobs in the public sector seem more likely to be part-
time according to the descriptive findings in previous section, and a top-ranking
woman would be more likely to encounter a taste for discrimination regarding to
the part-time jobs.
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4.7 The Shifting Patterns of the UK Glass Ceilings by Occu-
pations, Age and Cohort Groups at Occupation Levels
This aim of this subsection is to discover how the changing proportion within
occupations of women with specific characteristics, in particular education, marital
status and the presence of children in the family, is associated with changes in the
UK glass ceilings at different levels of occupation between 1983 and 2011. The
dependent variables, the glass ceilings, are measured by the positions of the 90th
percentile of female wages, for the total, full-time, and part-time women respectively,
in the overall male wage distribution in each occupation (two-digit) at each time
point (Equation 4.4). The estimated results for different specifications are shown in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
For Table 4.4, the estimated results in the first two columns show, for all work-
ers, the changing relative positions associated the changing proportion of women
with specific characteristics. The next two columns focus on full-time workers only,
and the final two restrict the analysis to part-timers. In each case, the first col-
umn presents the results from an OLS specification, and the second column for an
occupational Fixed Effects specification, allowing the analysis to emphasise within
occupational variations. The significant and positive sign for the Female coefficient
in column 5 indicates that the occupations that have a greater share of women
benefit the top part-time female relative wage, but seem to hurt the overall and
the full-time wages, though the effects are not statistically significant (columns 1
and 3 ). The occupational Fixed Effects coefficients show that the high-end female
earnings will go down when the share of women in occupations is rising (columns
2, 4, and 6 ). This suggests that those occupations that are hiring more women are
hiring lower paid women, so that the wage at the 90th percentile falls.
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The rank of top female earnings is lower on the men’s scale in occupations
that have higher female employment in full-time compared to part-time work (odd
columns), while the positive Fixed Effects coefficients suggest that the effect of a
rising full-time female share is in the opposite direction, where a percentage point
increase in the full-time employment rate of women improves the overall relative
position of the 90th percentile woman by 0.14 percentage points (column 2 ). These
results suggest that looking across occupations, there must be some unobserved fea-
ture of occupations with a high proportion of full-timers that is associated with
lower relative pay for women. However, looking within occupations, the Fixed Ef-
fects estimates suggest that the glass ceiling will still be lifted in those occupations
that have increased their full-time female employment.
A higher proportion of women in an occupation who are younger than age 50,
working in the public sector and holding a higher qualification are all positively
associated with the location of the glass ceiling for almost all specifications. The
proportion of women working in London and the family factors do not seem to have
too much influence on the relative positions in the occupations, with some weak
evidence suggesting that the glass ceiling will be at a lower position for the female
part-timers in occupations that have a greater share of women working in London.
Also, a percentage point increase in the employment of mothers will lead to a decline
in the glass ceiling for the full-timers by 0.04 percentage points as the Fixed Effects
coefficient shows in column 4.
Table 4.5 gives the results from the estimates of the shifting glass ceilings for over-
all wages in different levels of occupations. The first two columns provide the results
for interpreting how the changing proportion of women with specific characteristics
will lead to changes in the location of glass ceilings within the ‘top’ occupations
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managers, professional, and associate professional and technical occupations, the
next two explain the relative changes in glass ceilings in the ‘middle’ occupations
clerical and secretarial, craft related, and personal and protective service occupa-
tion, while the final two columns are for the ‘bottom’ occupations sales, plant and
machine operatives, and elementary occupations. Similar to the previous table, the
first columns in each case are the results from an OLS specification, and the second
columns from an occupational Fixed Effects specification.
A positive relationship between the location of the glass ceiling and the total
female employment is discovered in the top-level occupations, but a negative rela-
tionship in the middle and the bottom level occupations. This suggests that top
women are paid better when there are more female managers and professionals, but
more lower-ranked women do not provide any benefit. On top of that, the Fixed
Effects coefficients indicate that a rising proportion of women strongly hurts the
income of the well-paid women in the middle occupations. Similar to previous find-
ings, looking across occupations, those occupations, except at the top, that have a
greater proportion of full-time women have seen the 90th percentile of female wages
rank lower on the men’s scale. However, the ranking position will move up by about
0.25 percentage points in the middle and high occupations for each percentage point
increase in the proportion of full-time women within occupations, as the Fixed Ef-
fects estimates have shown in column 2 and 4. Women fare significantly better in
the middle and the low-level occupations when a greater proportion of women are
working in the public sector, but it seems unlikely to benefit those women in the
top-level occupations in Britain. This corresponds to some extent with what was
observed in the previous sections, that men have held the better paid higher level
jobs in the public sector, especially for the part-timers, leading to a more difficult
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situation for the top women in that sector.
As for the matter of age, it is found that the greater share of younger women in
the middle or bottom occupations is strongly associated with higher relative wage
rates, but the young do not seem to benefit that much from their age in the top
occupations, with some evidence to suggest that a rising proportion of younger
women in the top occupations will decrease the top female relative pay. In addition,
the top women are paid relatively better in occupations that have hired more women
who are well-educated and working outside London, and their relative wages have
been increasing across all levels of occupations over time. The effects of the family
elements are still weak, with evidence suggesting that each percentage point rise in
the share of mothers in occupations reduces the female relative pay by about 0.08
percentage points in top-level occupations.
In summary, the estimated results for the top occupations and for the remainder
are somewhat different, both for the overall relative wage and for full-time and part-
time relative wages53 measured separately. For instance, the top-ranking woman in
general tends to be more disadvantaged in the female-dominated occupations at the
lower level, but the reverse seems to be true for those in the top occupations. This
corresponds to the empirical literature (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010; Elkinawy
and Stater, 2011; Leah, 2011) that when more women are able to move up to the
highest-level occupations, this will lift the position of the glass ceiling.
It is also worth noting that the impact of working full-time on the location of
the glass ceiling has been observed to be opposite in sign in the individual-level
and occupational level Fixed Effects results. It is suggested that an individual high-
earning woman may maximise her own utility by choosing to work part-time, though
53See Table 4.11 and 4.12 in Appendix 4A
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the occupation level Fixed Effects results show that women as a whole will be better
off when a higher proportion of them work full-time, which is a case of individual
self-interest versus the common good.
Besides, strong evidence indicates that a greater share of women working in the
public sector in the top occupations hurts the high-end female relative pay, while
it raises the pay in the other occupations54. This has confirmed the findings in
the previous sections that although the gender-specific policies are more stringently
enforced in the public sector, it does not seem to help improve the gender equality for
the best paid women (those at the top end of the wage distribution in the top-level
occupations) within this sector. Alongside a rather weak effect found in the high
level occupations, it is likely that the well-paid younger women would fare better in
the middle and the low-level occupations.
Better education and working outside London are suggested to lift the position
of the glass ceiling in all occupations, however the effects of family status are quite
weak, in general decreasing the relative pay of high-earning women55. It has to be
borne in mind that the results are conditional upon being in employment, upon being
in specific occupational groups, and upon those women at the 90th percentile of the
female wage distribution in specific occupations across the two digit occupational
levels. Hence, the lack of significance of the family related variables should be seen
as having no effect only on the women who are studied who are paid amongst the
highest in the particular occupation - rather than for women in general. What is
more, it has been seen that the results for the returns to female characteristics in
54These phenomena are also true in the specifications for the top full-time and part-time female
relative wages (See Table 4.11 and 4.12 in Appendix 4A)
55There is a little evidence suggesting that a greater proportion of mothers working in low-level jobs
is associated with higher part-time female pay at the top end of the distribution (Table 4.12 in
Appendix 4A)
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the top occupations are fairly weak compared to that for the middle and bottom
occupations, which implies that the gender wage differential at the very top levels
has been driven by other unobserved factors.
4.8 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to discover how the UK gender pay gap at the top
end of the distribution (the ‘glass ceiling’) has evolved over the period of 1975−2011
with respect to different labour market sectors, occupations, and different cohort
groups, both within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts. The research
was based upon a set of descriptive, graphical and statistical analyses with a concern
that there may be a misleading conclusion due to the linear dependency between
age, birth cohort and time periods. The results are consistent across all the sections.
Specifically, the graphic cohort analysis set a firm ground for the following analyses,
revealing that although the gender wage inequality in the public sector remained
considerably lower over time, the female relative pay at the top of the earnings
distribution in the private sector has been increasing dramatically across the age
and cohort groups. It also reveals the considerably higher wage that male part-
timers have been paid in the public sector. These findings support the estimated
results from regression analysis that a higher paid woman will be significantly better
off working in the private sector.
It is found that the British women in general are paid much closer to men in
professional and technical occupations, but significantly less than men in low-level
male-dominated jobs and the top management jobs, compared to other occupations.
These patterns are especially explicit for the female top earners. The results show
that an individual higher-waged woman fares pronouncedly lower than their male
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counterpart in top managerial jobs, yet if the proportion of female employment grows
in these jobs their relative wage increases. It implies that if there are more women
able to move into the highest jobs, a narrower gender pay gap can be expected.
However, if more women are engaged in clerical occupations, a lower female relative
wage for the top-ranking women will be seen, as majority of them are involved in
lower level tasks in these female-dominated occupations.
With respect to the public and the private sectors, very different patterns are
discovered across cohorts and occupations. Female relative pay has been relatively
stable over their lifetime in the public sector due possibly to collective bargaining,
nationally agreed pay scales, and the enforcement of female friendly policies within
the sector, but a notable decline in pay at childrearing age has been observed in the
private sector. As for cohort effects, it has been seen that top female wages relative
to men have reached a similar level in the private sector as in the public sector,
thus leaving the absence of a between-sectors wage gap for the current generation
of women. The evidence from further regression analysis confirms this point that a
top-ranking woman is now rewarded better in the private sector than if she works
in the public sector. Moreover, it is found that if there are more women engaged in
the top-level occupations in the public sector, the top female relative wage will fall.
It seems to imply that the top paid British women working in the public sector are
struggling to move up into the highest occupations together with the male-dominated
governance structures, resulting in their lower relative wages. It also implies that
the positive impact of gender equality-related policies is less significant on the top-
ranking women. This might be because of the inefficiency of the policy itself, but
may also be because some women might take a longer time out of the labour market
as a result of more generous female friendly regulations in the public sector, leading
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to their lower human capital accumulation and hence hurt their opportunity of being
promoted, as well as their wages.
Furthermore, the results indicate that although a majority of women will be
better off under full-time employment and a higher share of women engaged in full-
time work, some evidence suggests that an individual female top earner does not
necessarily receive a pay penalty for moving from full-time to part-time employ-
ment. It implies that an individual high-earning woman may maximise her own
utility by choosing to work part-time since she may be better able to afford the
change. Besides, younger women, better education and working outside London
are suggested to have a positive impact on the position of the glass ceilings in all
occupations, whereas the effects of family status are quite weak with only limited
evidence suggesting the presence of children to have a negative effect.
Overall, the results suggest that although the gender wage gap at both the mean
and the top of the wage distribution has been narrowing over the period 1975−2011,
it remains significantly large in particular for the top women. Equality policies do
benefit the majority of women but seem to be unlikely to help in explaining the
slow progress of women in current generations and in the highest-level management
jobs. However, what has really kept these women from reaching the top especially
in the public sector, and what has driven the stagnant wage growth for the recent
generations is subtle, which hence needs to be further investigated.
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Table 4.1: Female/Male Wage Ratio
Soc Occupation 1975 1980 1990 2000 2010
1 Managers 0.63 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.70
2 Professional 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90
3 Technical 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.78 0.86
4 Clerical 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.94 0.95
5 Craft 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.86
6 Personal Service 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.77
7 Sales 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.68 0.82
8 Machine Operatives 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.81
9 Other 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.84
Source: New Earnings Survey (NES) / Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (2013); and
authors calculations
Table 4.2: The Position of the 90th Percentile Woman in the Male Wage
Distribution by Occupations
Soc Occupation 1975 1980 1990 2000 2010
1 Managers 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.74 0.76
2 Professional 0.75 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.82
3 Technical 0.65 0.64 0.74 0.77 0.81
4 Clerical 0.50 0.60 0.73 0.77 0.83
5 Craft 0.47 0.49 0.59 0.76 0.85
6 Personal Service 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.78 0.83
7 Sales 0.42 0.60 0.69 0.77 0.80
8 Machine Operatives 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.62 0.79
9 Other 0.54 0.55 0.71 0.72 0.85
Source: New Earnings Survey (NES) / Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (2013); and
authors calculations
240
Table 4.3: Individual Level Determinants of Well-Paid Women’s Position
in the Male Wage Distribution
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1920s & 1930s cohorts are omitted
1940s cht 0.0215∗∗∗ . −0.0123∗∗∗ . 0.0056∗∗∗ .
(0.0019) . (0.0017) . (0.0017) .
1950s cht 0.0355∗∗∗ . 0.0014 . 0.0436∗∗∗ .
(0.0020) . (0.0017) . (0.0017) .
1960s cht 0.0504∗∗∗ . 0.0103∗∗∗ . 0.0662∗∗∗ .
(0.0025) . (0.0021) . (0.0020) .
1970s cht 0.0662∗∗∗ . 0.0057∗ . 0.0895∗∗∗ .
(0.0029) . (0.0024) . (0.0023) .
1980s cht 0.0837∗∗∗ . 0.0040 . 0.1172∗∗∗ .
(0.0035) . (0.0027) . (0.0026) .
1990s cht 0.1042∗∗∗ . −0.0143∗∗∗ . 0.1130∗∗∗ .
(0.0049) . (0.0033) . (0.0032) .
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s −0.0112∗∗∗ −0.0164∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0198∗∗∗ −0.0196∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Age 30s −0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0077∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
Age 20s −0.0453∗∗∗ −0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010)
Age 10s −0.0575∗∗∗ −0.1094∗∗∗ 0.1025∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016)
Managers is omitted
Profession 0.0619∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Technical 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0712∗∗∗ −0.0311∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0302∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Clerical 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.1074∗∗∗ −0.0504∗∗∗ −0.0309∗∗∗ −0.0496∗∗∗ −0.0285∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Craft −0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ −0.0518∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0473∗∗∗ −0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0041)
Personal 0.0357∗∗∗ 0.1150∗∗∗ −0.0272∗∗∗ −0.0218∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0175∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Sales 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗∗ −0.0275∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗ −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Machine −0.0986∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗ −0.0596∗∗∗ −0.0265∗∗∗ −0.0579∗∗∗ −0.0227∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0050)
Others 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.1415∗∗∗ −0.0377∗∗∗ −0.0257∗∗∗ −0.0385∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0066)
Full-time −0.0159∗∗∗ −0.0250∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗∗ −0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Public 0.0016 0.0017 −0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0025∗ −0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Work London 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
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Table 4.3: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1975-1984 are omitted
1985-1994 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0015 −0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
1995-2004 0.1063∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0009
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0010)
2005-2011 0.1139∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ −0.0144∗∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0011)
Constant 0.7172∗∗∗ 0.7217∗∗∗ 0.8427∗∗∗ 0.8552∗∗∗ 0.8485∗∗∗ 0.8952∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015)
FE(Individual) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 229167 229167 228110 228110 228140 228140
R2 0.3626 0.2058 0.3304 0.1326 0.3148 0.0422
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.4: Occupational Level Determinants of the Position of the Glass
Ceiling
Total Full-time Part-Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female −0.0203 −0.1760∗∗∗ −0.0158 −0.1857∗∗∗ 0.1349∗∗∗ −0.0751
(0.0106) (0.0307) (0.0106) (0.0318) (0.0176) (0.0563)
Full-time −0.1630∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗ −0.2386∗∗∗ 0.0125 −0.3110∗∗∗ −0.0192
(0.0205) (0.0307) (0.0209) (0.0329) (0.0347) (0.0592)
Public 0.0857∗∗∗ 0.0322 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0400∗ 0.0063 0.0082
(0.0106) (0.0187) (0.0107) (0.0194) (0.0187) (0.0381)
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s 0.2629∗∗∗ 0.0533 0.3261∗∗∗ 0.1287∗∗ 0.2436∗∗ 0.3235∗∗∗
(0.0515) (0.0452) (0.0531) (0.0477) (0.0901) (0.0880)
Age 30s 0.4185∗∗∗ 0.0656 0.4139∗∗∗ 0.0944∗ 0.7969∗∗∗ 0.5289∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0425) (0.0436) (0.0781) (0.0873)
Age 20s 0.4861∗∗∗ 0.0566 0.4891∗∗∗ 0.0974∗ 0.4393∗∗∗ 0.2104∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0411) (0.0384) (0.0427) (0.0661) (0.0802)
Age 10s 0.1935∗∗ −0.0248 0.2020∗∗∗ 0.0154 0.0316 0.0453
(0.0606) (0.0588) (0.0610) (0.0610) (0.1053) (0.1123)
Work London −0.0526 0.0172 −0.0244 0.0034 −0.1913∗ 0.0123
(0.0508) (0.0444) (0.0511) (0.0460) (0.0878) (0.0858)
Degree 0.0388∗ 0.0331 0.0358∗ 0.0593∗ 0.1747∗∗∗ −0.0642
(0.0151) (0.0270) (0.0153) (0.0279) (0.0260) (0.0512)
Married −0.0106 −0.0102 −0.0147 −0.0146 0.0110 −0.0021
(0.0128) (0.0099) (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0216) (0.0185)
Kid-16-Fmly −0.0080 −0.0338 −0.0111 −0.0372∗ 0.0181 −0.0016
(0.0223) (0.0182) (0.0225) (0.0189) (0.0381) (0.0348)
1983-1990 is omitted
1991− 1997 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0063) (0.0080) (0.0066) (0.0134) (0.0120)
1998− 2004 0.1246∗∗∗ 0.1373∗∗∗ 0.1067∗∗∗ 0.1181∗∗∗ 0.1321∗∗∗ 0.1829∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0140) (0.0136)
2005− 2011 0.1741∗∗∗ 0.1786∗∗∗ 0.1467∗∗∗ 0.1515∗∗∗ 0.2124∗∗∗ 0.2587∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0078) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Constant 0.4191∗∗∗ 0.5372∗∗∗ 0.4896∗∗∗ 0.6184∗∗∗ 0.2618∗∗∗ 0.2469∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0397) (0.0355) (0.0412) (0.0612) (0.0776)
FE(Occupation) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2149 2149 2149 2149 2091 2091
R2 0.3193 0.3393 0.2957 0.2803 0.3445 0.3022
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Kid-16-Fmly is the presence of children under the age of 16 in family.
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Table 4.5: Occupational Level Determinants of the Position of the Glass
Ceiling, by Occupational Groups
Top Middle Bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0992∗∗∗ −0.0519 −0.0320∗ −0.2603∗∗∗ −0.0629∗ −0.1047
(0.0221) (0.0525) (0.0152) (0.0651) (0.0257) (0.0564)
Full-time 0.0499 0.2552∗∗∗ −0.0564 0.2478∗∗∗ −0.2919∗∗∗ 0.0419
(0.0503) (0.0556) (0.0338) (0.0552) (0.0397) (0.0529)
Public −0.0294∗ −0.0035 0.1195∗∗∗ 0.0737∗ 0.1920∗∗∗ −0.0486
(0.0143) (0.0267) (0.0190) (0.0330) (0.0309) (0.0466)
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s −0.0134 −0.0793 0.0550 0.0120 0.6867∗∗∗ 0.2154∗∗
(0.0773) (0.0731) (0.1035) (0.0938) (0.0936) (0.0811)
Age 30s 0.0230 −0.1997∗∗ 0.4483∗∗∗ 0.3515∗∗∗ 0.6775∗∗∗ 0.0701
(0.0656) (0.0680) (0.0882) (0.0908) (0.0798) (0.0750)
Age 20s 0.0350 −0.1352 0.3753∗∗∗ 0.1138 0.7917∗∗∗ 0.0054
(0.0622) (0.0734) (0.0746) (0.0803) (0.0673) (0.0716)
Age 10s −0.0566 −0.3735 0.2399∗ 0.0350 0.3167∗∗ −0.0414
(0.2366) (0.2059) (0.0963) (0.0992) (0.1072) (0.1010)
Work London −0.1893∗∗ −0.0859 −0.0540 0.2212 0.1386 0.0573
(0.0620) (0.0594) (0.1315) (0.1151) (0.1036) (0.0942)
Degree 0.0793∗∗∗ −0.0210 0.1651∗ 0.0838 0.2979∗∗ 0.0402
(0.0168) (0.0308) (0.0750) (0.0694) (0.0905) (0.0892)
Married −0.0044 0.0028 −0.0238 −0.0024 −0.0230 −0.0302
(0.0182) (0.0149) (0.0216) (0.0180) (0.0239) (0.0185)
Kid-16-Fmly −0.0103 −0.0792∗ −0.0628 −0.0290 0.0393 0.0002
(0.0378) (0.0328) (0.0380) (0.0338) (0.0375) (0.0301)
1983-1990 is omitted
1991− 1997 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0842∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0707∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0100) (0.0131) (0.0111) (0.0159) (0.0126)
1998− 2004 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.1305∗∗∗ 0.1329∗∗∗ 0.1487∗∗∗ 0.1238∗∗∗ 0.1135∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0164) (0.0134)
2005− 2011 0.1191∗∗∗ 0.1615∗∗∗ 0.1836∗∗∗ 0.1878∗∗∗ 0.1692∗∗∗ 0.1636∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0148) (0.0133) (0.0165) (0.0138)
Constant 0.5844∗∗∗ 0.6151∗∗∗ 0.4392∗∗∗ 0.4272∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗ 0.5413∗∗∗
(0.0727) (0.0739) (0.0654) (0.0762) (0.0697) (0.0652)
FE(Occupation) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 799 799 735 735 615 615
R2 0.2425 0.3297 0.3987 0.4337 0.4510 0.3306
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Kid-16-Fmly is the presence of children under the age of 16 in family.
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Appendix 4A
Table 4.6: Proportion of Workers in the Public and the Private Sectors
Male Female
1975 1990 2010 1975 1990 2010
Panel A: Public Sector
Full-Time 0.570 0.425 0.300 0.292 0.343 0.402
Part-Time 0.004 0.009 0.033 0.134 0.223 0.266
Total 0.574 0.434 0.332 0.426 0.566 0.668
Panel B: Private Sector
Full-Time 0.652 0.606 0.473 0.256 0.283 0.261
Part-Time 0.004 0.009 0.072 0.089 0.101 0.194
Total 0.656 0.615 0.545 0.344 0.385 0.455
Source: New Earnings Survey (NES) / Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (2013);
and authors calculations
Table 4.7: Proportion of Workers in Total Employment by Occupation
Male Female
Soc Occupation 1975 1990 2010 1975 1990 2010
1 Managers 0.066 0.077 0.089 0.013 0.029 0.058
2 Professional 0.049 0.054 0.051 0.020 0.027 0.055
3 Technical 0.041 0.053 0.048 0.029 0.052 0.069
4 Clerical 0.062 0.054 0.059 0.142 0.160 0.113
5 Craft 0.158 0.105 0.054 0.018 0.011 0.003
6 Personal Service 0.028 0.032 0.044 0.029 0.042 0.095
7 Sales 0.024 0.027 0.044 0.033 0.045 0.074
8 Machine Operatives 0.136 0.107 0.052 0.044 0.031 0.011
9 Other 0.063 0.048 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.038
Source: New Earnings Survey (NES) / Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (2013); and
authors calculations
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Table 4.8: Individual Panel Regression on the Changes in the Position of
the Glass Ceiling (2-digit Occupations)
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1920s & 1930s cohorts are omitted
1940s cht 0.0221∗∗∗ . −0.0138∗∗∗ . 0.0043∗∗ .
(0.0017) . (0.0016) . (0.0016) .
1950s cht 0.0343∗∗∗ . −0.0017 . 0.0414∗∗∗ .
(0.0019) . (0.0016) . (0.0016) .
1960s cht 0.0484∗∗∗ . 0.0068∗∗∗ . 0.0649∗∗∗ .
(0.0022) . (0.0020) . (0.0019) .
1970s cht 0.0641∗∗∗ . 0.0015 . 0.0882∗∗∗ .
(0.0027) . (0.0023) . (0.0022) .
1980s cht 0.0817∗∗∗ . −0.0005 . 0.1166∗∗∗ .
(0.0032) . (0.0026) . (0.0025) .
1990s cht 0.1020∗∗∗ . −0.0191∗∗∗ . 0.1133∗∗∗ .
(0.0047) . (0.0032) . (0.0031) .
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s −0.0101∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗ −0.0128∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0215∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Age 30s −0.0227∗∗∗ −0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
Age 20s −0.0453∗∗∗ −0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010)
Age 10s −0.0562∗∗∗ −0.1151∗∗∗ 0.1075∗∗∗ 0.0986∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016)
SOC10 is omitted
Soc11 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.1005∗∗∗ −0.0509∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0499∗∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0025)
Soc12 0.0863∗∗∗ 0.0862∗∗∗ 0.0045 0.0021 0.0032 0.0016
(0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020)
Soc13 0.0162∗ 0.0581∗∗∗ −0.0170∗∗∗ −0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0179∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0022)
Soc14 0.1290∗∗∗ 0.1754∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0105∗ −0.0281∗∗∗ −0.0105∗
(0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0045)
Soc15 −0.0112 0.0407 −0.0035 −0.0050 −0.0042 0.0005
(0.0405) (0.0277) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0077)
Soc16 −0.0058 0.1005∗ −0.0117 0.0058 −0.0111 0.0178
(0.0493) (0.0487) (0.0133) (0.0172) (0.0158) (0.0112)
Soc17 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.1385∗∗∗ −0.0287∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0288∗∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0028)
Soc19 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗ −0.0158∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Soc20 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗ −0.0213∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Soc21 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.1572∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0029)
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Table 4.8: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Soc22 0.0905∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0133) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0035)
Soc23 0.1316∗∗∗ 0.1705∗∗∗ −0.0045 −0.0067∗ −0.0028 −0.0052
(0.0063) (0.0069) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Soc24 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.0076∗ −0.0095∗ 0.0055 −0.0100∗
(0.0077) (0.0103) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0040)
Soc25 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.1154∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0024)
Soc26 0.1006∗∗∗ 0.1226∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0238∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0056)
Soc27 0.1068∗∗∗ 0.1220∗∗∗ −0.0311∗∗∗ −0.0260∗∗∗ −0.0298∗∗∗ −0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0070) (0.0055)
Soc29 0.1661∗∗∗ 0.2287∗∗∗ −0.0266∗∗∗ −0.0223∗∗∗ −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0039)
Soc30 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.1543∗∗∗ −0.0517∗∗∗ −0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0495∗∗∗ −0.0302∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0045)
Soc31 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.1347∗∗∗ −0.0565∗∗∗ −0.0217∗ −0.0571∗∗∗ −0.0135
(0.0159) (0.0209) (0.0076) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0108)
Soc32 0.1405∗∗∗ 0.1664∗∗∗ −0.0201∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0028)
Soc33 −0.0239 −0.0872 −0.0032 0.0094 −0.0012 −0.0067
(0.0361) (0.0697) (0.0110) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0088)
Soc34 0.1232∗∗∗ 0.1961∗∗∗ −0.0672∗∗∗ −0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0651∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0031)
Soc35 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.1186∗∗∗ −0.0210∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗ −0.0226∗∗∗ −0.0165∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056)
Soc36 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0586∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Soc37 0.1397∗∗∗ 0.2156∗∗∗ −0.0660∗∗∗ −0.0336∗∗∗ −0.0637∗∗∗ −0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Soc38 0.1481∗∗∗ 0.1754∗∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0105) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0034)
Soc39 0.1122∗∗∗ 0.1813∗∗∗ −0.0315∗∗∗ −0.0186∗∗∗ −0.0348∗∗∗ −0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Soc40 0.1361∗∗∗ 0.2489∗∗∗ −0.0776∗∗∗ −0.0429∗∗∗ −0.0779∗∗∗ −0.0369∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0027)
Soc41 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.1940∗∗∗ −0.0622∗∗∗ −0.0363∗∗∗ −0.0609∗∗∗ −0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0024)
Soc42 0.1026∗∗∗ 0.2177∗∗∗ −0.0638∗∗∗ −0.0410∗∗∗ −0.0649∗∗∗ −0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Soc43 0.1065∗∗∗ 0.2180∗∗∗ −0.0422∗∗∗ −0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0411∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Soc44 0.1402∗∗∗ 0.2730∗∗∗ −0.0752∗∗∗ −0.0506∗∗∗ −0.0767∗∗∗ −0.0463∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0056)
Soc45 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.1477∗∗∗ −0.0653∗∗∗ −0.0353∗∗∗ −0.0638∗∗∗ −0.0334∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027)
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Table 4.8: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Soc46 −0.0041 0.1145∗∗∗ −0.0726∗∗∗ −0.0373∗∗∗ −0.0721∗∗∗ −0.0337∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0040) (0.0050)
Soc49 −0.0114 0.0851∗∗∗ −0.0538∗∗∗ −0.0276∗∗∗ −0.0528∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0034)
Soc50 0.0432∗ 0.2010∗∗∗ −0.0189 0.0050 −0.0465∗ −0.0386
(0.0193) (0.0249) (0.0138) (0.0301) (0.0195) (0.0355)
Soc51 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.1246∗∗∗ −0.0625∗∗∗ −0.0217∗ −0.0544∗∗∗ −0.0137
(0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0074) (0.0078)
Soc52 0.1170∗∗∗ 0.2180∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗ −0.0230∗∗ −0.0414∗∗∗ −0.0162∗
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0046) (0.0067)
Soc53 −0.0218 0.0482 −0.0567∗∗∗ −0.0419 −0.0529∗∗∗ −0.0374
(0.0258) (0.0303) (0.0132) (0.0247) (0.0161) (0.0284)
Soc54 0.0463∗ 0.1741∗∗∗ −0.0391∗ 0.0063 −0.0408∗ −0.0109
(0.0221) (0.0362) (0.0152) (0.0243) (0.0170) (0.0317)
Soc55 −0.0357∗∗∗ 0.1245∗∗∗ −0.0853∗∗∗ −0.0589∗∗ −0.0801∗∗∗ −0.0253
(0.0074) (0.0108) (0.0046) (0.0208) (0.0060) (0.0195)
Soc56 −0.0830∗∗∗ 0.0300∗ −0.0728∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗ −0.0395∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0138) (0.0084) (0.0133) (0.0096) (0.0100)
Soc57 0.0271 0.2630∗∗∗ −0.0669∗∗∗ −0.0766 −0.0893∗∗∗ .
(0.0361) (0.0341) (0.0134) (0.0412) (0.0154) .
Soc58 0.0366∗∗ 0.2166∗∗∗ −0.0503∗ −0.0903∗∗∗ −0.0676∗ 0.0630∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0262) (0.0209) (0.0037) (0.0277) (0.0136)
Soc59 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.1811∗∗∗ −0.0481∗∗∗ −0.0255∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0390∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0055) (0.0102) (0.0059) (0.0082)
Soc61 0.1196∗∗∗ 0.1847∗∗∗ −0.0490∗∗∗ −0.0351∗∗∗ −0.0403∗∗∗ −0.0272∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0113) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0048)
Soc62 0.1062∗∗∗ 0.2444∗∗∗ −0.0678∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0625∗∗∗ −0.0227∗
(0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0090)
Soc63 0.1773∗∗∗ 0.2795∗∗∗ −0.0139∗∗∗ −0.0181∗ −0.0175∗∗∗ −0.0222∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0116) (0.0037) (0.0078) (0.0036) (0.0078)
Soc64 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.2109∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0304∗∗∗ −0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0052)
Soc65 0.1043∗∗∗ 0.2316∗∗∗ −0.0263∗∗∗ −0.0144∗ −0.0268∗∗∗ −0.0144∗
(0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0038) (0.0066) (0.0039) (0.0071)
Soc66 0.1210∗∗∗ 0.2480∗∗∗ −0.0318∗∗∗ −0.0242 −0.0292∗∗∗ −0.0240∗
(0.0072) (0.0132) (0.0060) (0.0144) (0.0059) (0.0114)
Soc67 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.2291∗∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗ −0.0281 −0.0680∗∗∗ −0.0360
(0.0080) (0.0112) (0.0088) (0.0407) (0.0124) (0.0348)
Soc69 0.1279∗∗∗ 0.2448∗∗∗ −0.0480∗∗∗ −0.0330∗∗∗ −0.0335∗∗∗ −0.0157
(0.0072) (0.0087) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0088)
Soc70 0.1181∗∗∗ 0.1631∗∗∗ −0.0268∗∗∗ −0.0208∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0041)
Soc71 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.1424∗∗∗ −0.0282∗∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ −0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032)
Soc72 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.2160∗∗∗ −0.0564∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0535∗∗∗ −0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0038)
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Table 4.8: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Soc73 0.0587∗∗ 0.1608∗∗∗ −0.0137 0.0017 −0.0215 −0.0020
(0.0214) (0.0300) (0.0155) (0.0233) (0.0120) (0.0146)
Soc79 0.1347∗∗∗ 0.2250∗∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗ −0.0249∗∗∗ −0.0254∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0043)
Soc80 0.0200∗ 0.1554∗∗∗ −0.0715∗∗∗ −0.0504∗∗∗ −0.0657∗∗∗ −0.0264
(0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0064) (0.0145) (0.0073) (0.0135)
Soc81 −0.0838∗∗∗ 0.1127∗∗∗ −0.1048∗∗∗ −0.0098 −0.1030∗∗∗ −0.0181
(0.0141) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0253) (0.0199) (0.0237)
Soc82 −0.0877∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ −0.0735∗∗∗ −0.0230 −0.0765∗∗∗ −0.0267∗
(0.0093) (0.0102) (0.0065) (0.0119) (0.0073) (0.0128)
Soc83 −0.3000∗∗∗ −0.1066∗∗ −0.0826∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0942∗∗ −0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0402) (0.0288) (0.0029) (0.0302) (0.0030)
Soc84 −0.1100∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗ −0.0975∗∗∗ −0.0607 −0.1042∗∗∗ −0.0892
(0.0131) (0.0156) (0.0103) (0.0355) (0.0124) (0.0472)
Soc85 −0.0861∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗ −0.0830∗∗∗ −0.0600∗∗∗ −0.0747∗∗∗ −0.0455∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0097) (0.0051) (0.0102) (0.0060) (0.0123)
Soc86 −0.0464∗∗∗ 0.1088∗∗∗ −0.0825∗∗∗ −0.0520∗∗∗ −0.0807∗∗∗ −0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0078) (0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0076)
Soc87 0.1586∗∗∗ 0.2682∗∗∗ −0.0348∗∗∗ −0.0046 −0.0322∗∗∗ −0.0079
(0.0071) (0.0104) (0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0085) (0.0082)
Soc88 0.1462∗∗∗ 0.1926∗∗∗ −0.0541∗∗∗ −0.0276 −0.0616∗∗∗ −0.0349
(0.0189) (0.0229) (0.0053) (0.0191) (0.0070) (0.0200)
Soc89 −0.0368∗∗∗ 0.1095∗∗∗ −0.0581∗∗∗ −0.0256∗ −0.0583∗∗∗ −0.0357∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0108) (0.0069) (0.0111) (0.0093) (0.0115)
Soc90 0.1711∗∗∗ 0.3226∗∗∗ −0.0616∗∗∗ −0.0275∗∗ −0.0452∗∗ −0.0133
(0.0088) (0.0219) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0167) (0.0186)
Soc91 0.0211 0.1765∗∗∗ −0.0424∗∗ −0.0203 −0.0379∗ −0.0421
(0.0112) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0192) (0.0169) (0.0247)
Soc92 −0.0108 0.0888 −0.0236 −0.0172∗∗∗ −0.0293∗∗ 0.0094
(0.0331) (0.0595) (0.0124) (0.0041) (0.0113) (0.0056)
Soc93 0.0058 0.1192∗∗∗ −0.0917∗∗∗ −0.1315∗∗∗ −0.0925∗ −0.1048∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0305) (0.0199) (0.0137) (0.0407) (0.0260)
Soc94 0.1228∗∗∗ 0.2522∗∗∗ −0.0524∗∗∗ −0.0343 −0.0692∗∗∗ −0.0126
(0.0075) (0.0118) (0.0064) (0.0177) (0.0063) (0.0133)
Soc95 0.1025∗∗∗ 0.2570∗∗∗ −0.0551∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗ −0.0537∗∗∗ −0.0169∗
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0038) (0.0073)
Soc99 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.2055∗∗∗ −0.0659∗∗∗ −0.0685∗∗∗ −0.0675∗∗∗ −0.0675∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0169) (0.0085) (0.0257)
Full-time −0.0157∗∗∗ −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0099∗∗∗ −0.0140∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Public −0.0099∗∗∗ −0.0018 −0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0025∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Work London 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
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Table 4.8: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1975-1984 is omitted
1985-1994 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
1995-2004 0.1043∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0016
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010)
2005-2011 0.1123∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗ −0.0194∗∗∗ −0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Constant 0.6631∗∗∗ 0.6216∗∗∗ 0.8605∗∗∗ 0.8593∗∗∗ 0.8668∗∗∗ 0.8988∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0024)
FE(Individual) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 229167 229167 228110 228110 228140 228140
R2 0.4339 0.2684 0.3644 0.1375 0.3457 0.0463
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.9: Individual Panel Regression on the Changes in the Position of
the Glass Ceiling (2 Age Dummies Omitted)
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1920s cohorts is omitted
1930s cht 0.0032 . −0.0078∗∗ . 0.0021 .
(0.0026) . (0.0025) . (0.0025) .
1940s cht 0.0184∗∗∗ . −0.0235∗∗∗ . −0.0020 .
(0.0025) . (0.0023) . (0.0024) .
1950s cht 0.0296∗∗∗ . −0.0133∗∗∗ . 0.0310∗∗∗ .
(0.0026) . (0.0023) . (0.0023) .
1960s cht 0.0408∗∗∗ . −0.0084∗∗∗ . 0.0474∗∗∗ .
(0.0027) . (0.0025) . (0.0025) .
1970s cht 0.0548∗∗∗ . −0.0155∗∗∗ . 0.0674∗∗∗ .
(0.0031) . (0.0027) . (0.0027) .
1980s cht 0.0700∗∗∗ . −0.0198∗∗∗ . 0.0909∗∗∗ .
(0.0035) . (0.0029) . (0.0029) .
1990s cht 0.0888∗∗∗ . −0.0406∗∗∗ . 0.0829∗∗∗ .
(0.0049) . (0.0034) . (0.0033) .
Age40s & Age50s are omitted
Age 30s −0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Age 20s −0.0317∗∗∗ −0.0534∗∗∗ 0.0817∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Age 10s −0.0422∗∗∗ −0.0839∗∗∗ 0.1193∗∗∗ 0.1244∗∗∗ 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Managers is omitted
Profession 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Technical 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0713∗∗∗ −0.0309∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Clerical 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.1078∗∗∗ −0.0500∗∗∗ −0.0303∗∗∗ −0.0481∗∗∗ −0.0273∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Craft −0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ −0.0515∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0459∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0041)
Personal 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.1157∗∗∗ −0.0271∗∗∗ −0.0213∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Sales 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0961∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗ −0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Machine −0.0986∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗ −0.0592∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0560∗∗∗ −0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0050)
Others 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.1418∗∗∗ −0.0375∗∗∗ −0.0250∗∗∗ −0.0372∗∗∗ −0.0166∗
(0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0066)
Full-time −0.0158∗∗∗ −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0171∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Public 0.0017∗ 0.0013 −0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0020 −0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Work London 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
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Table 4.9: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1975-1984 are omitted
1985-1994 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0020∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
1995-2004 0.1121∗∗∗ 0.1013∗∗∗ 0.0384∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010)
2005-2011 0.1221∗∗∗ 0.1133∗∗∗ 0.0491∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Constant 0.7093∗∗∗ 0.6981∗∗∗ 0.8420∗∗∗ 0.8277∗∗∗ 0.8370∗∗∗ 0.8658∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0015)
FE(Individual) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 229167 229167 228110 228110 228140 228140
R2 0.3620 0.2036 0.3289 0.1239 0.3096 0.0305
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.10: Individual Panel Regression on the Changes in the Position
of the Glass Ceiling (2 Period Dummies Omitted)
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1920s cohorts is omitted
1930s cht 0.0415∗∗∗ . 0.0048∗ . 0.0121∗∗∗ .
(0.0026) . (0.0024) . (0.0025) .
1940s cht 0.0863∗∗∗ . −0.0018 . 0.0136∗∗∗ .
(0.0024) . (0.0023) . (0.0023) .
1950s cht 0.1188∗∗∗ . 0.0152∗∗∗ . 0.0517∗∗∗ .
(0.0025) . (0.0023) . (0.0024) .
1960s cht 0.1552∗∗∗ . 0.0288∗∗∗ . 0.0743∗∗∗ .
(0.0028) . (0.0024) . (0.0024) .
1970s cht 0.1853∗∗∗ . 0.0274∗∗∗ . 0.0976∗∗∗ .
(0.0032) . (0.0026) . (0.0026) .
1980s cht 0.2179∗∗∗ . 0.0287∗∗∗ . 0.1253∗∗∗ .
(0.0036) . (0.0028) . (0.0028) .
1990s cht 0.2502∗∗∗ . 0.0135∗∗∗ . 0.1211∗∗∗ .
(0.0050) . (0.0033) . (0.0033) .
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s −0.0335∗∗∗ −0.0319∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗ −0.0211∗∗∗ −0.0178∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Age 30s −0.0648∗∗∗ −0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Age 20s −0.1029∗∗∗ −0.1212∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Age 10s −0.1293∗∗∗ −0.1692∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Managers is omitted
Profession 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Technical 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ −0.0309∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗ −0.0304∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Clerical 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.1054∗∗∗ −0.0508∗∗∗ −0.0312∗∗∗ −0.0493∗∗∗ −0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Craft −0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ −0.0531∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0468∗∗∗ −0.0180∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0041)
Personal 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.1150∗∗∗ −0.0273∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Sales 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ −0.0272∗∗∗ −0.0196∗∗∗ −0.0246∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Machine −0.1018∗∗∗ 0.0125∗ −0.0611∗∗∗ −0.0268∗∗∗ −0.0571∗∗∗ −0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0049)
Others 0.0391∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗∗ −0.0378∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0381∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0066)
Full-time −0.0162∗∗∗ −0.0248∗∗∗ −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Public −0.0004 −0.0026 −0.0168∗∗∗ 0.0021∗ −0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011)
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Table 4.10: Continued
Occupation Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Work London 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
1975-1984 & 1985-1994 are omitted
1995-2004 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
2005-2011 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ −0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Constant 0.7199∗∗∗ 0.7927∗∗∗ 0.8454∗∗∗ 0.8672∗∗∗ 0.8405∗∗∗ 0.8874∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0015)
FE(Individual) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 229167 229167 228110 228110 228140 228140
R2 0.3642 0.1868 0.3284 0.1310 0.3154 0.0415
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: Occupational Panel Regression on the Changes in the Full-
Time Glass Ceiling by Occupational Levels
Top Middle Bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0469∗ −0.0950 −0.0171 −0.3765∗∗∗ −0.0232 −0.0426
(0.0223) (0.0524) (0.0156) (0.0681) (0.0258) (0.0592)
Full-time −0.1797∗∗ 0.0145 −0.0856∗ 0.2077∗∗∗ −0.3566∗∗∗ −0.1122∗
(0.0552) (0.0632) (0.0347) (0.0579) (0.0399) (0.0555)
Public −0.0458∗∗ −0.0063 0.1287∗∗∗ 0.0886∗ 0.2022∗∗∗ −0.0473
(0.0145) (0.0267) (0.0195) (0.0346) (0.0311) (0.0489)
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s 0.0964 0.0082 0.0914 0.0473 0.6807∗∗∗ 0.2898∗∗∗
(0.0798) (0.0756) (0.1063) (0.0980) (0.0941) (0.0851)
Age 30s 0.0504 −0.1531∗ 0.3949∗∗∗ 0.3412∗∗∗ 0.6766∗∗∗ 0.1521
(0.0652) (0.0686) (0.0907) (0.0950) (0.0802) (0.0787)
Age 20s 0.0599 −0.0741 0.3397∗∗∗ 0.1037 0.7601∗∗∗ 0.0807
(0.0622) (0.0741) (0.0766) (0.0839) (0.0676) (0.0751)
Age 10s −0.1552 −0.3942 0.3461∗∗∗ 0.1303 0.1989 −0.1414
(0.2330) (0.2054) (0.0989) (0.1038) (0.1077) (0.1061)
Work London −0.1133 −0.0703 0.0723 0.2238 0.0754 −0.0617
(0.0611) (0.0593) (0.1349) (0.1203) (0.1041) (0.0989)
Degree 0.0711∗∗∗ −0.0151 0.1917∗ 0.1060 0.3343∗∗∗ 0.1134
(0.0165) (0.0307) (0.0770) (0.0726) (0.0910) (0.0936)
Married −0.0237 −0.0127 −0.0113 0.0021 −0.0268 −0.0309
(0.0180) (0.0149) (0.0223) (0.0189) (0.0240) (0.0194)
Kid-16-Fmly −0.0211 −0.0621 −0.0562 −0.0481 0.0292 −0.0034
(0.0373) (0.0327) (0.0390) (0.0353) (0.0377) (0.0316)
1983-1990 is omitted
1991− 1997 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗ 0.0500∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0101) (0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0160) (0.0133)
1998− 2004 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.1087∗∗∗ 0.1249∗∗∗ 0.1369∗∗∗ 0.1007∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0165) (0.0141)
2005− 2011 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.1332∗∗∗ 0.1561∗∗∗ 0.1620∗∗∗ 0.1390∗∗∗ 0.1274∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0145)
Constant 0.7950∗∗∗ 0.7977∗∗∗ 0.4649∗∗∗ 0.5210∗∗∗ 0.3110∗∗∗ 0.6275∗∗∗
(0.0729) (0.0759) (0.0671) (0.0795) (0.0700) (0.0685)
FE(Occupation) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 799 799 735 735 615 615
R2 0.2307 0.2874 0.3461 0.3674 0.4664 0.2845
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Kid-16-Fmly is the presence of children under the age of 16 in family.
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Table 4.12: Occupational Panel Regression on the Changes in the Part-
Time Glass Ceiling by Occupational Levels
Top Middle Bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.3623∗∗∗ −0.1216 0.1222∗∗∗ 0.2887∗ 0.0065 −0.0381
(0.0422) (0.1075) (0.0263) (0.1123) (0.0399) (0.1005)
Full-time −0.1549 0.1037 −0.3072∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.4706∗∗∗ −0.1140
(0.0967) (0.1209) (0.0588) (0.1005) (0.0622) (0.0993)
Public −0.1119∗∗∗ −0.0789 0.0407 0.1569∗∗ 0.0064 −0.1270
(0.0316) (0.0680) (0.0333) (0.0604) (0.0482) (0.0839)
Age50s is omitted
Age 40s −0.0415 0.6001∗∗∗ 0.0601 0.0991 0.8320∗∗∗ 0.3374∗
(0.1557) (0.1586) (0.1932) (0.1774) (0.1469) (0.1465)
Age 30s 0.8449∗∗∗ 0.9556∗∗∗ 0.5951∗∗∗ 0.3043 0.7360∗∗∗ 0.1477
(0.1400) (0.1562) (0.1626) (0.1676) (0.1385) (0.1570)
Age 20s 0.1836 0.3809∗ 0.3872∗∗ 0.1262 0.6269∗∗∗ 0.0723
(0.1298) (0.1646) (0.1326) (0.1482) (0.1060) (0.1308)
Age 10s 0.0077 0.3594 0.1210 −0.0417 0.2431 0.0217
(0.4601) (0.4290) (0.1790) (0.1822) (0.1683) (0.1820)
Work London −0.3713∗∗ −0.1692 −0.2227 0.4540 0.1952 0.3886∗
(0.1213) (0.1278) (0.2662) (0.2416) (0.1617) (0.1681)
Degree 0.1686∗∗∗ −0.0443 −0.1163 0.0474 0.0311 −0.0349
(0.0335) (0.0656) (0.1319) (0.1247) (0.1365) (0.1485)
Married 0.0286 0.0234 0.0015 0.0383 −0.0087 −0.0373
(0.0353) (0.0313) (0.0376) (0.0319) (0.0378) (0.0335)
Kid-16-Fmly 0.0585 −0.0548 −0.1251 −0.1165 0.1292∗ 0.0753
(0.0756) (0.0727) (0.0671) (0.0607) (0.0593) (0.0551)
1983-1990 is omitted
1991− 1997 0.0365 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0324 0.0585∗∗ 0.1068∗∗∗ 0.1167∗∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0230) (0.0200) (0.0252) (0.0231)
1998− 2004 0.0814∗∗∗ 0.1784∗∗∗ 0.1561∗∗∗ 0.1987∗∗∗ 0.1811∗∗∗ 0.2069∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0278) (0.0245) (0.0225) (0.0263) (0.0249)
2005− 2011 0.1284∗∗∗ 0.2457∗∗∗ 0.2930∗∗∗ 0.2776∗∗∗ 0.2527∗∗∗ 0.2667∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0342) (0.0259) (0.0244) (0.0258) (0.0248)
Constant 0.2717 −0.0011 0.3999∗∗∗ 0.1548 0.1307 0.3450∗∗
(0.1446) (0.1631) (0.1186) (0.1405) (0.1092) (0.1192)
FE(Occupation) No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 767 767 717 717 607 607
R2 0.3452 0.3153 0.3837 0.3841 0.3584 0.3005
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Kid-16-Fmly is the presence of children under the age of 16 in family.
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Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation
ASHE/NES
Age 50s 2781 0.17 0.09
Age 40s 2781 0.24 0.09
Age 30s 2781 0.25 0.09
Age 20s 2781 0.28 0.13
Age 10s 2781 0.05 0.07
Full-time 2781 0.76 0.17
Part-time 2781 0.24 0.17
Public 2781 0.30 0.30
Private 2781 0.70 0.30
Work London 2781 0.04 0.05
Female 2781 0.35 0.29
Managers 2776 0.12 0.32
Professional 2776 0.12 0.32
Technical 2776 0.13 0.33
Clerical 2776 0.11 0.31
Craft 2776 0.13 0.34
Personal Service 2776 0.11 0.31
Sales 2776 0.07 0.25
Machine Operatives 2776 0.13 0.34
Other 2776 0.09 0.28
LFS
Degree 2299 0.16 0.21
Single 2304 0.39 0.18
Married 2304 0.43 0.24
Kids 2160 0.35 0.12
Source: New Earnings Survey (NES) / Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)
(2013); Labour Force Survey(LFS); and authors calculations
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Table 4.14: Definition of 2-digit SOC90 Occupational Classification
Major Group 1 Managers and Administrators
10 General Managers and Administrators in National and
Local Government, Large Companies and Organisations
11 Production Managers in Manufacturing,
Construction, Mining and Energy Industries
12 Specialist Managers
13 Financial Institution and Office Managers,
Civil Service Executive Officers
14 Managers in Transport and Storing
15 Protective Service Officers
16 Managers in Farming, Horticulture, Forestry and Fishing
17 Managers and Proprietors in Service Industries
19 Managers and Administrators N.E.C.
Major Group 2 Professional Occupations
20 Natural Scientists
21 Engineers and Technologists
22 Health Professionals
23 Teaching Professionals
24 Legal Professionals
25 Business and Financial Professionals
26 Architects, Town Planners and Surveyors
27 Librarians and Related Professionals
29 Professional Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 3 Associate Professional and Technical Occupations
30 Scientific Technicians
31 Draughtspersons, Quantity and Other Surveyors
32 Computer Analyst/Programmers
33 Ship and Aircraft Officers, Air Traffic Planners and Controllers
34 Health Associate Professionals
35 Legal Associate Professionals
36 Business and Financial Associate Professionals
37 Social Welfare Associate Professionals
38 Literary, Artistic and Sports Professionals
39 Associate Professional and Technical Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 4 Clerical and Secretarial Occupations
40 Administrative/Clerical Officers and Assistants
in Civil Service and Local Government
41 Numerical Clerks and Cashiers
42 Filing and Records Clerks
43 Clerks (Not Otherwise Specified)
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Table 4.13: Continued
44 Stores and Despatch Clerks, Storekeepers
45 Secretaries, Personal Assistants, Typists, Word Processor Operators
46 Receptionists, Telephonists and Related Occupations
49 Clerical and Secretarial Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 5 Craft and Related Occupations
50 Construction Trades
51 Metal Machining, Fitting and Instrument Making Trades
52 Electrical/Electronic Trades
53 Metal Forming, Welding and Related Trades
54 Vehicle Trades
55 Textiles, Garments and Related Trades
56 Printing and Related Trades
57 Woodworking Trades
58 Food Preparation Trades
59 Other Craft and Related Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 6 Personal and Protective Service Occupations
61 Security and Protective Service Occupations
62 Catering Occupations
63 Travel Attendants and Related Occupations
64 Health and Related Occupations
65 Childcare and Related Occupations
66 Hairdressers, Beauticians and Related Occupations
67 Domestic Staff and Related Occupations
69 Personal and Protective Service Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 7 Sales Occupations
70 Buyers, Brokers and Related Agents
71 Sales Representatives
72 Sales Assistants and Check-Out Operators
73 Mobile, Market and Door-To-Door Salespersons and Agents
79 Sales Occupations N.E.C.
Major Group 8 Plant and Machine Operatives
80 Food, Drink and Tobacco Process Operatives
81 Textiles and Tannery Process Operatives
82 Chemicals, Paper, Plastics and Related Process Operatives
83 Metal Making and Treating Process Operatives
84 Metal Working Process Operatives
85 Assemblers/Lineworkers
86 Other Routine Process Operatives
87 Road Transport Operatives
88 Other Transport and Machinery Operatives
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Table 4.13: Continued
89 Plant and Machine Operatives N.E.C.
Major Group 9 Other Occupations
90 Other Occupations in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
91 Other Occupations in Mining and Manufacturing
92 Other Occupations in Construction
93 Other Occupations in Transport
94 Other Occupations in Communication
95 Other Occupations in Sales and Services
99 Other Occupations N.E.C.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Empirical Findings
5.1.1 Chapter 2
The first empirical study of this thesis conducted two stages of analysis. Firstly,
it aimed to investigate the variation in the magnitude of the estimated gender ‘dis-
crimination’ in relation to the settings of the estimated wage models across dif-
ferent empirical papers and a broad range of countries; and secondly, the impact
on such variation of trade globalisation and cultural differences was examined. A
set of meta-data for 1963 − 2007 was constructed, followed by the estimations us-
ing meta-regression analysis (MRA). The results found in the first empirical study
of this thesis indicate that the variations in the estimated gender wage residual
are strongly influenced by the type of data set (the sample) used and the control
variables included in the estimated models. Studies concentrating on a sample of
new entrants in the labour market, non-married individuals, the public sector, a
specific occupation, and high-prestige occupations produce lower gender wage resid-
uals, whereas the reverse holds true for those focusing on married women and the
private sector. This implies that there are some more unobserved characteristics
in these two segments driving the lower female relative pay, which might be the
attitudes towards careers of married women, the relatively looser equal pay policy
enforcement in the private sector compared to the public sector, or discrimination
against married women in the labour market. Moreover, including a measure of
potential experience increases the unexplained portion of the gender pay gap by
around 3 percentage points, while the omission of real experience, marital status,
and the presence of children are associated with a smaller unexplained gap. This
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suggests that estimating models including less precise measures of labour market
attachment are likely to overstate the magnitude of gender wage residual, and this
magnitude decreases if the models include fewer characteristics in relation to female
disadvantages.
In terms of trade globalisation, it is found that greater openness in general de-
creases the international gender wage differential overall, where a one percent in-
crease in trade will decrease the differential by about one to two percentage points.
However, different patterns are discovered across different income levels and devel-
opment categories. Trade openness reduces the gender gap for countries in high
and low income categories, with some weak evidence that the trade effect is much
stronger in low income, and developing countries. By contrast, the introduction of
trade significantly increases the unexplained portion of the gender wage differential
in lower-middle income groups, where a one percent rise in the share of international
trade increases the differential by 5 to over 7 percentage points. This indicates that
trade liberalisation together with the diffusion of technology decreases the relative
demand and wages for unskilled workers, where the majority of women might be
found in this group of countries, which hence leads to a higher wage inequality.
The results also indicate that changes in the economic structure moving towards
the service sectors benefited women in terms of their wages. As women may have a
comparative advantage in the service sectors, even in unskilled nursing or servicing
jobs, but a disadvantage in the labour-intensive agriculture and male-dominated
manufacturing sectors, the expansion of the service sectors results in an increased
demand and thus wages for female labour and in a lower gender pay gap.
Furthermore, this study has analysed the impact of the development of social
openness, by using the share of women in national parliaments as a proxy, and
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social conventions on female relative wages. The results suggest that more women
in national parliaments in general decreases the gender wage differential, yet different
patterns have been found across different cultural backgrounds. An increase in the
share of female politicians in Protestant countries significantly decreases the gender
differential, while the reverse holds true for the Communist, Confucianism, Muslim,
and Mixed countries. As for different income level categories, a higher share of female
politicians does not seem to have much impact on the narrowing gender wage gap
in higher income categories, while such effects are found to be much stronger in the
low income countries.
5.1.2 Chapter 3
Along with the integration of the world economy, the development of eco-
nomic structure, and the spread of technology, the supply of and the demand for
labour have inevitably changed, which is reflected in the changes in female relative
labour market outcomes in both employment and wages, and the results presented
in Chapter 2 of this thesis somewhat confirm this point. The analysis in the second
empirical (Chapter 3) within this thesis demonstrates the impact of the development
of technology on the changes in demand for male and female workers at different skill
levels in primary (regular) and subordinate (non-regular) labour market segments in
Japan, using two aggregate level data sets from Japan’s Employment Status Survey
and EU KLEMS over the period 1987 − 2007. The results of this analysis indicate
that the total gender employment gap in Japan has fallen considerably by almost
12 percentage points in favour of female workers in the period 1987 − 2007, as a
consequence of a series of Japanese and Asian crises and structural changes. Most
of the aggregate changes in employment are observed between sectors, as well as be-
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ing due to the fast growth of non-regular employment for women, but not for men.
Moreover, the gender gap in regular employment increased within sectors during the
recession between 1992 and 2002, with an increased demand to hire men as regular
workers and women as non-regular workers, which implies that women losing regular
jobs is more likely because of their relatively lower human capital accumulation −
as the skilled female labour supply can not keep up with the demand alongside the
development of technology.
However, better education attainment does not seem to improve gender parity
in Japan in terms of employment, moving men into regular jobs whereas the reverse
is observed in the case of women. The results in addition suggest that firms that
have higher proportions of higher waged workers (e.g. female university graduates
and prime aged men) tend to increase (decrease) the share of non-regular (regular)
employment to reduce their labour costs. With respect to the impact of technical
changes, it is found that industry ICT intensity increases male regular employment
in higher-skilled and least-skilled jobs and decreases middle-skilled jobs. However,
technical change only increases the relative demand for female regular employment
in lower-skilled sales jobs, and it seems to be pushing most women into non-regular
jobs. These findings are in line with the general idea of task-biased technical change
(TBTC) with a suggestion of gender bias in the rising relative demand for non-
routine jobs at the top and the bottom of the skill distribution following an increase
in ICT intensity.
5.1.3 Chapter 4
The findings in Chapter 3 of this thesis highlight that the correlation between
higher female human capital accumulation and female labour market outcomes does
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not seem necessarily to be positive. Therefore, the third empirical study (Chapter
4) provides some understanding of how the labour market outcomes of top ranking
female workers, whose wages are in the top decile of the female wage distribution and
who are usually higher skilled than the average woman, have been changing over their
lifetime and across different generations within different labour market sectors and
occupations, using the UK as an example. The analysis drew upon two datasets, the
New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the
Labour Force Surveys, between 1975 and 2011. The results indicate that although
the gender wage gap at both the mean and the top of the wage distribution has
been decreasing over time, it remains large. A top-ranking woman fares better in
professional and technical occupations, but worse in low-level male-dominated jobs
and the top management jobs, compared to other occupations. Of these, if there
are more women hired in the high level occupations, top female relative pay will
increase significantly, reflecting the fact that more women moving up to the highest
level occupations will lift the glass ceiling. However, an increase in the share of
women in clerical occupations is associated with lower female relative pay at the top
of the wage distribution, which is consistent with the empirical evidence that the
majority of lower level jobs in the female-dominated occupations have been held by
women (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Lindley, 2011).
In terms of female relative pay over their lifetime and across generations, very
different patterns are observed between the public and the private sectors. Gender
wage differentials in the public sector in general have been relatively lower and
relatively stable throughout working lives and across different generations, while
it has been seen that top female wages relative to men have caught up more in
the private sector after the pay was significantly lower for the older generation.
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Further analysis on this point suggests that the relative wage for a high-earning
individual woman is now higher in the private sector than if she works in the public
sector. Besides, although a majority of top ranking women have benefited from a
higher share of female employment in the public sector, it does not seem to hold
true for those highest status women, who have engaged in the top-level occupations
and whose wages are in the top decile of the distribution. A younger age and better
education are found to have a positive impact on women’s wages, whereas the effects
of family status are quite weak with limited evidence suggesting the effect of the
presence of children to be negative. Moreover, the results indicate that women as
a whole will be better off when a higher proportion of them work full-time, yet an
individual highest female earner may maximise her own utility by choosing to work
part-time due possibly to family commitments.
5.1.4 Overall Summary
In summary, economic integration via international trade, the development
of economic structure, and the spread of technology all play important roles in
explaining the variations in female relative labour market outcomes, although they
do not benefit all women. Trade openness in general reduces the gender gap across
all income levels, except those classified as lower-middle income countries. The
development of technology with a rising demand for skilled workers increases the
gender wage gap in the middle income countries, and pushes the majority of women
into bad/non-regular jobs in Japan. Conflicting evidence is observed in terms of
female employment in the higher skilled occupations, a larger share of women hired in
these jobs being associated with an increase in the top female relative pay in Britain,
yet the opposite story is found for Japanese women in general. Although working
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in the public sector benefits women on average in terms of their wages, it does not
seem to hold true for the highest status women whose pay is at the top decile of the
wage distribution as the findings for the UK suggested. Contrary to popular belief,
better investment in education does not necessarily lead to more gender parity in the
labour market, as a higher share of well-educated women in Japan is associated with
a higher share of women in the bad/non-regular jobs. Furthermore, it seems that
more women involved in national parliament in the relatively conservative countries
does not help improve gender equality in their labour market.
5.2 Implications of Findings
5.2.1 Implications of the Development of the World Economy and Tech-
nology
As outlined in the introduction to the thesis, the effects of increasing globalisa-
tion and the diffusion of technology are not independent. Globalisation has assisted
the diffusion of the use of technology, and technological development has assisted
the intensification of trade and financial connections between countries, therefore
changing the structure of the labour market and the compensations of workers. In
general, trade openness together with technical change would lead to a rising rela-
tive demand for skilled workers internationally (skill-biased technical change), as a
consequence of a shift in intermediate inputs, which are relatively high skill-intensive
goods from a developing country’s point of view, from developed to developing coun-
tries, and an improvement of skill in developed countries to reduce the future threat
of imitation, resulting in a rising wage inequality in such countries. This thesis has
analysed the impact of trade openness on the gender wage inequality across different
income levels and status of development. The findings in this thesis suggest that
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the effect of trade openness is positively associated with the narrowing of gender
pay differentials in the higher and the low income countries, yet such an effect is
found to be very weak in the high income and advanced countries, which may imply
that the variations in female relative pay in these countries are more subject to the
pressure within the countries or to female labour force characteristics. By contrast,
the introduction of trade is found to have a greater impact on increasing the gender
wage residual in the lower-middles income countries, which is in line with existing
empirical evidence (Davis, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Berman and Machin,
2000, 2004; Acemoglu, 2003; Xu, 2003; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2007; Conte
and Vivarelli, 2007) that middle income countries are facing the contraction of both
high and low skill intensity sectors as a result of trade liberalisation together with
the diffusion of technology, which leads to a lower relative demand and wages for
unskilled workers as well as a higher wage inequality. If the majority of women in
those lower-middle countries are less well educated, who are very likely to be shunted
into the lower paid, unskilled jobs, and if the female labour supply has not been able
to keep up with the relative demand for skilled workers in those countries, a larger
gender pay gap will hence be the inevitable result.
However, the argument of skill-biased technical change does not seem to be valid
within the developed countries (Autor et al., 2003; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2006,
2010; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; Lindley, 2011), and a more nu-
anced concept of tasked-biased technical change is hence developed, where technol-
ogy has replaced the middle-skilled routine tasks, and increased the relative demand
for well-paid skilled jobs and low-paid least skilled jobs. In the case of Japan, the
results found in this thesis indicate that the effect of technical change on changes in
Japan’s employment structure do not seem strong, which might possibly be due to
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their strict workforce regulation limiting the quantitative effects of technical devel-
opment as Michaels et al. (2009) have suggested. However, some strong evidence
was found in Chapter 3 that the introduction of technology has put the majority of
Japanese women in a worse situation in their labour market. A rising ICT intensity
has a great effect on moving women into regular jobs in sectors that hire a larger
share of unskilled sales/service workers, while strongly moving professional women
out of regular into non-regular employment. It implies that there is possibly a gender
bias in ICT usage within higher skilled jobs as a larger proportion of women might
be engaged in less complex computer tasks than men, and those tasks are more
easily substituted by advanced technology/computers and non-regular workers.
5.2.2 Labour Market Implications
The standard human capital model predicts that investments in human capital,
such as formal education or on-the-job training, can promote labour productivity
and hence accelerate the growth of income (Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1961; Becker,
1964). Thus, if more women have better educational attainment, a lower gender
wage differential could be expected. However, the analysis in this thesis found this
may not always be true. The findings in this thesis indicate that better education
attainment does increase the relative wages for the top ranking British women and
help the Japanese men move into good/regular jobs, yet a higher proportion of well-
educated women in the Japanese labour market seems to push themselves and other
women into the bad/non-regular jobs. It may imply that the majority of women
in Japan have engaged in subordinate tasks regardless of whether they have high
working skills or if they have graduated from elite universities, due to the strong
social convention of gender division, and hence they are more likely to be dismissed
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during the downturn and be substituted by advanced technology/computers. It may
also imply that, owing to the specific structure of the Japanese labour market, firms
tend to provide fewer regular positions if there are more expensive workers hired;
in other words, these higher-skilled higher-waged women occupy the good pay slots
and hence reduce the opportunities for other less-skilled women being hired in good
jobs.
The occupation and the task in which a woman is engaged strongly determine
her relative wage. Due partly to the lower gender differentials in human capital
accumulation, women in higher level jobs usually fare more equally relative to their
male counterparts, compared to women in lower level jobs. Besides, a greater share
of women in higher positions will likely improve the gender parity in labour market
outcomes, as they may benefit other women by being role models or being less
gender biased during the hiring process (Matsa and Miller, 2011; Elkinawy and
Stater, 2011). Conflicting evidence for this is observed in this thesis.
The results in Chapter 2 indicate that, across a broad range of countries, the
unexplained portion of the gender pay gap is significantly narrower if the estimated
wage models only focus on the higher-prestige occupations, implying there are fewer
unobserved factors driving the gap within these occupations. It is found to be
partly true in the case of the UK, where the raw female relative wages at both the
mean and the top end of the wage distribution are much higher in the professional
occupations but significantly lower in the top managerial jobs. Besides, the results
from further analysis indicate that an individual female top earner who undertakes
a top manager’s role is more likely to face a wage barrier than if she works in other
jobs. Yet it is also found that if the share of women in the higher level occupations
increases, the wage for top ranking women will be improved. It implies that although
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the gender pay differential in the very top managerial jobs is significantly large, if
there are more women able to move into the highest jobs, more equal pay between
genders can be expected.
However, a different story is found in Japan, where the results from Chapter 3
indicate that the greater the proportion of women engaged in the higher occupa-
tions, then a greater proportion of women will be moved from regular to non-regular
employment. This is again very likely because firms are not able to afford more
higher-waged regular jobs if there is already a large number of expensive employees,
and this seems to also hold true in the case of Japanese male employment. Hence,
the findings in this thesis somewhat imply that the differences between countries,
culture, and labour market structure are playing a very important role in the vari-
ations of labour market outcomes in particular for the top-level jobs.
Many empirical studies have demonstrated that women hired in the public sector
are more likely to be paid similar to men, due to the more intensive enforcement
of gender-specific policies together with the specific wage-setting mechanisms (Kee,
2006; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010). The findings from the first empirical study
in this thesis have confirmed this point, that the international gender pay residual
on average is significantly lower in the public sector. However, a more complex
pattern is found in the case of the UK. The results from Chapter 4 indicate that the
gender gap in the public sector at both the mean and at the top end of the wage
distribution has been significantly lower and constant over time, across generations
and over workers’ lifetimes. Female relative pay was significantly lower for the older
generations, and the falls during the child bearing age have been pronounced across
all birth cohorts, in the private sector. However, this sector has seen a significant
catch up for the top female wages relative to men across generations, decreasing the
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difference in the differentials between sectors.
The evidence from further analysis reveals that an individual top female earner
is now rewarded better in the private than in the public sector, and that a higher
share of women hired in the top-level occupations in the public sector is negatively
associated with the top female relative wage. It implies that the highest paid British
women working in the public sector suffer from being unable to move up to the
very top occupations, which hence affects their relative wages. It also implies that
although gender equality-related policies do benefit the majority of women in the
UK, they have less impact for the women who have engaged in the highest positions
in the public sector.
Furthermore, although women’s pay penalties due to moving from full-time to
part-time jobs have been extensively discussed (Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Man-
ning, 2006; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008), the existence of such a penalty does not
seem to be always the case. The findings from the cross-country analysis (Chapter
2) and from the UK (Chapter 4) do suggest that a majority of women will be better
off under full-time employment as well as when a higher proportion of them are
working full-time. However, some evidence from the UK also suggests that being
part-time employed does not hurt the wage for an individual top-ranking woman. It
implies that, for those high-earning women, part-time work is a choice as they are
more able to afford to change to part-time work, in order to spend more time with
their family.
5.2.3 Implications of Institutional and Cultural Constraints
Previous research has indicated that the enactment of gender equality and
family friendly policies will have positive implications on female relative labour
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market outcomes (Kee, 2006; Manning, 2006; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010; World
Economic Forum, 2013). The findings in this thesis have somewhat confirmed this
argument. The majority of women do benefit from the positive impact of gender-
specific policies, especially for those working in the public sector compared to the
private sector, and for the old generations alongside a significant wage growth over
time.
However, it is also found from the UK case (Chapter 4) that the effects on the
current generations are significantly weaker, which implies that the cause of the
slow progress of women in the current generation is more subtle and difficult to be
influenced directly by policy. Furthermore, it has been observed that the women
in the top-level occupations in the public sector seem to face more difficulties to
improve their career status. This may be due possibly to the negative implications
of stringently enforced use of policies (Gupta et al., 2006) on the working mothers
as they may take a longer time out of labour force, which is found more harmful for
the women at higher position than others (Gupta et al., 2006; Swaffield, 2007). It
also suggests that the current gender related policies focus on the average woman,
but seem to ignore the benefit of the top ranking women, perhaps as they might be
thought not to have such needs. Yet the findings imply that to help women break
the glass ceilings a more effective policy is required.
The effects of cultural differences on the variations of female relative labour
market outcomes have been found to be significant, even if such effects are difficult
to quantify. The findings in the first empirical study suggest that although the
development of social openness is in general positively associated with gender pay
parity, it seems rather unlikely to happen in the relatively conservative countries. Of
these, Japan and South Korea, which are strongly influenced by Confucianism, have
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often been pointed out as having an unfriendly work environment against women,
regardless that they are classified as developed and advanced for a long period
of time. It implies that although these countries have been through a significant
development of their economy, their societal development has changed more slowly.
In Japan’s patriarchal social system, the young are dominated by the old, and
the subordinate roles of women can be clearly seen from the second empirical study
in this thesis. With a large share of good/regular jobs occupied by the old, young
Japanese workers, both men and women, have found difficulty moving into this
domain. Gender differentials in Higher Education investment are also significant,
due possibly to the influence of the social norms that women should focus on their
household responsibility rather than their career, and of the strong gender stereo-
type coupled with occupational segregation (Becker, 1985). Women may have less
incentive to invest in education, when they realise that a great amount of higher
educated women are unable to break out the trap nor improve their working sta-
tus. These results imply that social conventions have a great impact of women’s
performance in the labour market throughout different dimensions.
5.2.4 Summary of Implications
In summary, the results found in this thesis indicate that the variation of fe-
male relative labour market outcomes has been driven strongly by both economical
and sociological channels. Although the development of the world economy and
technology following the expansion of the service sector has created vast job oppor-
tunities, these seem not to be distributed equally between men and women. That is,
the findings in this thesis tend to suggest that, when the global economy increases
the relative demand for both lower and higher status jobs and gives rewards biased
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toward skilled workers, where female supply has failed to keep up with the demand
for the latter, a persistently high gender wage differential is the inevitable result.
However, things may not go as well as expected, even when female supply in
higher skilled workers is growing. At least, it is not the case for Japan, where many
women seem to pay the penalties, rather than gain the bonus, for the rising share of
higher skilled women in the labour market. Besides, there may be more difficulties
out there for those women who are engaged in top-level jobs. In the case of the
UK, the gender wage gap at the higher end of the wage distribution is significantly
large, and women suffer from being unable to climb up to better positions especially
in the top managerial jobs and in the public sector where gender policies are more
stringently enforced.
What has made these higher skilled women be in an unfavourable situation and
kept them from reaching the top is subtle, with societal constraints and ineffective
policies maybe having played some roles. The results in this thesis seem to imply
that although a more stringent enforcement of gender policies can ensure women are
paid more equally, it has also limited their wage growth. It is additionally suggested
that the government may need to think about whether they are actually aiming at
the right target to improve female relative labour market outcomes. Furthermore,
cultural changes in attitude towards women’s role are needed. Instead of only asking
women themselves to be more work oriented to promote their status in the labour
market, perhaps men could also think about being more home oriented.
5.3 Limitations of Thesis
The aim of the first empirical analysis (Chapter 2) in this thesis is to investigate
the variations of gender ‘discrimination’ across a broad range of countries over the
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period of 1963 − 2007, and how much these variations can be explained by trade
liberalisation and cultural differences. The limitation of this chapter is from using
meta-regression analysis (MRA), which relies on published papers, resulting in the
sample being biased towards English speaking countries in particular to the US and
towards high income countries. The analysis adopts a weighting scheme to cope
with the issue of the lack of independence of the estimates as there are some data
points conducted by the same study. Some of the estimates are quite weak and
inconsistent, hence the interpretation of the results focuses solely on those that are
significant and consistent across all specifications.
The sample being biased towards high income countries has also caused some
concerns for the examination of trade and social openness, as the results might be
weaker or less relevant for other countries. This disadvantage is especially explicit
for the estimation of social openness into many different cultural dimensions. Fur-
thermore, different measures for trade openness have been considered through the
process of estimation in this chapter, as it has been suggested that the measure of
the ratio of trade to GDP may reflect a wide range of factors other than trade glob-
alisation (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). The measure of average tariff rates should also
be considered. However, the availability of tariffs data is very imperfect, only 1988
onwards data is available with many data points missing, especially for developing
countries. This makes the analysis unable to identify the effect of trade openness
across different income levels, and hence this measure is finally not included.
The aim of the second empirical study (Chapter 3) within this thesis is to explore
the changes in the Japanese gender employment differential together with the devel-
opment of technology. The limitation of this chapter is the use of aggregated data.
The results can only predict overall changes in regular and non-regular employment
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within or between sectors without a clear pattern about individuals’ characteristics.
For instance, it is found that a higher proportion of female university graduates and
professional workers within sectors increases female non-regular employment. Yet it
is not clear whether better education does push these women into bad jobs or their
existence makes other female workers struggle. It is also not known about individ-
uals’ computer skills coupled with the tasks in which they are engaged, which is an
important factor in the analysis of technical change.
The third empirical study (Chapter 4) in this thesis uses cohort analysis to ex-
amine how the UK gender gap at the top end of the wage distribution has evolved
with respect to different labour market sectors, occupations, and different cohort
groups, both within cohorts over their lifetime, and across cohorts. This methodol-
ogy suffers from a linear dependency between age, period and cohort effects, where
cohort = period-age. Hence, the analysis in this chapter adopts a commonly used
strategy, that is, to omit one additional dummy variable of a specific group, assum-
ing the two dismissed dummies have equivalent behaviour. Considering this point,
a rich graphical analysis is conducted across different dimensions to guide possible
direction of the changing patterns in the data and help interpret the results from
statistical models.
As the primary data source, the New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) suffers from its lack of demographic information, the
results are unable to identify how a top-ranking female individual’s educational level
and marital status would affect her wage relative to men. The successive Labour
Force Surveys are employed as a supplement with the demographic data for the
occupation-level panel analysis. However, the estimates for family status from this
analysis are very weak. Besides, there is a lack of part-time workers’ information in
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particular for males, leading to a lower reliance on the part-time wage comparison
between genders.
5.4 Implications for Further Research
The results from the first empirical study (Chapter 2) in this thesis suggest that
although the situations in individual countries vary, there are some common char-
acteristics that can explain the general pattern of gender wage differentials across
a broad range of countries at different levels of development. Further work needs
to be done to explore the gender pay gap across different regional and sectoral
dimensions and its association with globalisation, together with the situations of
individual countries in relation to the structure of their economy. The findings in
this chapter underscore the importance of international comparisons to understand
more detail about the impact on female relative labour market outcomes of the im-
ports and exports of skilled- and unskilled- intensive sectors, and tariffs on different
commodities.
The results found in Chapter 3 suggest that further work needs to be done
to indentify the returns to productivity characteristics for individual women and
young workers in Japan. It is interesting to understand, apart from the fact that
the vacancies of good/regular jobs have been occupied by the older men together
with strong sexism in the labour market, what other factors have driven women
and young workers being unable to enter the regular labour market. Although there
have been many articles discussing about the work-life decisions that women make
with a small sample of fieldwork (Haworth, 2013; Hewlett, 2013; Wingfield-Hayes,
2013), a more comprehensive survey on women’s attitude towards work and family
is also needed.
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The findings in the third empirical study (Chapter 4) indicate that further work
needs to be done to understand the outcomes of top-ranking male part-timers and
their relationship to female workers in particular in the public sector. The empirical
evidence has been largely silent on this point but focused solely on female part-time
workers. If it is true there is a larger number of extremely high paid jobs particularly
held by men in the public sector, this will be a very interesting dimension to explore
in terms of understanding the lower outcomes of female workers. Moreover, it is
found that there is a very different pattern for the variation of top female relative
wages between the public and the private sectors, and so further work needs to be
done to investigate top-ranking women’s performance in these sectors separately.
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